The People Of The State Of Colo. v. Wylie
| Decision Date | 02 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | Fremont County District Court No. 05CR526,Fremont County District Court No. 05CR417,Fremont County District Court No. 06CR260,Court of Appeals No. 07CA2324 |
| Parties | The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Wylie, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Opinion by JUDGE TERRY
OPINION is modified as follows:
Page 3, lines 4-9 currently read:
A defendant is insane for purposes of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition if the defendant "suffered from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or defect that prevented the [defendant] from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of a crime charged."
Opinion now reads:
A defendant is insane for purposes of the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity if the defendant "suffered from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or defect that prevented the [defendant] from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of a crime charged."
Page 3, lines 10-14 currently read:
Even where evidence of a defendant's mental slowness does not reach the threshold requirements of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition, the defendant may still introduce such evidence to factually counter or contest whether the defendant formed the requisite mental state.
Opinion now reads:
Even where evidence of a defendant's mental slowness does not reach the threshold requirements of the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant may still introduce such evidence to factually counter or contest whether the defendant formed the requisite mental state.
Page 5, lines 12-22 currently read:
If you conclude [defendant] suffered from a mental illness but conclude that the mental illness suffered by [defendant] does not meet the requirements of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition, you may still consider his mental illness as relevant evidence as to whether he formed the culpable mental state of the crimes charged.
We conclude this instruction was cumulative to those that were given, and that those instructions accurately informed the jury of the governing law.
Opinion now reads:
If you conclude [defendant] suffered from a mental illness but conclude that the mental illness suffered by [defendant] does not meet the requirements of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition, you may still consider his mental illness as relevant evidenceas to whether he formed the culpable mental state of the crimes charged.
We note that this defense should have been referred to as "the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity," and not as "the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition." See People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 778 n.2 (Colo. 2005) (); see also § 16-8-101.3, C.R.S. 2010.
In any event, we conclude this instruction was cumulative to those that were given, and that those instructions accurately informed the jury of the governing law.
Defendant, James Wylie, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of four counts of second degree assault. He also appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court. We affirm.
On three separate occasions while incarcerated at the Colorado State Penitentiary, defendant assaulted correctional officers using feces and urine. During two of the assaults, defendant threw urine and feces at the officers and, during the third assault, defendant sprayed the officers with a mixture of urine, feces, and water. Defendant was charged with four counts of second degree assault-in custody-bodily fluids under section 18-3-203(1)(f.5), C.R.S. 2009.
Defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity under section 16-8-101.5(1)(b), C.R.S. 2009. Following trial, a jury rejected that defense and found him guilty of four counts of assault. He was sentenced to four consecutive ten-year prison terms to be served consecutively to the sentence he was serving at the time of the assaults.
At trial, defendant argued that he did not have the culpable mental state required by section 18-3-203(1)(f.5) at the time of the attacks due to his impaired mental condition. He now contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his tendered jury instruction, which stated that the jury could consider evidence of his mental illness to determine whether he actually had the requisite culpable mental state for assault at the time of the attacks. We disagree with his contention on appeal.
We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether the instructions as a whole adequately informed the jury of the governing law. People v. Whittiker, 181 P.3d 264, 276 (Colo. App. 2006). We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's decision to provide the jury with additional written instructions that properly state the law and fairly cover issues presented at trial. People v. Renfro, 117 P.3d 43, 48 (Colo. App. 2004). On appeal, we must read the instructions as a whole, and must presume that the jurors understood and followed them, absent evidence to the contrary. People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 697 (Colo. 1984); People v. Asberry, 172 P.3d 927, 933 (Colo. App. 2007).
A defendant cannot be held criminally responsible for his or her actions if a mental illness or insanity at the time of the crime prevented formation of the requisite culpable mental state. Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390-92 (Colo. 1982). A defendant is insane for purposes of the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity if the defendant "suffered from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or defect that prevented the [defendant] from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of a crime charged." § 16-8-101.5(1)(b), C.R.S. 2009. Even where evidence of a defendant's mental slowness does not reach the threshold requirements of the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant may still introduce such evidence to factually counter or contest whether the defendant formed the requisite mental state. People v. Vanrees, 125 P.3d 403, 405 (Colo. 2005).
The assault statute, under which defendant was convicted, states:
A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if:... [w]hile lawfully confined in a detention facility within this state, a person with intent to infect, injure, harm, harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm a person in a detention facility whom the actor knows orreasonably should know to be an employee of a detention facility, causes such employee to come into contact with... urine [or] feces... by any means, including but not limited to throwing, tossing, or expelling such fluid or material.
§ 18-3-203(1)(f.5)(I), C.R.S. 2009.
Looking, as we must, at the jury instructions as a whole, we see that the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Defendant's proposed instruction stated:
If you conclude [defendant] suffered from a mental illness but conclude that the mental illness suffered by [defendant] does not meet the requirements of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition, you may still consider his mental illness as relevant evidence as to whether he formed the culpable mental state of the crimes charged.
We note that this defense should have been referred to as "the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity," and not as "the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition." See People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 778 n.2 (Colo. 2005) (); see also § 16-8-101.3, C.R.S. 2010.
In any event, we conclude this instruction was cumulative to those that were given, and that those instructions accurately informed the jury of the governing law.
We are unpersuaded by defendant's citation to Vanrees. In that case, the trial court had given a jury instruction that essentially told the jury that an issue related to mens rea was "not an issue for [the jury's] consideration." 125 P.3d at 406. No such language appears in the instructions given here,...
To continue reading
Request your trial