The People v. Castellon

Citation91 Cal.Rptr.2d 204,76 Cal. App. 4th 1369
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Decision Date20 December 1999
Parties(Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1999) THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAVIER PONCE CASTELLON, Defendant and Appellant. G023144 Filed

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, James A. Stotler and Richard F. Toohey, Judges. Affirmed.

(Super. Ct. No. 95CF2733) O P I N I O N

Michael Ian Garey for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kyle Niki Shaffer and Angela K. Rosenau, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

SILLS, P. J.

Javier Ponce Castellon pled guilty to possession of heroin after his motions to suppress evidence and set aside the information were denied. On appeal, Castellon argues that the heroin found on his person should have been suppressed as the result of an illegal detention and search. We affirm.

FACTS

Officer John Hibbison was on patrol when he saw a car with expired tags pulling away from the curb. Hibbison turned on his overhead lights and the car immediately pulled over and stopped. As he exited his police car, he saw Castellon, a passenger in the stopped car, simultaneously start to get out. Hibbison recognized Castellon as a member of the Alley Boys gang with whom he had been "in contact" since 1990: He had once responded to a shooting that had occurred at Castellon's home at which Castellon was present but was not arrested; on another occasion Hibbison had conducted "a car stop where I had stopped him." Hibbison said he had never known Castellon to have a weapon on his person.

As Hibbison got out of his car, he told Castellon not to get out of the car. Castellon nonetheless exited the car, but stopped about three feet away from it. Hibbison could not recall if Castellon "just stopped or if I told him to stop." As Hibbison walked toward him from about 15 or 20 feet away, he asked Castellon if he had any weapons. Castellon responded that he did not. Hibbison then asked him if he had any narcotics on his person. He replied that he did not have any narcotics. Hibbison then asked if he could search him, and Castellon consented.1 In each of Castellon's front pockets, Hibbison found a $1 bill containing a residue substance that tested positive for heroin.

Hibbison testified that "[p]robably less than a minute" elapsed from the time Castellon opened his car door to the time he completed his search. He said his first words to Castellon as he approached were to ask him "if he had any weapons on him." He said his "concern was for my own safety, and that's why I asked him if he had any weapons on him."

The trial court hearing the motion to suppress found there was a legal detention of the car in which Castellon was a passenger, and the request to search for weapons and for consent to search "under the circumstances of this case, with this officer having specific knowledge that the defendant is an Alley Boy[s] gang member, [are] certainly justified." It found that "under the totality of circumstances" the search was "not illegal" and denied the motion. The trial court hearing the motion to set aside the information denied that motion without comment.

DISCUSSION I

Castellon first argues the initial stop of the car was unreasonable. The car was stopped on October 12, and the tags had expired at the end of September. Castellon does not dispute the tags had expired; rather, he argues that displaying tags with an expiration date 12 days prior to the date of the stop "is so meaningless as to provide no basis for a stop."

Vehicle Code section 4601 provides that vehicle registration shall be renewed prior to the expiration of the registration year. The tags on the license plate of the vehicle in which Castellon was a passenger indicated that vehicle's registration had not been properly renewed. Hibbison's stop of the vehicle was predicated upon probable cause that a Vehicle Code violation had occurred. Nothing more is required; the stop was proper. (See Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 810 ["As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."].)

Castellon complains that Hibbison failed to conduct any traffic investigation, and that his authority was limited to taking the time to inquire into the Vehicle Code violation and issue a citation. He argues Hibbison used the routine traffic stop as an excuse to investigate other matters. But that is not what happened here. At the point where Castellon failed to follow Hibbison's order to remain in the car and Hibbison became concerned for his safety, the stop ceased to be a routine traffic stop. As a result of Castellon's actions, Hibbison's initial focus shifted from a routine investigation of a Vehicle Code violation to officer safety.

II

Castellon next argues that even if the initial car stop was valid, the detention which occurred when Hibbison ordered him to remain in the car was unlawful because there was no evidence any crime had been committed or Castellon was connected to any criminal activity.

Our analysis begins with a determination as to whether Castellon was detained for Fourth Amendment purposes, and if so, at what point. Relying on People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, the Attorney General argues a passenger in a vehicle that was lawfully stopped is, like the driver, lawfully detained. Recently, in People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, this court rejected that approach. (Id. at p. 1369.) Citing Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, we concluded, "Passengers are not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment simply because they occupy a seat in a vehicle which a police officer stops for a violation of the Vehicle Code." (People v. Cartwright, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369.) In doing so, "[w]e respectfully disagree[d] with the courts in People v. Bell, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 754 and People v. Grant [(1990)] 217 Cal.App.3d 1451 to the extent they conclude passengers are detained from the inception of a traffic stop." (People v. Cartwright, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.) Accordingly, Castellon was not lawfully detained simply because the vehicle in which he was riding was stopped by Hibbison.

A person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officer's words would convey to a reasonable person that he or she is being ordered to stop, and the person complies with that order. (California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 628, 629.) After Hibbison told Castellon to remain in his car, Castellon exited the car, but then stopped about three feet from the car, apparently in response to Hibbison's order and approach. At the point where Castellon submitted to Hibbison's authority, he was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Having determined a seizure occurred, our inquiry turns to whether Hibbison's detention of Castellon was reasonable. "[T]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security, [citations omitted] and that reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. (Maryland v. Wilson, supra, 519 U.S. at p. 411, internal quotation marks omitted.) In holding that a police officer could order the passenger out of the vehicle during a routine traffic stop, the United States Supreme Court found officer safety to outweigh the minimal additional intrusion on the personal liberty of the passenger who is "already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle." (Id. at p. 414.)

Castellon attempts to distinguish Maryland v. Wilson, supra, 519 U.S. 408 on the ground that while a police officer may order a passenger to exit a vehicle for safety purposes, the officer may not order a passenger to stay in a vehicle without reasonable suspicion to detain him or her because the passenger is free to leave. We disagree; whether the passenger is ordered to stay in the car or exit the vehicle is a distinction without a difference. (See id. at p. 414 ["The only change in their circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car."].) Further, the inconvenience and intrusion are certainly less when the passenger is simply ordered to remain seated in the car than when he or she is ordered out of the vehicle. If the minimal additional intrusion on the personal liberty of the passenger ordered out of the vehicle cannot trump the safety of the officer, then surely the slight inconvenience of ordering the passenger to remain seated can be justified by an officer's concerns.

Here, Hibbison was the only officer present at the stop. He testified he saw Castellon, whom he recognized as a gang member, immediately begin to exit the car as Hibbison opened his car door. He said he immediately ordered Castellon to stay in the car and did so out of concern for his safety. Hibbison's subsequent actions lend support to this rationale. His two questions as he approached Castellon were whether he had any weapons or narcotics, both questions pertinent to officer safety. (See People v. Autry (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 365, 369 ["a contaminated hypodermic needle is one of the more deadly objects one can imagine outside of firearms"].) After Castellon gave negative responses to both questions, Hibbison asked to search him and Castellon gave his consent. This entire sequence of events transpired very quickly, in the space of less than one minute.

...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • People v. Bowen, A114061 (Cal. App. 7/2/2007)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • July 2, 2007
    ...intrusive measures were warranted by considerations of officer safety. (Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113, 117-118; People v. Castellon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375; People v. Hart (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 484; People v. Wilborn (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 339, 348.) The detention was not......
  • People v. Castellon
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 1999

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT