The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tubbs

• Decision Date: 20 August 2021
• Docket Number: 20-CV-233-JFH
• Parties: THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN JAMES TUBBS and C.M.P., a minor, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN JAMES TUBBS and C.M.P., a minor, Defendants.

No. 20-CV-233-JFH

United States District Court, E.D. Oklahoma

August 20, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHNVHEIL, III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the motion for default judgment and relief in interpleader, filed by Plaintiff The Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”). Dkt No. 18. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Prudential filed its complaint in interpleader on July 7, 2020. Dkt. No. 2. Prudential claims that it issued a group life insurance policy to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (the “Plan”). Dkt. No. 2 at 2; Dkt. No. 2-1. According to Prudential, Catrina J. Pope (“Pope”) was an eligible employee of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., who received life insurance coverage under the Plan. Pope died on February 5, 2020. Dkt. No. 2 at 3; Dkt. No. 2-2. Under the Plan, life insurance benefits in the amount of $20, 000 (the “Death Benefit”) became due to a beneficiary or beneficiaries. Dkt. No. 2 at 3. However, at the time of her death, Pope had not designated a beneficiary to her Plan life insurance coverage. Dkt. No. 2 at 3; Dkt. No. 2-3.

The Plan's Beneficiary Rules provide, in relevant part, that any amount of insurance for which there is no beneficiary at the insured's death will be payable to the first of the following: the insured's “(a) surviving spouse or domestic partner; (b) surviving child(ren) in equal shares; (c) surviving parents in equal shares; (d) surviving siblings in equal shares; (e) estate.” Dkt. No. 2-1 at 53. Pope was survived by her husband, Defendant Jonathan James Tubbs, and her minor daughter, Defendant C.M.P. Dkt. No. 2 at 3.

However, at the time this action was filed, Tubbs had been charged with Pope's murder and Prudential believed that he may be precluded from receiving the Death Benefit by federal common law and/or 84 O.S. § 231 (the “Oklahoma Slayer Statute”).^[1] Dkt. No. 2 at 3-4. Prudential asserts that if Tubbs is determined to have forfeited his right to the Death Benefit pursuant to federal common law and/or the Oklahoma Slayer Statute, it would be as if he predeceased Pope and the Death Benefit would be payable to C.M.P., as Pope's only child. Dkt. No. 2-4.

Tubbs has not yet asserted a claim to the Death Benefit, but On May 20, 2020, C.M.P.'s guardians, Mary Jo Pope and Mark Pope^[2], asserted a claim to the Death Benefit on C.M.P.'s behalf. Dkt. No. 2 at 4; Dkt. No. 2-3; Dkt. No. 13. Prudential argues that, under the circumstances, it cannot determine who is entitled to the Death Benefit and that because the actual or potential claims of Defendants are conflicting, Prudential may be exposed to multiple liability. Dkt. No. 2 at 4. Prudential states that it “is ready, willing and able to pay the Death Benefit, plus applicable interest, if any, payable in accordance with the terms of the Plan and to whomever this Court shall designate.” Id. Prudential disclaims any interest in the Death Benefit^[3] and respectfully requests that this Court determine to whom it should be paid. Id.

C.M.P. filed an answer to the complaint in interpleader on July 30, 2020. Dkt. No. 13. Tubbs did not file an answer, and on December 7, 2020, upon Prudential's motion, the Clerk of Court filed an entry of default as to Tubbs. Dkt. No. 16; Dkt. No. 17. Prudential has now moved for default judgment against Tubbs and seeks relief in interpleader. Dkt. No. 18. C.M.P. has filed a response to the motion indicating that she does not oppose the relief requested. Dkt. No. 19.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When a defendant fails to answer or otherwise defend against an action, Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides two distinct sequential steps: the entry of default and the entry of default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b); Guttman v. Silverberg, 167 Fed.Appx. 1, 2 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (“The entry of default and the entry of a judgment by default are two separate procedures.”). Initially, a party must ask the Clerk of the Court to enter default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). After default has been entered, the party may seek default judgment. Garrett v. Seymour, 217 Fed.Appx. 835, 838 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (holding that entry of default is a prerequisite for the entry of a default judgment under Rule 55(b)(1)).

Upon an entry of default, the Court takes all the well-pleaded facts in a complaint as true. See Tripodi v. Welch, 810 F.3d 761, 765 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that after default is entered, “a defendant admits to a complaint's well-pleaded facts and forfeits his or her ability to contest those facts.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Craighead, 176 Fed.Appx. 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.”) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the Court need not accept the moving party's legal conclusions or factual allegations relating to the amount of damages sought.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Before granting a motion for default judgment, the Court must ensure that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over the defaulting defendant. See Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Intern. Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 771-72 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We have noted earlier that judgment by default should not be entered without a determination that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.”).

“Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's authority to hear a given type of case and may not be waived.” Radil v. Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “To establish subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a party must show that complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000.” Id. at 1225. Here, Prudential asserts that federal question jurisdiction exists because the group life insurance policy at issue in this action is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (“ERISA”). Dkt. No. 2 at 2; see 29 U.S.C §§ 1132(e) and (f) (providing that the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions relating to benefits due under ERISA plans, without respect to the amount in controversy). Defendants do not dispute that the policy at issue in this case is governed by ERISA or challenge the Court's subject matter over this action. Dkt. No. 19.

“In reviewing its personal jurisdiction, the Court does not assert a personal defense of the parties; rather, the Court exercises its responsibility to determine that it has the power to enter the default judgment.” Williams, 802 F.2d at 1203. Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over [a] defendant.” Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Sol., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000); see Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI(6)-1, LLC v. Devine, Millimet & Branch, 750 F.3d 1178, 1179 (10th Cir. 2014); Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011). Where, as here, the issue is presented for decision on the basis of allegations and affidavits or written materials, Plaintiff “need only make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” Intercon, 205 F.3d at 1247 (internal quotation omitted). To establish personal jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant, “a plaintiff must show that jurisdiction is legitimate under the laws of the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Employers, 618 F.3d at 1159 (internal quotation omitted).

Under Oklahoma law, the personal jurisdiction inquiry is simply the due process analysis. Intercon, 205 F.3d at 1247; see Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Grp.) Co., 701 F.3d 598, 613 (10th Cir. 2012). The familiar due process standard requires “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state and a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 297 (1980); Intercon, 205 F.3d at 1247.

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: “‘general' (sometimes called ‘all-purpose') jurisdiction and ‘specific' (sometimes called ‘case-linked') jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Court of Cali., 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011)). “As a general matter . . . if a nonresident party has continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state, general personal jurisdiction might exist.” Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013).

For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the suit must arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1780; see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127. In other words, there must be “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.” Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Thus, “specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of...