The State ex rel. Armour Packing Company v. Stephens
Decision Date | 13 December 1898 |
Citation | 48 S.W. 929,146 Mo. 662 |
Parties | The State ex rel. Armour Packing Company v. Stephens et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Record of board of equalization quashed.
Edward C. Wright and Frank Hagerman for relator.
(1) The law violates section 8, article X, of the Constitution because the tax exceeds the limit therein fixed. Brookfield v. Toocy, 141 Mo. 619; Arnold v Hawkins, 95 Mo. 569; Black v. McGonigle, 103 Mo. 192. (2) If this law be declared to create a tax on property as distinguished from the use thereof, it is void because the property is not taxed in proportion to its value as required by section 4, article X, of the Constitution. Life Ass'n v. Board, 49 Mo. 512; State v Railroad, 75 Mo. 208; Board v. Railroad, 59 Ala. 551. (3) The tax authorized is clearly illegal because it covers property having no situs in the State. Relator has a packing house in Kansas; it has specially constructed cars in which to transport its own products from its packing house to the consumer in other States, who buys from it; it does business for no one else; it carries products for no one except for itself; it has a customer in Chicago who orders a car load of meat; the meat is loaded into relator's car in Kansas, there placed in a train for through shipment to the consumer at Chicago; it passes through the State of Missouri. That use is counted under the provisions of this law for the imposition of a tax upon property. There is no difference in that case in principle between taxing the freight that is in that car and the car itself. The use is merely transitory and in no way pertains to business in the State; yet, under the law, the use is counted, for the statute gives no way by which such business may by the board be distinguished from a use strictly within the State. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230; Bain v. Richardson, 105 N.C. 362; 2 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 755; People ex rel. v. Wemple, 131 N.Y. 64; People ex rel. v. Wemple, 138 N.Y. 1; Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 232.
Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondents.
(1) Relator claims this is not a property tax, it is not a direct tax on the cars as such. We think it is in the nature of an excise tax for the right to have the corporate capacity to do business in this State, and not a tax on the privilege or franchise, which, when incorporated, the relator may exercise. Home Ins. Co. v. N. Y., 134 U.S. 599; Maine v. Railroad, 142 U.S. 217; Cooley on Taxation, p. 5. (2) A tax may be imposed on a corporation on account of its property within the State and may take the form of a tax for the privilege of exercising its franchise within the State if the ascertain ment of the amount is made dependent in fact on the value of its property situated within the State and if payment be not made a condition precedent to the right to carry on the business. Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 438; Maine v. Railroad, 142 U.S. 217; Postal Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688; Postal Cable Co. v. Adams, 14 So. Rep. 36; Seibert v. Pacific Express Co., 14 U.S. 339; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194. (3) This law does not operate directly to exercise or assert control over interstate commerce and is therefore valid. Seibert v. Pacific Express Co., 142 U.S. 339; Maine v. Railroad, 142 U.S. 217; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688; Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 438. (4) The tax in this case is in the nature of an excise tax upon the relator, and that a tax of this character is within the power of a State to levy there can be no question. Maine v. Railroad, 142 U.S. 217; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688; Seibert v. Pacific Express Co., 142 U.S. 339; Poeple ex rel. v. Wemple, 131 N.Y. 64; People ex rel. v. Wemple, 138 N.Y. 11; Home Ins. Co. v. New York State, 134 U.S. 594. (5) The act imposes an excise tax for the right given by the State to do business in a corporate capacity, and not a tax on the business which, when incorporated, the relator may carry on. Home Ins. Co. v. N. Y., 134 U.S. 599. (6) A domestic corporation can be subjected to an excise or franchise tax even though it is engaged in both State and interstate business, and the tax may be measured by its whole capital or business or in any other way in the discretion of the legislature without taking any notice of its business arising from interstate commerce, providing no hostile discrimination is made against that part which is interstate commerce business. Seibert v. Pacific Express Co., 142 U.S. 339; People ex rel. v. Wemple, 131 N.Y. 64; People ex rel. v. Wemple, 138 N.Y. 1. (7) The same kind of a tax can be laid upon a foreign corporation doing both State and interstate business in this State. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; Seibert v. Pacific Express Co., 142 U.S. 339. (8) The form of the statute is immaterial. It is the operation of the statute that determines whether or not it is constitutional or unconstitutional. State Freight Tax case, 15 Wall. 272; Maine v. Railroad, 142 U.S. 228.
Marshall, J. Gantt, C. J., Burgess, Brace and Williams, JJ., express their views in a separate opinion. Robinson, J., concurs as to 2d paragraph. Sherwood, J., concurs as to 2d paragraph, and as to 1st paragraph thinks it must affirmatively appear from the record that the Board of Equalization has jurisdiction. Williams, J., concurring.
OPINIONIn Banc.
Certiorari.
This is an original proceeding, by certiorari, to quash the assessment, for the years 1896 and 1897 against relator, made by the State Board of Equalization. It is submitted upon the petition, return and motion to quash, which are set out in full for a better understanding of the controversy.
The petition is as follows:
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