The State ex rel. Lynn v. The Board of Education of the City of St. Louis
| Citation | 41 S.W. 924,141 Mo. 45 |
| Parties | The State ex rel. Lynn v. The Board of Education of the City of St. Louis |
| Decision Date | 17 July 1897 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Peremptory writ denied.
W. C Marshall for relator.
(1) The contention of relator is that neither the whole of the act of 1897, nor section 6 thereof, ever contemplated requiring the city to pay the expense of holding this special election, and that section 6 was intended to insure a fair election, but never had any reference to the question of who was to pay the cost thereof, and that inasmuch as the Constitution and laws of this State authorize a separate taxation for school purposes, the cost of this special election should be paid out of that fund and not out of revenue authorized by the Constitution and laws of Missouri and the charter of the city of St. Louis to be raised for municipal purposes only. Cooley's Blackstone [3 Rev. Ed.], p. 59; Smythe v Fisk, 23 Wall. 380; Heydon's case, 3 Rep. 7b; Regina v. Most, L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 251; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439; State ex rel. v. School Board, 131 Mo. 505; State ex rel. v. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546; State ex rel. v Holladay, 70 Mo. 137. (2) The General Assembly has no power, under the Constitution of Missouri, to require money raised by the city of St. Louis for municipal purposes to be applied to the payment of the expenses of the schools. State ex rel. v. Holladay, 70 Mo. 138; Hamilton & Treat v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 3; State ex rel. v. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546. Section 1 of article X of the Constitution vests the taxing power in the General Assembly for State purposes, and in counties and cities, under authority granted to them by the General Assembly for county and other corporate purposes.
R. E. Rombauer for respondents.
(1) It is the duty of the courts to confine themselves to the words of the legislature, nothing adding thereto, nothing diminishing. Everett v. Wells, 2 Scott (N. C.), 531; Green v. Wood, 7 Q. B. 185; State v. Hays, 78 Mo. 600; Hicks v. Jamison, 10 Mo.App. 35; Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo. 47; State v. Wellott, 54 Mo.App. 310; Bedsworth v. Bowman, 104 Mo. 44. (2) The case of Hamilton et al. v. St. Louis Co. Ct., 15 Mo. 3; State ex rel. v. St. Louis Co. Ct., 34 Mo. 546; State ex rel. Brown v. Holladay, 70 Mo. 137, and State ex rel. v. Owsley, 122 Mo. 68, all concede the power of the legislature to appropriate funds raised by taxation for local purposes, for expenses of this character. In fact all these cases go much farther than it is necessary to go in this case, since in the case at bar the election is for a purely local purpose. (3) That the legislature had power to impose the expenses of this election upon the city's general revenue and to make them payable out of the city treasury, can admit of no possible doubt after the full and able discussion of that subject in State ex rel. v. Owsley, supra. That it has so imposed them can admit of no doubt under the clear and explicit language of the laws of 1895 and 1897, which admit of no other construction.
This is a proceeding by mandamus to compel the board of education of the city of St. Louis and the members thereof to audit relator's claim for services as one of the clerks at a special election held in the city of St. Louis on the eighteenth day of May, 1897, to select members of said board of education under the act creating said board passed and approved on the twenty-third day of March, 1897, known as The Civic Federation Bill, and to appropriate out of the funds belonging to said board of education sufficient money to pay same. The relator was regularly appointed as one of the clerks of the election in precinct number 7, ward 28, of the city of St. Louis, on the twenty-third day of September, 1896, for a term ending sixty days prior to the next general election, pursuant to the provisions of the act approved May 31, 1895, relating to elections. He alleges that as such clerk he served at the election for members of the board of education on the eighteenth of May last, and is entitled to the sum of $ 15 for such services, which have been properly certified to by the board of election commissioners of the city of St. Louis.
About two thousand, six hundred other clerks and judges in the city of St. Louis are similarly situated. The board of election commissioners for the city of St. Louis, as required by law, held the election on the eighteenth day of May, 1897, and thereafter certified the costs to the respondent and asked it to make the proper and necessary appropriation to pay the same, together with all other costs incurred at said election. The board of education refused to do so on the ground that it was not within its power under the act of '97 creating said board to comply with the request and that such election expenses were subject alone to be audited by the fiscal officers of the city of St. Louis and payable out of the city treasury under the law in force when said expenses were incurred.
To determine whether the expense of this election is to be paid out of the treasury of the board of education or out of the city treasury, this proceeding has been instituted, both the city of St. Louis and the board of education denying the liability. There is no controversy touching any facts. The respondents have entered their appearance and in their return say that the writ is insufficient in law and does not state any cause against respondents or either of them.
The contention of the relator is that inasmuch as the Constitution and laws of this State authorize a separate taxation for school purposes, the costs of this election should be paid out of the school fund and not out of revenues raised for municipal purposes only, and further that the legislature has no constitutional power to require the city of St. Louis to pay the expenses of this school election. If the last contention is not well made, then the answer to relator's first contention is simply that the legislature has thought proper to provide for the expenses of the election of the board of education of the city of St. Louis out of a fund and by a way not approved by his judgment, if we read aright the act creating the respondent board of education and the election laws of 1895 to which it refers in section 6 thereof.
Just what constitutional provision would be violated, if it is determined that the legislature has provided that the expenses incurred by the election of the directors of the board of education of the city of St. Louis shall be defrayed by the city of St. Louis out of its general revenue, is not named or designated by the relator; but be that it may, the constitutional power of the legislature to authorize by law a tax to be levied by the municipal authorities upon property within its limits to pay the expenses of all elections held therein ought not now to be a question in this State since the ruling of this court in the case of The State ex rel. v. Owsley, 122 Mo. 68, 26 S.W. 659. In that case this court, construing section 1011, Revised Statutes 1889, containing a similar provision to section 91 of the present election law, upon which respondent relies to throw the costs of this election upon the city, held that the legislature had the constitutional right to require the city to pay the expenses of holding all elections, whether national, state, or municipal, held in such city, out of revenue raised by the city.
The legislature has control over the revenues of the city as over that of the county and State, and can direct by law that the expenses of elections held in a municipality, for the election of school directors, or for local purposes, shall be paid out of the treasury of the municipality from taxes levied and collected by municipal authorities.
If then, the question as to the constitutional power of the legislature to require the city of St. Louis to pay the expenses of this election out of its treasury, raised but not elaborated by counsel for relator, is disposed of, let us now see if the legislature has so directed the payment of all election expenses held within the limits of the city out of its treasury as contended by respondent. By section...
To continue reading
Request your trial