The State ex rel. Taggart v. Perkins
Decision Date | 19 June 1920 |
Parties | THE STATE ex rel. A. E. TAGGART, Clerk of Circuit Court, v. JOSEPH D. PERKINS et al., Judges of Circuit Court |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Peremptory writ issued.
George V. Farris for relator.
In the case of State v. Logan, 268 Mo. 169, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Act of 1913, Laws 1913, p 709, relating to the office of recorder of Jasper County because the same was class legislation. There could not be any difference whatever in the Logan case and the case at bar, as the acts are couched in exactly the same language and apply alike to the same County, viz., Jasper County and no other. Bridges v. Mining Co., 252 Mo. 53; Hays v. Mining Co., 227 Mo. 288; Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356; Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479; State v. Anslinger, 171 Mo. 600; State ex rel., Kinsey v. Messerly, 198 Mo. 351.
In Banc
Mandamus.
This is a proceeding by mandamus brought in this court in which it is sought to compel the judges of the Circuit Court of Jasper County to approve or reject the appointment of the deputies of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of said county, to designate their number and fix their compensation and term of employment. The section of the statute the compliance with which is sought herein, is as follows:
The respondents in their return challenge the right of relator to the relief sought on the ground that Jasper County is not within the purview of the Act of 1915 on account of the following provision in Section 1 of [283 Mo. 163] same: "Provided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply . . . to any county which now contains or may hereafter contain eighty thousand inhabitants and less than one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, in which circuit court is held in two or more places in said county."
The relator contends that this proviso, in so far as it classifies Jasper County according to the number of places in which circuit court is held therein, is obnoxious to that portion of Section 53 of Article IV of the State Constitution, which provides in effect that the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law when a general law can be made applicable.
This constitutional provision has frequently been construed as applied to classifications of this nature, with the result that such provisos as are here under review have been held purely arbitrary and hence violative of the Constitution. The reason for this conclusion being that a classification, to meet the requirements of the organic law, must, as applied to any subdivision of the State, be based upon natural present or prospective conditions of such subdivision and not to the possibilities of legislative action. A well recognized basis for such classification being the population of the subdivisions involved. This rule of construction, while definitely defining a present class, makes provision, within the range of reasonable probability, for the addition to the class created of other subdivisions of like nature, while a classification based upon legislative action leaves additions thereto wholly dependent upon conjecture.
The same proviso in the identical words as that at bar appears in an act approved March 25, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 709) and was held by this court, in State v. Logan, 268 Mo. 169, 186 S.W. 979, to be invalid. The legislative acts in which these provisos are found are, it is true, different in purpose, that of 1913 prescribing the salary of certain county officers, not including the clerk of the circuit court, while that of 1915 is intended to regulate the appointment, etc., of the deputies and assistants of the latter officer. The purpose of the proviso in each, however, was the same, to more definitely fix the classification of the counties to which each act was to apply. The reasoning and conclusion in the Logan case, therefore, as to the invalidity of the proviso in the Act of 1913 applies with equal force to that in the Act of 1915.
State ex inf. Barker v. Southern, 265 Mo. 275, 177 S.W 640, affords another illustration of an arbitrary or artificial classification, in which the court's ruling may not inappropriately be cited as a precedent in the case at bar. There was involved in the Barker case a construction of Section 10556, Revised Statutes 1909, which relates to the office of county highway engineer in which a classification of counties was attempted. After other limitations not pertinent here, it was provided that a county or counties containing 150 miles of macadamized roads outside of a municipal corporation should be included within the class to which the section was intended to apply. This proviso dealt exclusively with existing conditions as to its application, except as to the matter of population, as to which it purported to include such counties as might hereafter enter the particular zone of legislation. The proviso at the time of its enactment could not have applied to any other than Jackson County. Its terms negative any other basis for its enactment than an arbitrary...
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