The State ex rel. Barker v. Scott
Decision Date | 20 February 1917 |
Citation | 192 S.W. 90,270 Mo. 146 |
Parties | THE STATE ex rel. JOHN T. BARKER, Attorney-General, v. JAMES P. SCOTT, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Clark Circuit Court. -- Hon. N. M. Pettingill, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Cooley & Murrell, J. A. Whiteside and B. L. Gridley for appellant.
(1) The statutory provisions pleaded and relied on by plaintiff make no provision as to when the work for which these fees were paid shall be completed, nor does any other statute; and even if there was a statutory time limit, and the work had not been completed within such time, neither the statute pleaded not any other, fixes as a penalty for such failure the forfeiture of the fees, nor authorizes the State to recover the fees after they have been paid; especially when, as here the work was done and completed before suit brought. The burden is on the State to show a clear right of recovery. (2) The extension of the taxes for which these fees were paid to the clerk is not necessary to the validity of the assessment nor a prerequisite to the collection thereof. State ex rel. v. Wilson, 216 Mo. 286; State ex rel. v Lounsberry, 125 Mo. 163. (3) The statute pleaded, Sec. 11397, R. S. 1909, provides that the clerk shall do this work. Sec. 11549 provides that he shall be paid certain fees for doing it. Neither section says when he shall do it. No statute provides that for any delay in doing it he shall forfeit the fees. If not done until after the "tax book" (the book that goes to the collector) has been made and delivered, it still remains the clerk's duty to extend these taxes on the assessor's book, which remains in his office. When done, he would unquestionably be entitled to the fees. Therefore, even if the State would have had a right to recover on the theory that the fees had not been earned when they were paid, if suit had been brought before the work had been done, it could have no such right to recover in this case, because when suit was filed, the work was done and the fees earned. (4) Money or fees paid through mistake of law cannot be recovered. The answer pleads, and for the purposes of this case, the motion for judgment admits, that the State paid the money with full knowledge of the facts. Hence if there was a mistake, it was one of law. The law allows the clerk certain fees, aggregating a certain amount. Having received and charged himself with these fees it reduced the amount he could keep from other sources. It was a settlement. State ex rel. v. Ewing, 116 Mo. 129; Corbin v. County, 171 Mo. 385; Schell City v. Mfg. Co., 39 Mo.App. 264; State ex rel. v. Hawkins, 169 Mo. 615; State ex rel. v. Shipman, 125 Mo. 436; Scott County v. Leftwitch, 145 Mo. 34. The case of Lamar Twp. v. City of Lamar, 261 Mo. 171, does not fit the case at bar; besides it recognizes that where there has been a settlement, or what amounts to a settlement, with an officer, the municipality is barred from any recovery. See Lamar case, 190, and cases cited.
John T. Barker, Attorney-General, and Lee B. Ewing, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
(1) The statutes require a county clerk to extend the tax levy for a given year, upon the assessment books, and after the extension has been made thereon to make a copy of said book with taxes extended for the use of the county collector. They require this to be done within ninety days, after the assessments have been equalized by the boards of equalization, and the assessments adjusted by the county clerk. This extension must be made at least before October 1st each year, and if it is not done before that time the clerk is entitled to no fee therefor. Secs. 11397, 11425, 11411, 11414, 11402, 11404, 11549, 11461, R. S. 1909. (2) The fact that suit was not brought to recover back these illegal fees until after the extension of the taxes had been made in August, 1914, does not avail appellant. A public servant may not collect money for the performance of a public service, fail to perform it until such a time as it has become useless, and then escape repayment by performing the useless service after demand for the repayment. (3) The doctrine that money paid under mistake of law cannot be recovered back has no application to public funds paid by one officer to another. To so hold would violate fundamental principles of law and open wide the door to fraud in the dealing of officials with such funds. Lamar Twp. v. Lamar, 261 Mo. 183; Morrow v. Surber, 97 Mo. 155; Ada County v. Gess, 4 Idaho, 611; Allegheny County v. Grier, 179 Pa. St. 639; Heath v. Allbrook, 123 Iowa 559; Ellis v. State Auditors, 107 Mich. 528; State v. Young, 134 Iowa 505; Board of Commissioners v. Heuston, 144 Ind. 588; Reppy v. Jefferson County, 47 Mo. 66; Sears v. Stone County, 105 Mo. 236.
The petition, filed September 19, 1914, is in three counts, the first of which, omitting caption, is as follows:
The second and third counts declare for similar fees collected upon the assessments for the two following years respectively. The answer is, omitting caption and signatures, as follows:
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