The State v. Austin.
| Decision Date | 13 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. A11A0601.,A11A0601. |
| Citation | 310 Ga.App. 814,11 FCDR 2455,714 S.E.2d 671 |
| Parties | The STATEv.AUSTIN. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Patrick H. Head, Dist. Atty., Ann Bethune Harris, John Richard Edwards, Amelia Greeson Pray, Anna Green Cross, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellant.Thomas Edwin Griner, Marietta, for appellee.DILLARD, Judge.
The State appeals the trial court's grant of Robert John Austin's motion to suppress statements made and evidence obtained at his home after officers responded to a call that shots had been fired there. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion after finding that Austin had not been read his Miranda rights. For the reasons noted infra, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
The record shows that Cobb County police officers received a call that shots had been fired in a residential area on the afternoon in question. The call, made by a neighbor, implicated Austin's home, and at least four officers responded by approaching the home in a tactical manner. Using trees and other available cover to conceal their bodies (though no additional shots were heard during the approach), the officers carefully made their way to Austin's driveway, where they spotted two men outside the garage.
As the officers drew closer with their weapons at the ready, one of the men—later determined to be Austin—spotted them and retreated into the garage. Concerned that the men might be armed, the officers ordered the men to show themselves with their hands up. Although the gentleman outside the garage was very cooperative, Austin proved more difficult. Indeed, when Austin emerged from the garage, he appeared angry and did not immediately show his hands.
Thereafter, both men were identified and subjected to pat-downs. During this procedure, Austin was argumentative, slow to respond, and belligerent. He also appeared intoxicated, with slurred speech, glassy eyes, and unsteady balance; and he admitted to having consumed three to four beers that afternoon. And when the officers informed Austin that they were responding to a call of shots fired, he began to rant about his neighbor and an apparent conflict between the two of them.
During this tirade, Austin appeared to take on a fighting stance, squaring up with an officer face-to-face. In response, the officer handcuffed Austin, and in doing so told him that (1) he was not under arrest, (2) he was being cuffed for both the officers' protection and his own, and (3) he needed to calm down. Thereafter, Austin admitted to having fired a gun but said that he had done so while engaging in target practice in his back yard. Nevertheless, officers were concerned that, given the proximity to other homes, the potential for injuries could be high depending on the type of gun fired. And although Austin claimed to have used a handgun, the officers wanted to visually verify that he had not used a shotgun—which, in the officers' opinion, would have heightened the potential for injuries.
Eventually, Austin—who by that time had calmed down but remained in handcuffs 1—stated that he would take the officers inside his home to see the gun he had used. He then escorted the two officers inside (instructing them in how to manipulate a tricky doorknob to enter the house), and led them to a bedroom, where he indicated that the gun he had used for target practice was beneath the mattress. While retrieving and securing the handgun, an officer noticed a small amount of marijuana in a container on the bedside table. And while Austin was not placed under arrest at that point, the officer asked if he had additional guns or drugs in the house and, if so, to inform them of their locations. Austin then indicated that there was additional marijuana in his dresser, which the officers then opened to find a one-gallon bag containing the contraband. Austin also led the officers through the remainder of the home, pointing out additional firearms (which the officers collected).
Once Austin and the officers exited the home, Austin was placed under arrest. He was subsequently indicted on felony possession of marijuana 2 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, 3 namely the handgun that was retrieved from beneath the mattress.
Thereafter, Austin filed a motion to suppress Miranda warnings. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the statements made by Austin after he was handcuffed and the tangible evidence seized as a result of those statements were inadmissible because Austin was in custody for purposes of Miranda. This appeal follows.4
At the outset, we note that on a motion to suppress, the State has the burden of proving that a search was lawful.5 And “[a]n appellate court reviewing a trial court's order on a motion to suppress must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment.” 6 But when, as here, “the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court's application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.” 7 With these guiding principles in mind, we will now address the State's enumerations of error in turn.
1. The State first argues that the trial court erred in excluding physical evidence obtained from Austin's home by misapplying state and federal law to find that the tangible evidence must be excluded as the “fruit” of statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.8 We agree that the trial court misapplied the law; 9 however, for the reasons noted infra, we nonetheless affirm in part and reverse in part. 10
It is well established that even when probable cause to arrest exists, “warrantless intrusion of a person's home is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances” because “[a] citizen's home is an unquestionable zone of privacy under the Fourth Amendment [.]” 11 And when the State “seeks to justify a warrantless search on grounds of consent, it has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” 12 Indeed, “[v]oluntariness must reflect an exercise of free will, not merely a submission to or acquiescence in the express or implied assertion of authority.” 13 Thus, to have lawfully seized the contraband discovered within Austin's home, the State had the burden of proving that Austin voluntarily consented to a search.14
The voluntariness of consent to search is measured by evaluating the totality of the circumstances, which includes factors such as prolonged questioning; the use of physical punishment; the accused's age, level of education, intelligence, length of detention, and advisement of constitutional rights; and the psychological impact of these factors on the accused. 15 The actual scope of consent is also evaluated by examining the surrounding circumstances,16 using an “objective reasonableness” standard to consider “what ... a typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect[.]” 17
In the case sub judice, Austin invited officers to follow him inside his home to examine the handgun he claimed to have fired. There is no indication in the record that Austin was coerced into doing so. Indeed, the idea to lead officers to the gun was Austin's own. 18 And under the circumstances (i.e., the officers having responded to a “shots fired” call and Austin's aggressive demeanor during the investigation), it was perfectly reasonable to handcuff Austin and to leave the handcuffs on as he led officers through his home.19 Moreover, the fact that a suspect is handcuffed does not in and of itself render his or her consent involuntary.20 Accordingly, we conclude that Austin voluntarily consented to leading officers through his home to see the handgun he claimed to have fired, resulting in a lawful seizure of that gun and of the small amount of marijuana that officers subsequently observed in plain view. 21
However, the scope of Austin's consent was limited to showing officers the handgun beneath his mattress,22 and despite the discovery of the marijuana in plain view, “[t]he presence of contraband without more does not give rise to exigent circumstances.” 23 Thus, in order to lawfully seize any additional drugs or guns in Austin's home, police were required to obtain additional consent to search. And under the totality of the circumstances, the State has failed to prove that Austin freely and voluntarily consented to expanding the search.24
A Cobb County police officer—who was the sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing—testified that after spotting the small amount of marijuana on Austin's bedside table, he said the following: In response, Austin looked toward his dresser and said “[i]t's in the drawer.” And after retrieving the drugs, the officer asked of Austin, “Do you have any ... other guns or drugs in the house?” Austin then showed officers where his additional guns were kept throughout the house.
Considering the totality of the circumstances at this point in Austin's encounter with the officers, the State failed to meet its burden of showing that he voluntarily consented to expanding the search of his home.25 Indeed, while Austin “apparently acquiesced to the officer's directive to give him the [additional drugs and guns], we cannot say that single factor demonstrated free consent or showed that [Austin] felt free to refuse to do so.” 26 Unlike when Austin himself suggested that the officers come inside his home to view his handgun, at the point when Austin consented to the search of his dresser, he (1) was handcuffed inside...
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...Ga.App. 193, 635 SE2d 810 (2006) ("turn around and put hands behind back" suggests arrest to normal citizen); but see State v. Austin, 310 Ga.App. 814, 714 SE2d 671 (2011) (rev'd finding of arrest when officer handcuffed belligerent suspect in shots fired call and told suspect it was for sa......
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C3 Warrantless Searches
...Ga.App. 193, 635 SE2d 810 (2006) ("turn around and put hands behind back" suggests arrest to normal citizen); but see State v. Austin, 310 Ga.App. 814, 714 SE2d 671 (2011) (rev'd finding of arrest when officer handcuffed belligerent suspect in shots fired call and told suspect it was for sa......
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C3 Warrantless Searches
...Ga.App. 193, 635 SE2d 810 (2006) ("turn around and put hands behind back" suggests arrest to normal citizen); but see State v. Austin, 310 Ga.App. 814, 714 SE2d 671 (2011) (rev'd finding of arrest when officer handcuffed belligerent suspect in shots fired call and told suspect it was for sa......
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C3 Warrantless Searches
...Ga.App. 193, 635 SE2d 810 (2006) ("turn around and put hands behind back" suggests arrest to normal citizen); but see State v. Austin, 310 Ga.App. 814, 714 SE2d 671 (2011) (rev'd finding of arrest when officer handcuffed belligerent suspect in shots fired call and told suspect it was for sa......