The State v. Benton
Decision Date | 21 July 2010 |
Docket Number | No. A10A1489.,A10A1489. |
Citation | 699 S.E.2d 767,305 Ga.App. 332 |
Parties | The STATEv.BENTON. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Howard Z. Simms, Dist. Atty., Garrison A. Wood, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant.
Lark N. Bedrick, William M. Ermine, for appellee.
By accusation, the State of Georgia charged Jessie Benton with theft by conversion, OCGA § 16-8-4(a). Assisted by counsel, Benton reached an agreement with the prosecutor to plead guilty. After the prosecutor described the factual basis for Benton's guilty plea, the Superior Court of Bibb County determined that the facts as alleged could not support a conviction for theft by conversion because there was no allegation that Benton had agreed to make a specified disposition of the subject property, as required to prove that offense.1 Based on this determination, the trial court rejected Benton's guilty plea and sua sponte dismissed the accusation. The State appeals pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(1),2 contending that the trial court erred in finding that there was no factual basis that Benton had agreed to make a specified disposition of the subject property. For the reasons explained below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to undisputed facts. Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320(1), 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994).
At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor described the facts underlying the accusation as follows: The prosecutor explained that, at some point, Benton's employer realized that Benton was never going to make the payments and told Benton to return the truck instead. The trial court determined that the State had failed to identify any legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the truck and, therefore, that the State was seeking to impose criminal sanctions for Benton's failure to pay a debt, which is forbidden by Georgia's Constitution.3
On appeal, the State argues that, “as with any other periodic payment agreement,” it was “implied” in Benton's agreement with his employer that he (Benton) “no longer had the right to possess the truck if he was not making the scheduled payments” and that this constituted “an agreement to make a specified application of the truck, that being to return it” to his employer.
The failure to comply with the ... Act with respect to the perfection of [a] security interest[, however,] does not affect the creation of the security interest, which remains a matter of contract between the parties. It follows that a failure to comply with the Act does not nullify the contract but merely has the effect of loss of priority where the rights of third parties who complied with the Act have intervened.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Spoon v. Herndon, 167 Ga.App. 794, 795(1), 307 S.E.2d 693 (1983). From these authorities, we conclude that a security interest in a motor vehicle does not arise merely from the fact that a buyer agrees to make periodic payments after taking possession. To prove that Benton was under a legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the truck, therefore, the State was required to prove that Benton explicitly agreed to return the truck to his employer if he could not make the payments.6
Before accepting a guilty plea and entering judgment thereon, the trial court must first determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. King v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 655, 469 S.E.2d 30 (1996); State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 334(2), 454 S.E.2d 468 (1995). The purpose of this requirement “is to protect against someone pleading guilty when that person may know what he has done but may not know that those acts do not constitute the crime with which he [or she] is charged.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Evans, 265 Ga. at 334(2), 454 S.E.2d 468. Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9 provides this protection by requiring a trial judge to make “such inquiry on the record as may satisfy the judge that there is a factual basis for the plea.” See King v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. at 656, 469 S.E.2d 30. A trial court may discern the factual basis for a guilty plea from facts put on the record at the guilty plea hearing in a wide variety of ways: the judge may question the defendant, the prosecutor may state what he or she expects the evidence to show at trial, or the court may consider material contained in parts of the record other than the guilty plea hearing, so long as that material is identified and made a part of the record for appeal. State v. Evans, 265 Ga. at 334-335(2), 454 S.E.2d 468.
In this case, the method employed was for the prosecutor to state what he expected the evidence to show at trial. The prosecutor's recitation of the expected evidence, however, failed to show that, when Benton obtained the pickup truck from the seller, he explicitly agreed to return the truck to the seller if he failed to pay as agreed. Because the State failed to identify any factual basis for the essential element that Benton obtained the pickup truck under an agreement or other known legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the property, the trial court was authorized to reject Benton's guilty plea. Head v. State, 262 Ga. 795, 796(2), 426 S.E.2d 547 (1993).7
The accusation, which tracked the statutory definition of theft by conversion, however, was not technically deficient.8 Although the State failed to satisfy the trial court that there was a factual basis for a guilty plea, and the trial court may have doubted that the State would ultimately be able to carry its burden of proving Benton's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court abridged the State's right to prosecute in dismissing the accusation when the State had never...
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