The State v. Capotelli

• Decision Date: 20 December 1926
• Docket Number: 27315
• Citation: 292 S.W. 42,316 Mo. 256
• Parties: The State v. Gracinto Capotelli, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

292 S.W. 42

316 Mo. 256

The State v. Gracinto Capotelli, Appellant

No. 27315

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 20, 1926

Motion for Rehearing Denied An. 24, 1927.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. William A Taylor, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Verne Lacy for appellant.

(1) The statements of Whitten were hearsay and not admissible against defendant. 16 C. J. 634; State v. Richardson, 194 Mo. 326; State v. Kelleher, 201 Mo. 636; State v. Levitt, 278 Mo. 372; State v. Hogan, 252 S.W. 387; State v. Glon, 253 S.W. 366. (2) Without proof of the "corpus delicti," a confession of defendant is inadmissible. Kelley's Criminal Law & Practice, sec. 281; 16 C. J. 736; Robinson v. State, 12 Mo. 592; State v. Young, 237 Mo 177; State v. Campbell, 301 Mo. 621; State v Morro, 281 S.W. 720. Evidence showing that goods disappeared does not constitute proof of the corpus delicti of the crime of receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen. Sec. 3331, R. S. 1919; State v. Richmond, 186 Mo. 81; State v. Cohen, 162 S.W. 216; State v. Powers, 164 S.W. 466; State v. Fink, 186 Mo. 50.

North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, and A. B. Lovan, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.

Without question it is the law that a confession of defendant is not admissible without proof of the corpus delicti. But in this case there was sufficient proof. (1) There is sufficient proof of the larceny. State v. Creeley, 254 Mo. 390. (2) It is in evidence that the defendant and another man were arrested together at the home of defendant and that the man arrested with the defendant had in his possession one pair of the stolen gloves. (3) It is also in evidence that some of the stolen gloves were shipped to Chicago from 1821 Wash Street, St. Louis, and that there was no address at that number; that defendant at the time of his confession claimed to live at 1021 Wash Street; that he claimed at the time of his arrest that his home was at 1510 Wash Street. It is a circumstance worth noting that the defendant was in and about the neighborhood of the place on Wash Street from which the stolen goods were shipped to Chicago. The foregoing evidence, taken with the confession, is sufficient to prove the corpus delicti. 16 C. J. 736, 737.

OPINION

Blair, J.

This appeal is from a conviction of the felony of receiving stolen property in the city of St. Louis and a sentence of imprisonment in the state penitentiary for two years.

The main questions are the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti and the admissibility in evidence of an extra-judicial confession in the alleged absence of such proof. There was evidence which we will assume tended to prove the larceny from Rothschild Bros. Hat Company, a corporation, during June and July, 1923, of a large amount and of great value of ladies' and men's dress gloves. In December, 1923, Charles Witton, negro fireman and janitor of the hat company, was found emerging from the building of said company in St. Louis, having in his possession a number of pairs of gloves stolen from said company. He was arrested and taken to police headquarters. The inference from the testimony is that, after having confessed his complicity in the theft of the gloves taken during June and July, Witton implicated the defendant.

Defendant was arrested and taken to police headquarters where he was questioned by police officers and representatives of the hat company. He first denied his guilt. Later, after being confronted with Witton and his confession and after being urged by Witton to tell the truth, defendant admitted his guilt to the extent that he received a sack and a bundle of gloves from Witton, containing many dozens of pairs of gloves of a value shown to be far in excess of thirty dollars, knowing said gloves to have been stolen. Defendant steadfastly denied the statement of Witton that he had participated in the actual theft of the gloves. Defendant's admissions were afterward embodied in a typewritten statement to which his mark, abundantly witnessed, was attached. Such statement covered and included his admissions to the extent above referred to.

Witton was killed in an automobile accident before the trial. At the trial defendant testified that he was thirty-one years of age, was born in Italy and had come to the United States fifteen years before. He claimed he could not read or write either the English or the Italian languages. An interpreter was provided for him, but such provision appears to have been unnecessary, for the record shows on its face that he understood and answered the questions without resort to the interpreter. As a witness, defendant absolutely repudiated his confession and denied making any incriminating statements. He said that he made his mark upon some paper after he had been brutally treated and beaten and under the threat of further mistreatment. However, there was ample evidence that defendant was subjected to no such mistreatment, and that no improper inducements were held out to him to secure his confession. We think the alleged confession of defendant was properly admitted in evidence in so far as its voluntary character is concerned. We will assume for the present that statements shown to have been made by Witton to defendant, when defendant was under arrest and in custody, as well as defendant's answers thereto, were properly admitted in evidence.

There was evidence tending to show that gloves, in large amount and of great value, which had been stolen from Rothschild Bros. Hat Company, were afterwards discovered in Chicago and retaken by the hat company. There was evidence tending to show that such recovered gloves were shipped from 1821 Wash Street, St. Louis, Missouri, and that there was no such number on said street. There was no evidence tending to disclose the identity of the consignor of such shipment. Defendant had stated in his confession that he lived at 1021 Wash Street and at the trial testified that he lived at 1510 Wash Street.

The State sought to show that a man arrested with and in the company of defendant when he was arrested had a pair of the stolen gloves in his possession. The trial court properly excluded such testimony when objections were made; but it appears to have gotten in the record without objection or motion to strike out, when defendant's counsel was cross-examining one of the State's witnesses. Hence, we will assume, for the purposes of the case, that proof of such fact is in the record for consideration in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition to repudiating his confession, defendant also denied taking or receiving any gloves and testified concerning the alleged admissions and mistreatment as above stated. He offered proof tending to show that his reputation for honesty was good. The State offered no testimony in rebuttal on this point.

The foregoing constitutes a brief but, we think, an entirely accurate statement of the ultimate facts which the record tends to show. Outside of defendant's alleged confession, there is not a syllable of direct or circumstantial evidence that defendant ever had in his possession any of the gloves stolen from the hat company.

Defendant contends, the State concedes, and we agree with both of them, that an extra-judicial confession of guilt made by a person on trial for a criminal offense is not admissible without proof of the corpus delicti. [State v. Young, 237 Mo. l. c. 177; State v. Campbell, 301 Mo. l. c. 621; State v. Morro, 281 S.W. 720.] It necessarily follows that, when the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently established, an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession of guilt, improperly admitted, cannot be regarded as evidence tending to show guilt and cannot be considered in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict of guilt. [State v. Morro, supra.]

What constitutes the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property? Certainly more than a showing of the larceny of the goods, for larceny is a separate and distinct offense. In addition to the larceny, at least the facts that the stolen property was afterwards in the possession of another than the thief and that such other person had knowledge of its stolen character must be regarded as necessary elements in the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property, knowing that such property had been stolen.

The rule in this State is "that full proof of the corpus delicti, independent of the confession, is not required. If there is evidence of corroborating circumstances which tend to prove the corpus delicti and correspond with circumstances related in the confession, both the circumstances and the confession may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is sufficiently proved in a given case." [State v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. l. c. 463, and cases cited.]

Neither in the Skibiski, nor in any of the other cases there cited, nor in any of the cases cited by the learned Attorney-General did the facts and circumstances shown fall so far short of tending to corroborate the confession and, in connection with it, to establish the corpus delicti as in the case at bar.

In Skibiski's case defendant was charged with the larceny of a steer. There was evidence of a confession and of an offer to make restitution. Defendant actually made...