The State v. Swagerty
Decision Date | 14 May 1907 |
Citation | 102 S.W. 483,203 Mo. 517 |
Parties | THE STATE v. J. L. SWAGERTY, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis County Circuit Court. -- Hon. Jno. W McElhinney, Judge.
Affirmed.
R. H Stevens and Kehr & Tittmann for appellant.
(1) The general purpose of streets and highways is that of travel either on foot by a pedestrian or in a vehicle propelled by power. The use to which the public thoroughfares may be put comprehends all modern means of conveyance. The motor vehicle has an equal right with other vehicles in common use, to occupy and use the public highways and streets. Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 74 N.E. 615; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 217; Moses v. Railroad, 21 Ill. 515; Upton v. Windham, 75 Conn. 288; Christie v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 965; Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill.App. 94; Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555; Holland v. Bartsch, 120 Ind. 46. (2) Such being the law, and it having been decided in this State that the right and power to license, tax and regulate the use of vehicles upon the public roads or highways is solely based upon the common law maxim "that those who mainly wear out the streets should mainly pay for keeping them in repair and that there should be such graduated scales that the kind of carriage which most wears out the streets should pay most and those which are less destructive, should pay less" (City v. Green, 7 Mo.App. 477, 70 Mo. 562; Kansas City v. Richardson, 90 Mo.App. 458), the Automobile Act of 1903 is a special law, and, therefore, violates section 53, article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, which prohibits the enactment of a special law where a general law may be made applicable and which makes the question whether a general law could be made applicable a judicial one. State ex rel. v. Herman, 75 Mo. 346; State ex rel. v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 650; Sams v. Railroad, 174 Mo. 53; State v. Granneman, 132 Mo. 326. (3) The act violates the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Every person in the United States is entitled to the equal protection of the laws. That amendment is a guaranty of protection against State action. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722.
Herbert S. Hadley, Attorney-General, and N. T. Gentry, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
The Automobile Law is not unconstitutional, but is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. When such dangerous machines are allowed the use of our public highways, it is certainly right as well as reasonable to require that those in charge of them shall operate them at a reasonable rate of speed. In addition to the dangers attendant upon the use of them, such as collisions with other vehicles and the injury to pedestrians, automobiles are calculated to frighten horses and mules. It is a fact well known to all that our domestic animals do not frighten as readily at a bicycle, steam roller, automobile or threshing machine that is moving slowly as at one that is moving fast. Hence, for the safety of pedestrians as well as those riding and driving, this law was enacted. Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 39; McIntyre v. Orner, 76 N.E. 752; Shinkle v. McCullough, 77 S.W. 197; Gifford v. Jennings, 190 Mass. 154; Com. v. Sherman, 78 N.E. 98; Eichmann v. Buchheit, 107 N.W. 325; In re Berry, 147 Cal. 523; Radnor Twp. v. Bell, 27 Pa. Sup. Ct.; Crittenden v. Columbus, 26 O. C. C. 531; People v. Ellis, 88 A.D. 471.
On the 29th day of October, 1905, there was filed by the prosecuting attorney of St. Louis county, before R. F. Stevens, a justice of the peace of said county, an information charging that defendant J. L. Swagerty did wilfully and unlawfully, at said county, on said 29th day of October, 1905, operate and run a certain automobile, propelled by steam, gasoline, electricity or other motive power, at a greater rate of speed than nine miles per hour, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.
Thereafter, on November 16, 1905, said justice heard said cause, and found the defendant guilty, and assessed his punishment at a fine of one hundred dollars and costs. Defendant appealed from this judgment to the circuit court of St. Louis county, where, on the 23rd day of May, 1906, the cause was again tried by the court, a jury being waived, and the defendant again convicted, and his punishment fixed at a fine of one hundred dollars and costs. In due time defendant filed motions for a new trial and in arrest, which were overruled, and defendant appealed to this court.
The evidence showed very conclusively that on Sunday, the 29th day of October, 1905, the defendant, on the Clayton road, one of the public highways of St. Louis county, operated an automobile at a speed of twenty miles per hour, and that the automobile was propelled by gasoline. The State asked for no declarations of law. The defendant asked the court to declare the law to be that the act in question was unconstitutional and void, which the court refused to do, and the defendant duly excepted.
This prosecution is based upon the Act of 1903, entitled, "An Act regulating the operation and speed of automobiles on the public streets, roads and highways of this State, fixing the amount of license, and prescribing a penalty for violating same," approved March 23, 1903. It is as follows:
Automobiles, operated and propelled in a manner not incompatible with the safety of the traveling public, have equal rights with other vehicles upon the public highway, subject to such rules and regulations as are prescribed by law.
While it is conceded by defendant that the right to license or tax vehicles or the use of vehicles on the public streets, and to regulate such use, is acknowledged by the courts of this State (St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo.App. 468, 70 Mo. 562; Kansas City v. Richardson, 90 Mo.App. 450), it is insisted that an analysis of those cases shows that the legislative acts construed applied to all vehicles using the streets, and demonstrates that when the reason of the rule on which these decisions are based is considered, the act in question is special legislation, and, therefore, unconstitutional and void.
There can be no question but that an act which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while an act which refers to particular persons or things of a class is a special law. [State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645.] It is well settled, however, in this State that, when the conditions...
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