The Wabash Railroad Company v. Flannigan

• Decision Date: 13 May 1902
• Citation: 75 S.W. 691,95 Mo.App. 477
• Parties: THE WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Interpleader, Appellant, v. ALEXANDER FLANNIGAN et al., Respondents
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

75 S.W. 691

95 Mo.App. 477

THE WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Interpleader, Appellant, v. ALEXANDER FLANNIGAN et al., Respondents

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis

May 13, 1902

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court.--Hon. William Zachritz Judge.

Judgment affirmed.

Geo. S Grover for appellant.

(1) "A delay of three years in bringing a bill in equity to enforce a charge upon land created by a will, is not such laches as will defeat the plaintiff's right, if there has been no change in the defendant's position by reason of such delay." Nudd v. Powers, 136 Mass. 273. "Laches can not be imputed to one who begins proceedings as soon as he is in legal condition to do so, as where one awaits a discharge in bankruptcy." Gamble v Folsom, 49 Mich. 141. (2) "That a court has jurisdiction on a bill for an interpleader, filed by the judgment debtor, to require two judgment plaintiffs to come into court and interplead for the purpose of ascertaining which one of the two judgments at law against the common debtor shall be paid and which shall not be, is an unheard-of proposition, without the semblance of reason or authority to support it." In support of the text, the following authorities are cited: Cheever v. Hodgson, 9 Mo.App. 565; Dodds v. Gregory, 51 Miss. 351; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65. (3) "But a bill of interpleader may be filed after a verdict at law, if the effect of the action was merely to ascertain the damages due the plaintiff at law, who was a defendant in the equity case." In support of that principle, the following authority is cited: Hamilton v. Marks, 5 De Gex & Smale 638; 19 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 321. (4) The averments of this bill present an ideal situation, in equity, for the exercise of the right of interpleader. Upon the undisputed facts there presented, the parties were clearly entitled to a hearing, and it was error to refuse it. 2 Story on Eq. Jur. (13 Ed.), sec. 806, pp. 136-7; Freeland v. Wilson, 18 Mo. 380; Hathaway v. Foy, 40 Mo. 540; Robards v. Clayton, 49 Mo.App. 610; Miller v. Ins. Co., 68 Mo.App. 19; Bldg. Ass'n v. Joy, 56 Mo.App. 433. (5) The order of April 29, 1901, in this case, is a final judgment, from which an appeal will lie to this court. Sec. 806, R. S. 1899; Freeman on Judgments, secs. 12, 17, 36; 12 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, p. 63; Rogers v. Gosnell, 51 Mo. 466; State ex rel. v. Allen, 92 Mo. 20; Ormiston v. Trimble, 77 Mo.App. 310.

Charles P. Johnson and John D. Johnson for respondent Rule.

(1) The Wabash Railroad Company of Ohio, the substituted plaintiff in the amended petitions, being a citizen or legal entity, owing its existence to the laws of the State of Ohio, is not the corporate individual which instituted this suit, and one individual can not prosecute a suit instituted by another of the same name. Tourville v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 614; Railroad v. Railroad, 136 U.S. 356; R. S. 1899, sec. 566. (2) There is an indisputable legal presumption that a corporation is a citizen, or composed of citizens of the State which created it. Railroad v. James, 161 U.S. 545; Railroad v. Steele, 167 U.S. 659; Burrows Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100; Railroad v. Louisville Co., 174 U.S. 552. (3) The bill of interpleader does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants for the following reasons: It is essential to a bill of interpleader that the plaintiff shall make known his condition as a stakeholder by bringing a suit within a reasonable time after being advised of the double claims against him. It appears from the bill that plaintiff has been contesting this claim (now merged into the judgment of defendant Rule) since June 10, 1891, with full knowledge of the claim of defendant Flannigan. Cheever v. Hodgson, 9 Mo.App. 565; Dodds v. Gregory, 61 Miss. 351; McDevitt v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 592; Union Bank v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 460. The circuit court had no power to enforce its judgment against the person of defendant Flannigan, hence, a temporary injunction as against him would have been wholly without effect, unless he chose to obey it. R. S. 1899, sec. 598; Sheedy v. Bank, 62 Mo. 17. (4) A court of one jurisdiction can not enjoin the collection of a judgment of another court of competent jurisdiction, in the absence of any allegation of fraud in obtaining such judgment. Scrutchfield v. Souter, 119 Mo. 621; Nelson v. Brown, 23 Mo. 13; Keith v. Plemmons, 28 Mo. 104; Pettus v. Elgin, 11 Mo. 411; Mellier v. Bartlett, 89 Mo. 137.

BLAND, P. J. Barclay and Goode, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BLAND, P. J.

Plaintiff by its third amended petition averred that plaintiff was first organized as a railroad corporation under the laws of the State of Ohio, and subsequently organized under the laws of the States of Illinois and Missouri; that on the first day of August, 1889, and ever since, it has been continuously and without change a consolidated corporation; that in the months of May and June, 1891, defendant Tourville, earned as an employee of plaintiff, eighty-one dollars and ninety-eight cents more or less; that defendant Flannigan, in April, 1895, instituted an attachment proceeding against Tourville before James H. Wyatt, a justice of the peace for St. Clair county, Illinois, who had jurisdiction both of the subject-matter and person of defendant Tourville, and garnished the plaintiff in the cause; and that on June 14, 1895, judgment was rendered by said justice in said cause against Tourville and the plaintiff as garnishee for eighty-one dollars and ninety-eight cents, and that the said judgment was not appealed from and remains in full force and effect, no part of it having been paid by Tourville or the Wabash Railroad Company, and that an appeal by the Wabash Railroad Company as garnishee would have been wholly unavailing under the laws of Illinois as there in force; that on the tenth of June, 1891, Tourville instituted a suit before a justice of the peace in the city of St. Louis, State of Missouri, against the Wabash Railroad Company, claiming the sum of eighty-one dollars and ninety-eight cents due him for wages earned in the service of said railway company and that said suit was tried and passed through various courts of this State by appeal, resulting in a judgment of eighty-one dollars and ninety-eight cents, which was finally affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States; that both judgments are for the same sum of money and that plaintiff never owed Tourville but the one sum of eighty-one dollars and ninety-eight cents; that Tourville has assigned his judgment to defendant Virgil Rule, and that Flannigan and Rule were each undertaking to collect his several judgment, and that plaintiff is in danger of having to twice pay the said sum of eighty-one dollars and ninety-eight cents, and alleges that it is ready and willing to pay the said sum with interest to the party to whom it is due, but that it is unable to determine or to know whether the said sum and interest should be paid to Flannigan, or to Tourville and Rule, and prays that they be directed to come into court and interplead for said moneys.

A temporary restraining order was issued, to which defendant Rule made return assigning seventeen reasons why plaintiff should not maintain its bill and asked that the restraining order be dissolved.

On the twenty-second day of April, 1901, plaintiff filed its motion for the relief prayed for, notwithstanding the return of defendant Rule, as follows:

"Now comes the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause, by its solicitor, and moves the court here to continue its restraining order now in force, and to proceed with all convenient speed at its convenience to hear and determine the plaintiff's bill of interpleader therein filed, notwithstanding the return of Virgil Rule, defendant, filed in this cause April 19, 1901, for the following reasons, to-wit:

"First. Because this court has full and complete jurisdiction over this matter.

"Second. Because plaintiff is entitled to the relief here prayed for, notwithstanding said return.

"Third. Because said return states no facts which would deprive the plaintiff of the relief prayed for.

"Fourth. Because unless the relief here prayed for is granted to plaintiff, said defendants, Virgil Rule and Alexander Flannigan, will immediately proceed to defeat said bill of interpleader, by compelling the plaintiff, a mere stakeholder, to pay the sum twice out of the sum in plaintiff's hands.

"Fifth. Because the plaintiff is entitled to the relief here prayed for, both at law and in equity, upon the facts stated in its third amended petition, and admitted in the return of said Virgil Rule."

On the same day, defendant Flannigan filed the following separate answer, to-wit:

"Now on this day comes the defendant, Alexander Flannigan, having entered his voluntary appearance in this cause, by his attorney, to plaintiff's third amended petition, and says: He admits each and every allegation set forth in the petition of the plaintiff.

"Defendant further says that by virtue of said judgment of Peter Tourville against the Wabash Railroad Company, to the use of Alexander Flannigan, obtained in Illinois, as stated in plaintiff's third amended petition, this defendant thereby obtained a lien upon said sum of $ 81.98, prior in right to all liens, if any, upon said sum or sums claimed by Peter Tourville or his assignee, Virgil Rule, from the Wabash Railroad Company, and is, therefore, by virtue of said lien, entitled to the payment of said sum from the Wabash Railroad Company.

"Wherefore, this defendant, under the facts stated in the plaintiff's third amended petition and this defendant's amended answer, says that he is entitled to said sum of $ 81.98 mentioned, for which, with his costs, he prays judgment."

On April 29, 1901 the court...