Theaprin Pharm., Inc. v. Conway

• Decision Date: 30 March 2016
• Docket Number: 2014-02247, Index No. 601039/13.
• Citation: 29 N.Y.S.3d 401,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 02348,137 A.D.3d 1254
• Parties: THEAPRIN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., etc., et al., appellants, v. Joseph D. CONWAY, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

137 A.D.3d 1254

29 N.Y.S.3d 401

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 02348

THEAPRIN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., etc., et al., appellants,

v.Joseph D. CONWAY, et al., respondents.

2014-02247, Index No. 601039/13.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 30, 2016.

Simon Taylor, New York, N.Y., for appellants.

Doar Rieck Kaley & Mack, New York, N.Y. (John F. Kaley of counsel), for respondents.

THOMAS A. DICKERSON, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract and fraud, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Driscoll, J.), entered December 11, 2013, which granted the motion of the defendants Joseph D. Conway and Joseph D. Conway Certified Public Accountant and the separate motion of the defendants Michael Conway and Diana Conway to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, respectively, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court correctly held that the plaintiffs' causes of action alleging professional malpractice, negligence, and conversion were untimely brought (see CPLR 214[3], [6] ). Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the defendants were not equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations (see Putter v. North Shore Univ. Hosp.,

7 N.Y.3d 548, 552–553, 825 N.Y.S.2d 435, 858 N.E.2d 1140 ; Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Westbury v. IACO Realty, Inc., 131 A.D.3d 1060, 1061, 16 N.Y.S.3d 290 ; Attallah v. Nassau Univ. Med. Ctr., 131 A.D.3d 609, 610, 15 N.Y.S.3d 197 ).

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the plaintiffs' allegations as true and construe the allegations liberally, giving the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Dee v. Rakower, 112 A.D.3d 204, 208, 976 N.Y.S.2d 470 ; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v. Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 A.D.3d 122, 125, 884 N.Y.S.2d 94, affd. 16 N.Y.3d 775, 919 N.Y.S.2d 496, 944 N.E.2d 1135 ). Here, applying that standard, the Supreme Court correctly granted those branches of the motions which were to dismiss the plaintiffs' cause of action alleging breach of contract inasmuch as the complaint contained no allegations of the terms of any purported agreement (see Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 181–182, 919 N.Y.S.2d 465, 944 N.E.2d 1104 ; Canzona v. Atanasio, 118 A.D.3d 837, 838–839, 989 N.Y.S.2d 44 ). Vague allegations suggesting that there may have been an agreement do not suffice (see Canzona v. Atanasio, 118 A.D.3d at 839, 989 N.Y.S.2d 44 ).

The plaintiffs' causes of action alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty failed to satisfy the particularity requirements of CPLR 3016 (see CPLR 3016[b] ; Fulton v. Hankin & Mazel, PLLC, 132 A.D.3d 806, 807, 18 N.Y.S.3d 654 ; Deblinger v. Sani–Pine Prods. Co., Inc., 107 A.D.3d 659, 660, 967 N.Y.S.2d 394 ). Specifically, with respect to fraud, the complaint failed to allege facts supporting the allegations that the defendants knowingly misrepresented a material fact for the purpose of inducing reliance, actual justifiable reliance, and damages (see Fulton v. Hankin & Mazel, PLLC, 132 A.D.3d at 807–808, 18 N.Y.S.3d 654 ; Pace v. Raisman & Assoc., Esqs., LLP, 95 A.D.3d 1185, 1188–1189, 945 N.Y.S.2d 118 ). With respect to the cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs failed to make specific factual allegations, with respect to some of the defendants, that would establish that those defendants had a fiduciary obligation running to the plaintiffs (see Rosenblum v. Island Custom Stairs, Inc., 130 A.D.3d 803, 804, 14 N.Y.S.3d 82 ; Bill Kolb, Jr., Subaru, Inc. v. LJ Rabinowitz, CPA, 117 A.D.3d 978, 980, 986 N.Y.S.2d 523 ; Parekh v. Cain, 96 A.D.3d 812, 816, 817, 948 N.Y.S.2d 72 ). Where the allegations supporting the existence of a fiduciary relationship itself were sufficient, the allegations as to the defendants' breach of it were not (see Edem v. Grandbelle Intl., Inc., 118 A.D.3d 848, 849, 988 N.Y.S.2d 244 ; Deblinger v. Sani–Pine Prods. Co., Inc., 107 A.D.3d at 660–661, 967 N.Y.S.2d 394 ). The plaintiffs' claims regarding alleged statutory violations are similarly flawed (see United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Raia, 94 A.D.3d 749, 751, 942 N.Y.S.2d 543 ).

The Supreme Court also correctly granted those branches of...