Thomas & Associates, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
| Decision Date | 06 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. M2001-00757-COA-R3-CV.,M2001-00757-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | THOMAS & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County, Nos. 99C-3436 & 99C-3276, Thomas W. Brothers, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; and Remanded.
Vic L. McConnell, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellant, Thomas & Associates, Inc.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael Moore, Solicitor General; Rachel L. Steele, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Transportation, State of Tennessee.
BEN H. CANTRELL, P.J., M.S., WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., and WILLIAM B. CAIN, J.
This appeal involves a dispute between a road contractor and the Tennessee Department of Transportation involving two construction projects in the Nashville area. Following extensive construction delays attributed to the relocation of utilities, the contractor filed claims based on negligence and breach of contract with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration which were transferred to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all the contractor's claims. We have determined that the trial court correctly dismissed the contractor's negligence claims but that the trial court erred by denying the contractor's breach of contract claims. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the judgment dismissing the contractor's contract claims and remand the case for further proceedings.
Throughout the Nineties, the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("Department") worked to update the road infrastructure in and around Nashville and Metropolitan Davidson County to accommodate increased car traffic as the area's population grew. The updating involved both building new roads and reworking old ones. In the mid-to-late Nineties, two of the road reworking projects in Nashville, which mainly involved intersection work, were Project No. 4105, sometimes called the "Little Bell Road Project" and Project No. 4622, sometimes called the "Murfreesboro Road Project." In March 1996 and February 1997, the construction firm of Thomas & Associates, Inc. ("Thomas") of LaVergne entered into two contracts worth $3.7 million with the Department to serve as general contractor for the construction of the road improvements on both projects. The work involved mostly grading, installing underground drainage, and paving. To accomplish this work required, among other things, the widening of at least one bridge, relocating utilities, and changing or creating access to business property fronting the roadways.
Project 4105 was scheduled to take 265 calendar work days for completion by December 15, 1996. Project 4622, which had a later start date, was scheduled to take 427 calendar work days and be completed by June 15, 1998. Neither project was completed on schedule. Ultimately Project 4105 was extended by 536 calendar work days (twice its original length), and Project 4622 was extended by 690 calendar work days, more than doubling the length of that project. The principal difficulties encountered: (1) delays in relocating appurtenant utilities, and (2) failure to obtain all necessary right-of-way for the construction. Both these items were ultimately the Department's responsibility as the project owner.
According to Thomas, the extensive construction delays caused by both the utility relocation problems and the Department's failure to timely acquire all necessary right-of-ways forced the contractor to incur substantial, unanticipated costs on the two projects. Instead of making money on the two contracts, Thomas allegedly lost money. In the contractor's words, the two contracts were a "substantial financial loss." Thomas blamed this loss on the Department, whose actions, Thomas alleged, had held up the scheduled construction.
Seeking to recover its financial losses on Project 4105, Thomas filed a claim against the Department for damages with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration in June 1999. Thomas's cause of action against the Department was premised upon breach of contract, negligence and negligence per se. In September 1999, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(c) (1999), the Division of Claims Administration transferred the action to the Claims Commission, which, in March 2000, ultimately transferred the claims to the Sixth Circuit Court for Davidson County,1 where it was consolidated with a related lawsuit that Thomas had filed against Nashville Electric Service and BellSouth Telecommunications arising out of the same project.
Seeking to recover its financial losses on Project 4622, Thomas filed another claim for damages against the Department with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration in December 1999, which, in March 2000, transferred the action to the Claims Commission. In June 2000, upon motion of Thomas, the Claims Commission transferred Thomas's Project 4622 claims against the Department to the Sixth Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, where it was consolidated with another of Thomas's pending lawsuits against the utilities over the delays related to Project 4622.
In November 2000, the Department moved for summary judgment against Thomas in both lawsuits. For grounds, the Department asserted that all of Thomas's claims were barred by the express terms of the parties' contracts and that, furthermore, the Department enjoyed sovereign immunity against all the contractor's claims. Upon consideration of the Department's motion, the circuit court granted summary judgment in both cases. The court held that: (1) Thomas's negligence and negligence per se claims against the Department were barred by sovereign immunity; and (2) Thomas's breach of contract claims, while not barred by sovereign immunity, were untenable as a matter of law under the terms of the respective contracts. Thomas has appealed the trial court's decision in both cases.2 With no objection from the parties, we have consolidated the two appeals for adjudication.
It is well-settled that summary judgment is available in cases involving claims of negligence, see, e.g., Luther v. Compton, 5 S.W.3d 635, 640-41 (Tenn. 1999), as well as in cases asserting breach of contract. See, e.g., Smith v. Harriman Util. Bd., 26 S.W.3d 879, 884-85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Summary judgments are proper in virtually any civil case that can be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone. Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 66 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). They are not, however, appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Thus, a summary judgment should be granted only when the undisputed facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support one conclusion — that the party seeking the summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 529-30 (Tenn. 1998); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). If a party defends against a claim with a motion for summary judgment, the party asserting the claim may only overcome the motion by establishing the essential elements of the claim. White v. Methodist Hosp. South, 844 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Blair v. Allied Maint. Corp., 756 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal. Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1997); City of Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 938 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn. 1997). Accordingly, appellate courts must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and we must resolve all inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Terry v. Niblack, 979 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tenn. 1998); Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997). When reviewing the evidence, we must determine first whether factual disputes exist. If a factual dispute exists, we must then determine whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the summary judgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 214; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
A party may obtain a summary judgment by demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove an essential element of its case. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 212-13. Once the moving party demonstrates that it has satisfied Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56's requirements, the non-moving party must show that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56's requirements have not been satisfied. Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d at 647. One way for a non-moving party to fend off a motion for summary judgment is to convince the trial court that there are sufficient factual disputes to warrant a trial. The non-moving party may carry its burden by (1) pointing to evidence either overlooked or ignored by the moving party that creates a factual dispute, (2) rehabilitating evidence challenged by the moving party, (3) producing additional evidence that creates a material factual dispute, or (4) submitting an affidavit in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting additional time for discovery. McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n.6; Davis v. Campbell, 48 S.W.3d 741, 747-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
In this case, the summary judgments rest on two points of law. Interpreting Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) (Supp. 2002) in conjunction with the sovereign immunity provisions of Tenn....
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