Thomas R.W., By and Through Pamela R. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ.
Decision Date | 04 September 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 97-1477,97-1477 |
Citation | 130 F.3d 477 |
Parties | 122 Ed. Law Rep. 597 THOMAS R.W., By and Through his next Friends PAMELA R. and Edward W., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Stewart T. Graham, Jr., Hampden, MA, with whom Graham & Graham was on brief for Plaintiffs, Appellants.
Judy Zeprun Kalman, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, Boston, MA, was on brief for appellee Massachusetts Department of Education, Peter L. Smith, with whom Paroshinsky Law Offices, Springfield, MA, was on brief for appellee Mohawk Trail Regional District.
Before STAHL, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL and BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judges.
This appeal was brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1996) to resolve the question of whether a disabled student in a private school is entitled to the on-site services of a one to one aide provided by the public school system. Because we find that appellant's claim for injunctive relief became moot when he graduated, we now vacate the judgment of the district court and dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits.
Appellant Thomas R.W. (Thomas) is a fourteen-year-old, special education student who has ataxia telangiectasia, a congenital, progressive neurological disorder that results in loss of mobility control. As a student at the private, non-sectarian Greenfield Center School since kindergarten, Thomas had received physical, occupational, and speech therapy services as part of his individual education plan (IEP). Appellees Massachusetts Department of Education and Mohawk Trail Regional School District, the local education agency (collectively "LEA"), provided these services to Thomas at the private Greenfield School.
Because of his ongoing physical difficulties, Thomas came to require the full-time help of an instructional aide to assist him in the classroom. Although his parents and the LEA both agreed with the necessity of an aide, their dispute centered on whether the LEA would fund an aide at the private school. The parents wanted the LEA to provide an aide for Thomas at the private Greenfield School; the LEA offered to pay for an aide only at the local public school, Colrain. Rejecting the IEP that called for an aide at the public school, Thomas's parents (with assistance from Greenfield) assumed the cost of an aide for on-site special education services at the private school, and sought injunctive relief against the LEA in an appeal to the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA).
At the hearing before the BSEA, Thomas argued that the LEA was not only permitted to fund an aide at the private school, but that the IDEA required such funding for on-site services, relying on Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 125 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) ( ). The LEA maintained that its statutory obligations under the IDEA were fulfilled by offering Thomas a "genuine opportunity for equitable participation" in special education services available at the public school. The BSEA hearing officer ruled that the LEA was not legally obligated to fund an aide at the private school because Thomas's IEP Thomas sought review of the BSEA decision in the district court (Neiman, U.S.M.J. presiding), which found that Thomas's parents "ha[d] not borne their burden of demonstrating the central element of their case--the inappropriateness of the IEP." The district court found that, to establish a claim under the IDEA, a plaintiff must first make a threshold showing that the IEP was inappropriate. An IEP is inappropriate if it denies the student a FAPE. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 2005, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985) (); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (1984). In fact, the BSEA hearing officer had determined that neither the appropriateness of the IEP, nor the ability and willingness of the LEA to implement it, was in dispute. Because Thomas failed to establish this essential element of his claim--that his IEP was inappropriate--the magistrate judge recommended granting defendant LEA's motion for summary judgment.
which made an aide available at the public school, provided for a free appropriate public education (FAPE), thereby satisfying the LEA's responsibility under the IDEA.
Upon de novo review, the district court (Ponsor, J.), adopted the magistrate's recommendation, holding that Thomas had failed to show as a matter of law that his IEP was inadequate to provide him with a FAPE. In entering summary judgment for the LEA, the district court prudently declined to address the constitutional issues regarding Zobrest raised in dicta by the magistrate. Thomas filed this appeal.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming only where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution grants jurisdiction to federal courts to adjudicate only live cases or controversies. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a case to be justiciable, "an actual controversy must exist at all stages of appellate ... review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). A case becomes moot "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, or alternatively, when the party invoking federal court jurisdiction no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." Boston and Maine Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 94 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted). "A case is moot, and hence not justiciable, if the passage of time has caused it completely to lose its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if the court is to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-11, at 83 (2d ed.1988) (internal quotations omitted).
Thomas's graduation from the private Greenfield School last spring, and matriculation into the public Mohawk Trail Regional High School this fall, mooted the issue for which he sought relief. Since his graduation, Thomas no longer meets the live case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2. In the absence of a live case or controversy, this case is moot and therefore, we lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appellant's claim.
The rationale for the mootness doctrine is predicated on judicial economy--saving the use of the court's scarce resources for the resolution of real disputes. To avoid the relitigation of an otherwise moot question, however, the mootness doctrine countenances an exception for issues "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe, 410 U.S. at 125, 93 S.Ct. at 713. To preserve a case from mootness under this exception, two requirements must be met: "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully Though IEP claims similar to Thomas's have been found to fit the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception, see Honig v. Doe, ...
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