Thomas v. Cisneros
Decision Date | 12 March 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 13149,13149 |
Parties | J. C. THOMAS, Appellant, v. Kathy CISNEROS, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jim H. Arnold, Jr., Austin, for appellant.
Philip Juarez, Austin, for appellee.
This appeal presents the questions of whether motion for summary judgment was sufficiently specific so as to allow consideration of certain grounds on appeal and whether appellee proved, as a matter of law, that she did not cause or aid or cooperate in the causation of an alleged malicious prosecution of the appellant. We hold that appellee's motion for summary judgment was sufficient to place the elements of causation, probable cause and malice before the court and that appellee negated, as a matter of law, the element of causation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court granting appellee's motion for summary judgment is in all things affirmed.
Appellant, J. C. Thomas, plaintiff in the court below, filed suit against appellee, Kathy Cisneros, for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment that appellant take nothing. It is from this take nothing judgment that appellant has perfected this appeal.
The controlling facts are undisputed. Appellant was an attorney employed by the State Board of Insurance as a hearing examiner. Appellee was also employed by the State Board of Insurance as a secretary in the Company License Division, performing a function which was in conjunction with appellant's work but not in a directly subordinate capacity or position. The parties did have official contact of some frequency.
In addition to her work at the State Board of Insurance, appellee was, at the time of the incident complained of, a member of the April, 1977, term of the Travis County Grand Jury. During this same period of time, the Travis County Grand Jury for the January term of 1977, which had extended its term to complete an investigation which concerned the State Board of Insurance, was also in session.
It is undisputed that between 11:00 and 11:30 A.M. on June 21, 1977, appellant walked up to appellee's desk at the Board of Insurance and engaged her in conversation. The fact that appellee had been out of the office and was working on a grand jury came up and appellant made a comment to the effect that, ". . . well, I hope you are not after the chairman, you might not be here the next day." This comment was obviously in reference to an investigation by a Travis County grand jury of Great Commonwealth Insurance Company and its regulation by the Board of Insurance. The conversation ended and later in the day appellee related the incident to the foreman of the Grand Jury of which she was a member, withholding the identity of appellant.
On June 23, 1977, at a meeting of the same Grand Jury, the District Attorney approached appellee and questioned her about the incident. She was very reluctant to disclose any details and refused to divulge appellant's identity. Subsequently, after repeated urging by the District Attorney, appellee did furnish appellant's name but refused to file a complaint against him.
The next day the District Attorney filed a complaint, which he personally signed as a complainant, charging appellant with "retaliation" as defined in Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 36.06 (1974). Subsequently, on March 7, 1978, the charges against Thomas were dismissed on motion of the District Attorney after Thomas passed a polygraph examination.
On June 19, 1978, appellant filed suit against appellee for damages arising out of this alleged malicious prosecution.
Initially, appellant complains that ". . . Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment completely failed to state its grounds with specificity sufficient either to define the issues for summary judgment purposes or to provide Appellant with adequate information for opposing the motion."
Rule 166-A(c), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (Supp.1980), provides that a
In judging the specificity requirement, we are to be guided by the sufficiency requirements as made applicable to pleadings by Rules 45(b) and 47(a), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (1979). Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771, 772-3 (Tex.1978). Thus, grounds for summary judgment are sufficiently specific if they consist of a concise statement sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved to the non-moving party.
Appellee's motion for summary judgment provided, in pertinent part:
The elements of malicious prosecution are:
(1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution against plaintiff;
(2) which has been caused by the defendant or through defendant's aid or cooperation;
(3) which terminated in favor of the plaintiff;
(4) that plaintiff was innocent;
(5) that there was no probable cause for such proceedings;
(6) that it was done with malice; and
(7) resulted in damage to plaintiff.
Ellis v. Sinton Savings Association, 455 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Flowers v. Central Power & Light Co., 314 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1958, writ ref'd n. r. e.).
The above-quoted grounds for summary judgment gave fair notice of appellee's claims and were sufficiently specific to raise the grounds of lack of causation, probable cause, and malice.
"A defendant who seeks a summary judgment on the theory that the plaintiff's suit is without merit has the burden of establishing as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to at least one essential element of plaintiff's cause of action." Sanchez v. Garza, 581 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.1970); Citizens First National Bank of Tyler v. Cinco Exploration Company, 540 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.1976).
Because we deem the element of causation to be determinative of this case, we will discuss only this issue. This element of malicious prosecution requires that the criminal prosecution be caused by the defendant or through the defendant's aid or cooperation. Ellis v. Sinton Savings Association supra; Flowers v. Central Power & Light Co., supra. It is not necessary for the defendant to have signed the complaint or to have communicated the subject matter to the person who did if the making of the statement proximately caused the prosecution that followed. Meyer v. Viereck, 286 S.W. 894, 897 (Tex.Civ.App. Galveston 1926, writ dism'd). However, it is a corollary to this rule that ". . . if the defendant stated the facts fully and fairly to the District Attorney . . . and such officer determines that such facts constitute a crime and proceeds to formulate the necessary papers to set the prosecution in motion, the . . . defendant is not liable in an action for malicious prosecution, since if there is any fault, it is not the defendants'." Ada Oil Company v. Dillaberry, 440 S.W.2d 902, 912 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, writ dism'd); Meyer v. Viereck, supra; Sebastian v. Cheney, 86 Tex. 497, 25 S.W. 691 (1894); 36 A.L.R.2d 786, 812 (1954).
Public policy requires that there be wide latitude in reporting facts to prosecuting authorities in order that the exposure of crime not be discouraged. Reed v. Lindley, 240 S.W. 348 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1922, no writ).
The reasoning behind this corollary is succinctly stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 653, Comment g (1977):
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