Thomas v. City of Tacoma
| Decision Date | 08 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-35799.,No. 03-35816.,03-35799.,03-35816. |
| Citation | 410 F.3d 644 |
| Parties | Cory L. THOMAS; Abdullah Ali; and Muhammad Alexander, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, v. CITY OF TACOMA, a municipal corporation; Tacoma Police Department; Brian Ebersole; James O. Hairston; Ray Corpuz; Kristi Bucklin; Nathan Clammer; Terry Krause; Robert Luke; David Peck; Steve O'Keefe; Robert Baker; Joe Bundy; Ronald Tennyson; Todd Tehar; Sheppard Clarke; Keith Miller; Grant; and Rowbottom, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Lembhard G. Howell, Law Offices of Lembhard G. Howell, P.S., Seattle, WA, for the plaintiffs-appellants-cross-appellees.
Jean P. Homan, Assistant City Attorney, Tacoma City Attorney's Office, Tacoma, WA, for the defendants-appellees-cross-appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-05138-RBL.
Before McKAY,* O'SCANNLAIN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from the district court's denial of the parties' respective motions for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
Plaintiffs, residents of Tacoma, Washington, brought a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging multiple causes of action against the Tacoma Police Department ("TPD"), the City of Tacoma, three City officials, and twenty-two individually named police officers. Based on several incidents in which Plaintiffs were allegedly abused and harassed by police officers from the TPD, Plaintiffs brought numerous causes of action which ranged from violation of federal civil rights statutes to abuse of process.
During the course of litigation, several dispositive motions were filed by Defendants, many of which were granted.1 As a result, by the time of trial, three of the original four Plaintiffs maintained claims against the City and eight police officers stemming from ten incidents. The district court trifurcated the trial, grouping related causes of action into separate proceedings: (1) Plaintiffs' claims against the individual officers, (2) Plaintiffs' claims against the City for its hiring and retention of Officer Baker, and (3) Defendants' counter-claim against Plaintiffs for malicious prosecution.
The trial lasted five weeks and jury deliberations continued for three days. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Plaintiff Thomas on his claim against Officer Tennyson for violation of his constitutional right to be free from unlawful seizures. Defendants prevailed on all remaining claims, including the counterclaim. In its award to Plaintiff Thomas, the jury allocated $15,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages.2 Plaintiff Thomas3 and Defendants, in their respective status as prevailing parties and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, agreed to have the district court decide the issue of attorney's fees. After submission of the briefs and oral argument, the district court denied both parties' requests for fees.
We have jurisdiction over the district court's denial of attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Awards of attorney's fees are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002). However, we only arrive at discretionary review if we are satisfied that the correct legal standard was applied and that none of the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2001). If the parties contend the district court made a legal error in determining the fee award, then de novo review is required. Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.1985) (). All factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.2000).
A prevailing party may be awarded reasonable fees in relation to the prosecution of a federal civil rights claim.4 "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] ... 1983 ... of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee...." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). The statute does not differentiate between a prevailing plaintiff and defendant, but case law has filled that gap. "[A] prevailing plaintiff `should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (quoting S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976)). Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, may only be awarded attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) when the plaintiff's civil rights claim is "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christiansburg Garment Co. v EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978).
In denying Plaintiff's request for fees, the district court concluded that granting an award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff would be unjust because doing so would "result in a windfall." Thomas v. City of Tacoma, No. 01-5138 RBL, at *6-7 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 11, 2003). In support of this finding, the district court reasoned that "any outside observer would easily conclude that [Plaintiff] did not obtain what[he] sought in this case" as he only prevailed on one of his many claims. Id. at *6. As legal support, the district court relied on Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), which recognized that there are occasions when a prevailing party's reasonable fee is no fee at all. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566.
Plaintiff contends that reliance on Farrar was error. We agree. The district court used Farrar as a vehicle to arrive at the ultimate denial of Plaintiff's request for fees. After categorizing Farrar as a "primary case" for analyzing a request for a prevailing plaintiff's attorney's fees, the district court stated that Farrar "cautions that any fee award must be evaluated by comparing the extent of the plaintiffs' success with the amount of the award ... [and] recognizes that even where a plaintiff formally or technically prevails, sometimes the only reasonable fee is no fee at all." Thomas, No. 01-5138 RBL, at *6 (internal citation and internal quotation omitted). In so characterizing Farrar, the district court missed its central holding and improperly applied it to this case. The district court characterized Farrar as a case authorizing an award of no attorney's fees, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff prevailed, because the plaintiff did not prevail enough. Farrar's holding is much more limited. In Farrar, the United States Supreme Court decided the propriety of a fee award when the plaintiff was awarded only nominal damages. It held that, although a plaintiff is technically "prevailing" when awarded nominal damages, a formal or technical victory may, in some circumstances, only support an award of no fees. 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. By contrast to the plaintiff in Farrar who was awarded only nominal damages, Plaintiff here recovered a total of $35,000: $15,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. The jury's award of punitive damages alone is sufficient to take it out of the nominal category. Therefore, the district court's reliance on Farrar was improper.
The proper analysis requires that a prevailing plaintiff only be denied an award of attorney's fees when special circumstances exist sufficient to render an award unjust. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933. In applying the "special circumstances" exception, we focus on two factors: "(1) whether allowing attorney fees would further the purposes of § 1988 and (2) whether the balance of the equities favors or disfavors the denial of fees." Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 878 (9th Cir.1999).
The two justifications articulated by the district court for denying the request for fees were: (1) it would result in a windfall to Plaintiff, and (2) Plaintiff did not obtain the relief requested. Granting a windfall to plaintiffs was a concern echoed by Congress in enacting § 1988, but Congress balanced that concern against the need to attract competent counsel to prosecute civil rights cases. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 579-80, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (plurality opinion). Thus, § 1988 is a product of balancing those concerns by only permitting reasonable fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). To require Defendants to pay reasonable attorney's fees relevant to the prosecution of the successful claim does not create a windfall, but fulfills the Congressional purpose of § 1988(b).
The fact that Plaintiff failed to recover on all theories of liability is not a bar to recovery of attorney's fees. This concern was addressed by the Supreme Court in Hensley. In Hensley, the Supreme Court recognized that "the most critical factor [in determining the amount of attorney's fees to award] is the degree of success obtained." 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The Supreme Court explained:
Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court...
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