Thomas v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1970
• Citation: 13 Cal.App.3d 81,91 Cal.Rptr. 301
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Susan THOMAS, a minor, by and through Henry A. Thomas, her Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Frigidaire Sales Corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 9818.

Page 301

91 Cal.Rptr. 301

13 Cal.App.3d 81

Susan THOMAS, a minor, by and through Henry A. Thomas, her Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Frigidaire Sales Corporation, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 9818.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Nov. 24, 1970.

Hearing Denied Jan. 21, 1971.

[13 Cal.App.3d 85] Young, Henrie & McCarthy and John C. McCarthy, Pomona, for plaintiff-appellant.

King & Mussell, San Bernardino, and Ronald A. Burford, Covino, for defendants-respondents.

OPINION

KERRIGAN, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff, Susan Thomas, a six-year old minor at the time of the accident, acting by her guardian ad litem, filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a laundromat when the glass on top of one of the washing machines gave way as she was leaning on it and her left hand and arm were drawn into the machine while the unit was in full operation. Named as defendants were Malinda Lamb, the laundromat owner, Coin-O-Matic Equipment, Inc., the washing machine dealer, General Motors Corporation, the washing machine manufacturer, and Frigidaire Sales Corporation, a company formed for the purpose of selling washers manufactured by General Motors.

A jury awarded the plaintiff $5,000 damages against the laundromat owner (Lamb), but determined that she take nothing from the three remaining defendants. Judgment was entered accordingly.

Plaintiff initially appealed from that portion of the judgment decreeing that she take nothing against the manufacturer (GM), its sales organization (Frigidaire), and the dealer (Coin-O-Matic). She also appealed from the judgment in her favor against the operator (Lamb). However, pending appeal, plaintiff settled with the operator and dealer for $5,950.13 ($5,000 (verdict) $797.93 (court costs) $152.20 (interest) $ $5,950.13.) Consequently, GM and Frigidaire are the only respondents.

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, it is necessary to determine whether plaintiff is estopped from prosecuting her appeal inasmuch as her guardian ad litem, with court approval, executed a covenant not to sue in favor of the laundromat owner and washing machine dealer. Defendants maintain that, having accepted the benefits of the judgment, plaintiff is barred from seeking any further relief.

Section 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 'Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith Before verdict or judgment to one or more * * * tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort--(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; and (b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasors.' (Emphasis added.)

Defendants contend that the foregoing statute is not applicable because the covenant was given After judgment. Except as modified by section 877, the former law still applies, and a release of one joint tortfeasor is a release of all. (Watson v. McEwen, 225 Cal.App.2d 771, 775, 37 Cal.Rptr. 677.) In Watson, the jury returned a verdict against an owner and his lessee; the court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the owner and granted the lessee's motion for a new trial unless plaintiff consented to a reduction, which she did; the lessee paid the judgment in full, and a satisfaction of judgment was filed; in dismissing the appeal against the owner, the court held that plaintiff's acts were inconsistent with the retention of the right of appeal, and that section 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply because it provided that the release be executed before judgment; consequently, plaintiff was estopped from pursuing her appeal.

Plaintiff argues that the code in no way precludes a party from executing a covenant not to sue or appeal further where the action is taken on appeal, because the judgment is not final. A covenant not to sue one of several joint tortfeasors does not operate as a release of the others (Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d 857, 861, 13 Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345), and it makes no difference under the law existing prior to the enactment of section 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure whether the covenant is executed before or after judgment. (See Laurenzi v. Vranizan, 25 Cal.2d 806, 813, 155 P.2d 633; Rest. Torts, § 885.) While the distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue is highly artificial (see Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d 705, 711--713, 160 P.2d 783), a covenant not to sue is a valid method of avoiding the effect of the release doctrine by employing different language. (See Witkin, Summary of Calif.Law (7th ed. 1960), vol. 2, pp. 1188--1189).

In view of the strong policy favoring settlement rather than litigation and the harshness of the release doctrine governing joint tortfeasors, the use of the covenant not to sue should be extended to cases involving multiple defendants even after judgment has been rendered in the trial court and an appeal has been filed. In the case under review, there is no longer any dispute between plaintiff and the defendants Lamb and Coin-O-Matic. In the event of retrial and an adverse verdict, GM and Frigidaire will be entitled to a set-off. (See Laurenzi v. Vranizan, Supra, 25 Cal.2d 806, 813, 155 P.2d 633.) Therefore, plaintiff is not estopped from pursuing her appeal.

Turning to the merits of the case, on July 2, 1966, plaintiff accompanied her mother to the Ontario laundromat owned and operated by Malinda Lamb. The laundromat was equipped with 24 top-loading washing machines manufactured by GM. The machines had been newly-installed prior to July 1964, when Lamb assumed ownership of the business. Susan and her mother were the only ones in the laundromat at the time of the accident. The little girl went up to one of the washing machines the mother was using when she observed the machine shaking. The top lid of the unit contained a glass window in the center. The window was roughly 10 inches in diameter. The glass was held in place or secured to the lid by a hard rubber seal gasket with a slot in the underside. When the lid was fully assembled, this slot contained a rubber 'bead'--a round, 3/8-inch solid piece of rubber--which stiffened the underside of the seal gasket in order to hold the glass in the lid and to prevent it from rotating in the gasket.

Susan testified that she '* * * leaned (her) left hand on the glass * * * (t)o see if it would shake, too.' When the glass gave way, her arm plunged inside the machine which was functioning in rapid spindry cycle at the time. The child's screams alerted the mother and the latter extracted the girl's arm from inside the unit. The child sustained a badly damaged left hand the comminuted fractures of the left humerus--the bone between the elbow and the shoulder. At the time of trial the fractures of the humerus had healed, but the youngster experienced permanent scarring of the hand and diminished dexterity through loss of muscle tissue.

While there is some indication that the child may have been playing on top of the machine and fell in, as contrasted with the child's testimony to the effect that she merely leaned on the lid while at ground level, it can be fairly stated that the rubber 'bead' situated within the seal gasket was not in place at the time of the accident. With the bead in place, the glass could withstand an external pressure from above of 290--380 pounds. Without the bead, a force of 12--20 pounds applied to the glass could cause the glass to fall into the machine.

Plaintiff propounded three theories of recovery against the manufacturer and its sales outlet: (1) defect in the design and manufacture of the lid mechanism; (2) negligent design, manufacture, assembly, testing and inspection of the lid mechanism; and (3) negligent failure to warn users of a concealed danger and risk.

In maintaining that the judgment was erroneous in denying her any recovery of money damages against GM and Frigidaire, plaintiff raises several issues, only two of which are critical to the appeal: (1) Two of the instructions rendered by the trial court were erroneous; and (2) the court also erred in rejecting a proffered instruction.

Plaintiff argues that the effect of the following instruction rendered by the trial court was to direct the jury to find that the lid was not defectively designed:

'A defective design is such that the design itself inherently subjects a user to an unreasonable risk of harm from the reasonable and intended use of the washing machine.

'The nondefective design of a washing machine does not require that the latest, best, or safest design be utilized; neither is there any duty on * * * defendants to anticipate the misuse, mismounting, or abuse of the washing machine.

'In the event you find that the beading had been removed from the gasket as of the time of plaintiff's accident, then you are instructed that the washing machine was not being used for its intended purpose, and that such condition does not constitute a defective design.' (Emphasis added.)

Strict liability encompasses both design and manufacture. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 64, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897.) There is no rational distinction between design and manufacture, since a product may be equally defective and dangerous if its design subjects protected persons to unreasonable risk as if its manufacture does so. (Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 475, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229.) 'A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability...