Thomas v. Hector Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1943
• Docket Number: No. 33540.,33540.
• Citation: 12 N.W.2d 769,216 Minn. 207
• Parties: THOMAS v. HECTOR CONST. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

12 N.W.2d 769

216 Minn. 207

THOMAS v. HECTOR CONST. CO.

No. 33540.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

December 17, 1943.

Rehearing Denied January 28, 1944.

Second Petition for Rehearing Denied February 4, 1944.

Appeal from Municipal Court of St. Paul; Robert V. Rensch, now District Judge.

Action by Paul C. Thomas against Hector Construction Company to recover a monetary judgment in personam originally commenced before a justice of the peace and ancillary garnishment proceedings wherein the state highway department was named garnishee. The justice of the peace and the Municipal Court of the City of St. Paul on appeal overruled challenges to the jurisdiction and to the validity of service of summons and found against defendant, and defendant appeals.

Reversed with directions to dismiss.

Fred K. Gage, of Hector, and G. P. Smith, of Mankato, for appellant.

Paul C. Thomas, of St. Paul, for respondent.

PETERSON, Justice.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace of the city of St. Paul, county of Ramsey, wherein both plaintiff and the justice reside, to recover a money judgment in personam against defendant, a private domestic corporation. Ancillary to the action, a garnishment proceeding was commenced in which the state highway department, which has its office in the city of St. Paul, was named as garnishee.

Service of the summons in the main action was made on the secretary of state at his office in St. Paul under § 543.08 (§ 9231). Apparently a copy of the garnishment summons was also served on that official, who mailed a copy of the summons in the main action and of the garnishment summons to defendant at Hector, which it received.

Defendant appeared specially and moved to set aside the service of process upon the grounds (1) that it is "located" in the village of Hector, Renville county, Minnesota, wherein all its officers reside, and that it has no place of business outside said county; and (2) that service of the summons upon the secretary of state was unauthorized by law. The justice of peace overruled the challenges to his jurisdiction and to the validity of the service of the summons on the secretary of state and rendered judgment against defendant. On appeal from the judgment of the justice, the municipal court of the city of St. Paul also overruled the challenges to the jurisdiction and the validity of the service of the summons and made findings against defendant. Defendant appeals.

1. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace is defined by § 530.01 (§ 8993), which reads as follows:

"The jurisdiction of justices of the peace is coextensive with the limits of the county in which they reside, except in the following cases:

"(1) Writs of attachment may be directed to the proper officer in any county for the purpose of causing an attachment of property therein;

"(2) Garnishee process may run into, and be served on the garnishee in, any county.

"This section shall not affect the jurisdiction of any city justice or justice of the peace under the charter of any city or village situated in two or more counties."

The last sentence of the section has no application here, because the city of St. Paul is not situated in two or more counties. Jurisdiction of actions is governed by the provision that the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is coextensive with the limits of the county in which he resides. The statute plainly territorially limits jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to the county of his residence. A justice of the peace cannot exercise his power beyond the territorial limits of his county. A summons issued by a justice of the peace is without force or effect outside the county in which he resides. Perkins v. Meilicke, 66 Minn. 409, 69 N.W. 220. Consequently, the justice of the peace in Ramsey county before whom this action was commenced was without jurisdiction of a defendant residing in Renville county, and a summons issued by him could have no force and effect in that county.

2. The exceptions authorizing attachments to be made and garnishment process to be served in other counties relate to attachments and garnishments in actions of which the justice of the peace issuing them has jurisdiction. The plain purpose of these provisions is to provide procedures for the enforcement of the judgments of justices of the peace in counties other than the one in which they were recovered. It is not the purpose thereby otherwise to enlarge the jurisdiction of justices of the peace of actions. In Perkins v. Meilicke, supra, we held that, where the defendant resides in a different county than the justice of the peace, the justice of the peace could not obtain jurisdiction of the defendant by an attachment, for the obvious reasons that a valid attachment can be issued only in an action of which the justice has jurisdiction, and that the justice had no jurisdiction of the action because the defendant was outside his territorial jurisdiction.

Likewise, jurisdiction of a defendant residing in another county cannot be acquired by the institution of garnishment proceedings impounding defendant's property within the county. A garnishment is not an independent action but is a proceeding ancillary to an action. Jurisdiction of a garnishment proceeding depends on jurisdiction of the main action. It is necessary for a court to have jurisdiction of the main action in order to have jurisdiction of a garnishment proceeding ancillary thereto. Willson v. Pennoyer, 93 Minn. 348, 101 N.W. 502. A justice of the peace is without power to issue a garnishment in an action of which he has no jurisdiction. Roberts v. Hickory Camp C. & C. Co., 58 W.Va. 276, 52 S.E. 182. Since jurisdiction of the main action depends on jurisdiction of the defendant and since a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction outside his county, a justice of the peace of the city of St. Paul in Ramsey county could acquire no jurisdiction over a defendant residing in Renville county by the institution of garnishment proceedings impounding property of the defendant.

3. Jurisdiction outside his county is not conferred on a justice of the peace by the part of § 530.07 (§ 8999) which provides that "actions shall in all cases be brought in the town, village, or city where the plaintiff or defendant, or one of several plaintiffs or defendants, resides, or where an attorney at law licensed to practice in courts of record, representing plaintiff in the action, resides, or at the countyseat." The quoted language was adopted as part of an amendment enacted subsequent to the enactment of § 530.01 (§ 8993). The purpose of the amendment was not to expand but to further limit the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to the mentioned localities within the county "to prevent parties from being taken for trial to out of the way and inconvenient localities." Union Stoneware Co. v. Lang, 103 Minn. 466, 115 N.W. 271. The effect of the language in question is to limit the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace not only to the county wherein he resides but also to the mentioned localities within the county. Stevenson v. Murphy, 106 Minn. 243, 119 N.W. 47. The fact that an action is brought before a justice of the peace in the city wherein plaintiff resides does not confer jurisdiction on the justice of a defendant residing in another county.

4. The special appearance stated that the defendant is "located" in Renville county. A corporation is located where it exercises its corporate powers. Van Tassel (Carter) v. Spring Perch Co., 113 Conn. 636, 155 A. 832; Roedler v. Vandalia Bus Lines, Inc., 281 Ill.App. 520. As used here, "located" means the place where defendant has its place of business.

5. A corporation is deemed to be a "resident" within the purpose and intent of statutes defining the jurisdiction of courts and venue of actions. State ex rel. Oakland M. C. Co. v. District Court, 176 Minn. 78, 222 N.W. 524; 18 C.J.S., Corporations, p. 388, § 8b. Ordinarily, a private domestic corporation "resides" where it has its principal place of business; that is, where it exercises its corporate powers. State ex rel. Ballord-Trimble L. Co. v. District Court, 120 Minn. 99, 139 N.W. 135. Cf. Radabaugh v. H. D. Hudson Mfg. Co., 212 Minn. 180, 2 N.W.2d 828. Under § 542.09 (§ 9214), a private domestic corporation, other than certain public service corporations, "shall be considered as residing in any county wherein it has an office, resident agent, or business place." Ceska Farmarska, etc., v. Pavek, 203 Minn. 597, 279 N.W. 747; State ex rel. Minneapolis T. M. Co. v. District Court, 77 Minn. 302, 79 N.W. 960; Schoch v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 55 Minn. 479, 57 N.W. 208.

Because it has its principal and only place of business there and no office or resident agent elsewhere, defendant is a resident of Renville county. It is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the justice of the peace below. A justice of the peace whose jurisdiction is limited territorially to a county has no jurisdiction of a corporation whose place of business is in another county. Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Landers Chevrolet Co., 183 Ark. 669, 37 S.W.2d 873.

6. The provisions of § 543.08 (§ 9231 [2]), under which service of the summons was attempted on the secretary of state, read: "If such domestic corporation have no officer within the state upon whom service can be so made, of which fact the return of the sheriff that none can be found in his county shall be conclusive evidence, service of the summons upon it may be made by depositing two copies thereof with the secretary of state, which shall be deemed personal service upon such corporation. One of such copies shall be filed by such secretary, and the other forthwith mailed by him to the corporation, if the place of its main office be known to him or be disclosed by the files of his office."

While the statute provides that the sheriff's return that no officer of the defendant corporation can be found upon whom service can be made is...