Thomas v. Metals Express, Inc., No. 30813-4-II (WA 5/10/2005)
| Decision Date | 10 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30813-4-II,30813-4-II |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | FANNIE THOMAS, Respondent, v. METALS EXPRESS, INC., a Washington corporation; LARRY H. AMELL and `JANE DOE' AMELL, husband and wife, Appellants, And MICHAEL F. STANLEY and `JANE DOE' STANLEY, husband and wife, Respondents. |
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County. Docket No: 00-2-07391-2. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 08/08/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Katherine M Stolz.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Michelle Menely, Gordon Thomas Honeywell Malanca Peterson, 600 University St Ste 2100, Seattle, WA 98101.
Timothy Lee Ashcraft, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, 1301 a St Ste 900, Tacoma, WA 98402-4299.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Brett Andrews Purtzer, Attorney at Law, 1008 S Yakima Ave Ste 302, Tacoma, WA 98405-4850.
Michael Joseph Mc Kasy, Attorney at Law, 6602 19th St W, Tacoma, WA 98466-6131.
Shelly K Speir, Troup Christnacht Ladenburg McKasy et al, 6602 19th St W, Tacoma, WA 98466-6193.
Metals Express, Inc. and Larry Amell, defendants in a personal injury action brought by Fannie Thomas, appeal the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing co-defendant Michael Stanley. They argue that dismissal was inappropriate because there were material questions of fact as to Stanley's negligence. They also challenge the damages award against them, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that there could be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Finding issues of material fact as to Stanley's liability, we reverse and remand for trial.
In November 1997, Michael Stanley's vehicle struck Fannie Thomas's vehicle after he crossed the center line on Highway 509 while attempting to avoid a seven by eight foot metal garage door that fell off the back of a truck owned by Metals Express and driven by Amell. Thomas sued Metals Express, Amell, and Stanley to recover for her injuries from the accident. As an affirmative defense, Metals Express and Amell claimed that Thomas's injuries may have been caused by her own negligence or the negligence of others and requested apportionment under RCW 4.22.070.
Stanley moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) he was not negligent; and (2) if he was, his negligence did not proximately cause the accident. Specifically, he argued that:
{H}e was driving his automobile in a lawful manner. The only reason he collided with the plaintiff's vehicle was because of the flying metal garage door that was headed for his vehicle out of the truck of the defendant Metals Express, Inc.
There is simply no negligence established on the part of defendant Michael F. Stanley.
Metals Express, Amell, and Thomas opposed Stanley's motion. Metals Express and Amell1 argued that there were questions of fact as to Stanley's negligence, specifically: (1) whether Stanley was unable to avoid the accident because he was following Amell's vehicle too closely; (2) whether Stanley attempted to turn into a turn lane rather than into oncoming traffic; (3) whether the oncoming traffic was visible to Stanley; (4) whether the garage door landed to the right of Stanley's lane of travel; (5) whether there was a vehicle in the right lane preventing Stanley from moving into that lane rather than into oncoming traffic; (6) whether the garage door hit Stanley's vehicle; and (7) whether Stanley should have attempted to stop or hit the garage door rather than turn into oncoming traffic. Thomas argued that there were questions of fact as to whether Stanley was following too closely in violation of RCW 46.61.1452 or whether he violated RCW 46.61.1003 by driving on the left side of the roadway.
Stanley responded that RCW 46.61.145 did not apply because he was not a "following driver" for purposes of establishing his legal duty to Thomas, quoting Leach v. Weiss, 2 Wn. App. 437, 467 P.2d 894 (1970). He also argued that his `crossing the center line' was a normal response to the emergency arising from Metal Express's failure to secure the metal door on its truck. CP at 84.
The trial court granted Stanley's motion and dismissed all claims against him. Although the trial court did not specifically address the effect of this dismissal on Metals Express and Amell's affirmative defense, by finding that Stanley was not negligent, it effectively dismissed this affirmative defense as well.
Metals Express and Amell apparently did not request that the trial court issue CR 54(b) findings to allow them to appeal the summary judgment ruling. Instead, in their trial brief, Metals Express and Amell expressed disagreement with the summary judgment ruling, `reserve{d} all appellate rights related to that decision,' and stated that they were not contesting liability (duty and breach) in light of the ruling. CP at 91. Specifically, they stated:
Solely because of the ruling {on the summary judgment} motion, defendants Amell/Metals Express will not be contesting liability (duty and breach) at trial. However, defendants want to make it clear that they respectfully disagree with the court's ruling on summary judgment dismissing co-defendant Stanley and reserve all appellate rights related to that decision.
Metals and Amell did contest the nature, extent, and cause of Thomas's injuries. They presented evidence that Thomas had multiple health issues before the accident occurred. Metals Express and Amell then proposed the following instruction:
The term `proximate cause' means a cause which in a direct sequence produces the injury complained of and without which such injury would not have happened. There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury.
CP at 102 (emphasis added).
The trial court rejected this proposed instruction and, over defense counsel's objection, gave the following proximate cause instruction: The term `proximate cause' means a cause which in a direct sequence, unbroken by any new independent cause, produces the injury complained of and without which such injury would not have happened.
CP at 136. The trial court also instructed that the jury could find Metals Express and Amell liable only for those injuries proximately caused by the accident and not for preexisting injuries that were not aggravated by the accident.4
The jury found Metals Express and Amell liable for $176,000 in damages and awarded Thomas fees and costs of $1,219.18. Metals Express and Amell appeal the summary judgment dismissal of the claims against Stanley and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury.
Metals Express and Amell contend that the trial court erred in granting Stanley's summary judgment motion, arguing, in effect, that there were questions of fact as to whether Stanley breached his duty of care.
We review a summary judgment de novo, from the same position as the trial court. Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Wn.2d 243, 249, 850 P.2d 1298 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c), Clements, 121 Wn.2d at 249. `A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.' Clements, 121 Wn.2d at 249 (citing Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977)). The moving party may also prevail if its position is the only conclusion that a reasonable person could reach. Clements, 121 Wn.2d at 249.
The elements of a negligence claim are (1) the existence of a duty to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant's breach. Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 275, 979 P.2d 400 (1999) (citing Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wn.2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728 (1996)). The existence of a duty is a question of law, but breach and proximate cause are generally questions of fact for the jury. Hertog, 138 Wn.2d at 275 (citations omitted). `However, if reasonable minds could not differ, these factual questions may be determined as a matter of law.' Hertog, 138 Wn.2d at 275 (citing Sherman v. State, 128 Wn.2d 164, 183, 905 P.2d 355 (1995)). Generally, in an auto accident case like this, the defendant driver owes a duty of ordinary care to other nearby drivers. Robison v. Simard, 57 Wn.2d 850, 851, 360 P.2d 153 (1961).
The parties do not dispute that Stanley was subject to a duty of ordinary care or that Thomas suffered injuries caused by the accident. Instead, Metals Express and Amell argue that questions of fact exist as to whether Stanley breached his duty of ordinary care. Stanley asserts that (1) Metals Express and Amell's actions amounted to a superceding intervening cause that relieved him from any liability; and (2) any possible breach was excused under the sudden emergency doctrine.5
A defendant is not liable in negligence if a new, independent act breaks the chain of causation. McCoy v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 136 Wn.2d 350, 357-58, 961 P.2d 952 (1998); Qualls v. Golden Arrow Farms, Inc., 47 Wn.2d 599, 602, 288 P.2d 1090 (1955). But this doctrine does not apply here because Metals Express and Amell's negligence, failure to secure the door, did not interrupt the chain of causation; instead, it triggered it. See Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 117 Wn.2d 1, 17 n.7, 810 P.2d 917, 817 P.2d 1359 (1991).
Stanley next argues that although he crossed the center line, arguably in violation of RCW 46.61.100, summary judgment was still appropriate because the undisputed facts showed that he responded to a sudden emergency.7
Although driving on the left side of a two-way road is generally a violation of RCW 46.61.100,...
To continue reading
Request your trial