Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 2-1276A491,2-1276A491
• Citation: 381 N.E.2d 888,65 Ind.Dec. 238
• Parties: 25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 616 Eddie C. THOMAS, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, William H. Skinner, J. Frank Haley, and Ralph Miles, as Members and as constituting the Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, and Blaw-Knox Foundry& Machinery, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 888

381 N.E.2d 888

25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 616

Eddie C. THOMAS, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION William H. Skinner, J. Frank Haley, and Ralph Miles, as Members and as constituting the Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, and Blaw-Knox Foundry&amp Machinery, Inc., Appellees.

No. 2-1276A491.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, In Banc.

Oct. 26, 1978.

Janet L. Jannusch, Andrea K. Knish, Gary, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Darrel K. Diamond, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Eddie C. Thomas appeals from a decision of the Employment Security Review Board (the Board) denying his claim for unemployment compensation. The relevant facts are not in dispute and disclose that Thomas voluntarily terminated his employment for religious reasons. Thus, the reason for termination is not in dispute and is inextricably tied to First Amendment considerations.

In affirming the referee's decision, the Board adopted "by reference" the referee's Findings and Conclusions as follows:

"FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: The claimant worked for this employer for approximately one year concluding his employment on November 6, 1975. The claimant worked for this employer as a chainman 'hooker' and received approximately $4.52 per hour as remuneration for his services. The uncontradicted evidence indicates the claimant did voluntarily leave his position after requesting a layoff from the company. The evidence reveals that the claimant on his initial application form for employment indicated a religious belief of Jehovah Witness, and indicated his hobbies to be bible studying and bible reading. Claimant, upon the recommendation of another Jehovah Witness, was hired especially into the 'Roll Foundry' where claimant performed as a satisfactory employee. The evidence reveals that approximately two to three weeks prior to the claimant's date of leaving, the 'Roll Foundry' was closed permanently and claimant was transferred to the terret (sic) line. Claimant, at this time, realized that all of the other functions at The Blaw-Knox company were engaged in producing arms for the Armament Industry.

Claimant's religious beliefs specifically exempts (sic) claimant from producing or aiding in the manufacture of items used in the advancement of war. Claimant continually searched for a transfer to another department which would not be so armament related; however, this did not materialize, and prior to the date of his leaving, claimant requested a layoff, which was denied; and on November 6, 1975, Claimant did quit due to his religious convictions. The evidence further reveals that the other Jehovah Witness, who claimant used as a reference to gain his job, continued to work for the Blaw-Knox company in spite of his armament producing capability, and found a less strict interpretation of the Jehovah Witness principles, which claimant could not morally accept. The referee notes the claimant did not, knowing his special circumstances, seek out information concerning the Blaw-Knox company and its armament producing functions prior to his employment."

"From the foregoing findings it is concluded that the claimant did voluntary leave his position on November 6, 1975. It is further concluded by the referee that the claimant has the burden of going forward and establishing good cause in connection with the work, and that the claimant has not done so in this case. It is the conclusion of the referee that it was the claimant who placed special restrictions on his working capabilities, and that it was also the claimant who sought out the job at Blaw-Knox, not the employer who sought out the claimant; therefore, the employer hired the claimant in spite of his special circumstances. The action of the company leaves the referee with the conclusion that the claimant wanted to work for this employer when the claimant knew of his special circumstances and yet, in light of that, still requested employment whereupon the employer did grant set employment. Therefore, the referee finds no logic to the proposition that the employer in anyway contributed to the claimant's voluntarily leaving thereby establishing good cause in connection with the work. Therefore, the referee concludes, the claimant did voluntarily leave his employment without good cause in connection with the work." (Emphasis supplied).

We are squarely presented with the question whether the disqualifying provision of the Indiana Statute, I.C. 22-4-15-1 (Burns Code Ed. 1974), ¹ violates Thomas' First Amendment guarantee to the free exercise of his religion. ²

Thomas places principal reliance on Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 and Lincoln v. True (W.D.Ky.1975) 408 F.Supp. 22 to support his claim for benefits.

In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, unable to find employment because of her conscientious scruples against Saturday work, filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied her claim on the basis that she failed, without good cause, to accept otherwise suitable work. The state Supreme Court affirmed that decision and Sherbert appealed to the United States Supreme Court, contending that the disqualification abridged her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.

The Supreme Court analyzed Sherbert's claim in the following context:

"Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate . . ..' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 341, 9 L.Ed.2d 405." Id., 83 S.Ct. at 1793.

A majority of the Court was of the view that her disqualification imposed a burden on the free exercise of her religion:

"Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Id., 83 S.Ct. at 1794.

Because the State offered no persuasive "compelling interest" to justify this infringement, the Court held that for constitutional reasons the state was required to exempt her from its Monday through Saturday availability requirement. ³

The Lincoln case, Supra, applied the Sherbert holding in a slightly different context a context identical to that before us. In Lincoln, the claimant voluntarily terminated her employment with a tobacco company "because elders of Jehovah's Witnesses, a . . . sect of which she had been a member for 15 years, informed her that anyone using tobacco or working with tobacco products was violating the Will of God, and unless she resigned, she would be expelled from the fellowship of Jehovah's Witnesses." Id. at 23. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission denied her claim to benefits, calling her action a voluntary quitting without good cause. The District Court cited Sherbert as controlling and held that the denial of benefits was in violation of the claimant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of her religion and ordered that benefits be paid.

The Board here contends that neither Sherbert nor Lincoln control disposition of the present appeal.

The Board did not address Lincoln in its brief, but during oral argument observed that Lincoln had misstated the holding of Sherbert, on which it relied. It is true that Lincoln erroneously described Sherbert as having been discharged instead of having been "unavailable for work." Accordingly, this distinguishing factor will be hereinafter discussed but its consequence is significant only to the extent that we do not have available a reasoned analysis of the distinction between cases involving "voluntary quit" as opposed to "availability for work" or "discharge."

The Board contends that the distinction between disqualification standards under each statutory provision between good cause for quitting, I.C. 22-4-15-1, Supra, and good cause for refusing work, I.C. 22-4-15-2 (Burns Code Ed. 1974) makes Sherbert distinguishable. We agree that the distinction exists and that the standards for entitlement to benefits in a "voluntary quit" case are more strict than those in a "work availability" case. See Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc. (2d Dist. 1976) Ind.App., 357 N.E.2d 900. However, no explanation is offered by the Board why this should preclude application of the Sherbert analysis to Thomas' claim. Indeed, the Board argues merely that there Is a distinction and that Thomas' disqualification "was simply a determination that objective, religiously neutral standards were not met."

We think it settled that "(e)ven as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's valid aims." Gillette v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168.

Thomas is challenging the "neutral" disqualifying provisions As t...