Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.
Decision Date | 26 October 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 2-1276A491,2-1276A491 |
Citation | 381 N.E.2d 888,65 Ind.Dec. 238 |
Parties | 25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 616 Eddie C. THOMAS, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, William H. Skinner, J. Frank Haley, and Ralph Miles, as Members and as constituting the Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, and Blaw-Knox Foundry& Machinery, Inc., Appellees. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Janet L. Jannusch, Andrea K. Knish, Gary, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Darrel K. Diamond, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.
Eddie C. Thomas appeals from a decision of the Employment Security Review Board (the Board) denying his claim for unemployment compensation. The relevant facts are not in dispute and disclose that Thomas voluntarily terminated his employment for religious reasons. Thus, the reason for termination is not in dispute and is inextricably tied to First Amendment considerations.
In affirming the referee's decision, the Board adopted "by reference" the referee's Findings and Conclusions as follows:
(Emphasis supplied).
We are squarely presented with the question whether the disqualifying provision of the Indiana Statute, I.C. 22-4-15-1 (Burns Code Ed. 1974), 1 violates Thomas' First Amendment guarantee to the free exercise of his religion. 2
Thomas places principal reliance on Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 and Lincoln v. True (W.D.Ky.1975) 408 F.Supp. 22 to support his claim for benefits.
In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, unable to find employment because of her conscientious scruples against Saturday work, filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied her claim on the basis that she failed, without good cause, to accept otherwise suitable work. The state Supreme Court affirmed that decision and Sherbert appealed to the United States Supreme Court, contending that the disqualification abridged her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
The Supreme Court analyzed Sherbert's claim in the following context:
A majority of the Court was of the view that her disqualification imposed a burden on the free exercise of her religion:
Because the State offered no persuasive "compelling interest" to justify this infringement, the Court held that for constitutional reasons the state was required to exempt her from its Monday through Saturday availability requirement. 3
The Lincoln case, Supra, applied the Sherbert holding in a slightly different context a context identical to that before us. In Lincoln, the claimant voluntarily terminated her employment with a tobacco company "because elders of Jehovah's Witnesses, a . . . sect of which she had been a member for 15 years, informed her that anyone using tobacco or working with tobacco products was violating the Will of God, and unless she resigned, she would be expelled from the fellowship of Jehovah's Witnesses." Id. at 23. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission denied her claim to benefits, calling her action a voluntary quitting without good cause. The District Court cited Sherbert as controlling and held that the denial of benefits was in violation of the claimant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of her religion and ordered that benefits be paid.
The Board here contends that neither Sherbert nor Lincoln control disposition of the present appeal.
The Board did not address Lincoln in its brief, but during oral argument observed that Lincoln had misstated the holding of Sherbert, on which it relied. It is true that Lincoln erroneously described Sherbert as having been discharged instead of having been "unavailable for work." Accordingly, this distinguishing factor will be hereinafter discussed but its consequence is significant only to the extent that we do not have available a reasoned analysis of the distinction between cases involving "voluntary quit" as opposed to "availability for work" or "discharge."
The Board contends that the distinction between disqualification standards under each statutory provision between good cause for quitting, I.C. 22-4-15-1, Supra, and good cause for refusing work, I.C. 22-4-15-2 (Burns Code Ed. 1974) makes Sherbert distinguishable. We agree that the distinction exists and that the standards for entitlement to benefits in a "voluntary quit" case are more strict than those in a "work availability" case. See Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc. (2d Dist. 1976) Ind.App., 357 N.E.2d 900. However, no explanation is offered by the Board why this should preclude application of the Sherbert analysis to Thomas' claim. Indeed, the Board argues merely that there Is a distinction and that Thomas' disqualification "was simply a determination that objective, religiously neutral standards were not met."
We think it settled that "(e)ven as to neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's valid aims." Gillette v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168.
Thomas is challenging the "neutral" disqualifying provisions As t...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 79-952
...right to the free exercise of his religion. Accordingly, it ordered the Board to extend benefits to Thomas. Thomas v. Review Board, Ind.App., 65 Ind.Dec. 238, 381 N.E.2d 888 (1978). The Supreme Court of Indiana, dividing 3-2, vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, and denied Thomas b......
-
Miller v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.
...of such statements, they form no obstacle to my concurrence in this case. 1 Reference, Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1978) Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 888 (vacated).1 I concede that Indiana so far has rejected the "public policy exeception" to the employee at......
-
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.
...J., concurring, reversed the judgment of the Review Board. Buchanan, C. J., dissented with opinion. Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Sec., (1978) Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 888. The question presented for our review is whether the statute which made the claimant ineligible for unemplo......
-
Cargal v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division
...burden. The Division has not challenged this.8 The Review Board was reversed by the Second District of this Court in Thomas v. Review Board (1978), Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 888. The Supreme Court of Indiana vacated this Court's opinion in Thomas v. Review Board (1979), Ind., 391 N.E.2d ...