Thomas v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:09-cv-790-FtM-29SPC |
| Parties | CHARLIE LEE THOMAS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Charlie Lee Thomas (hereinafter "Petitioner") initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1, Petition) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 30, 2009,1 raising one ground challenging his plea-based conviction of burglary entered in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, Charlotte County, Florida (case number 06-1489CF). Petition at 1. Pursuant to this Court's Order, Respondent filed a Response (Doc. #11, Response) in opposition to the Petition and attached supporting exhibits (Doc. #12, Vol. I-IV, Exhs. 1-7) consisting of the trialcourt's records and Petitioner's post-conviction records.2 After being granted an enlargement of time, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. #14, Reply) in opposition to the Response. This matter is ripe for review.
By an Information dated November 20, 2006, Petitioner was charged with burglary of a dwelling, grand theft, dealing in stolen property, possession of cocaine, and possession of paraphernalia. Exh. I, Vol. I at 6. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, on July 17, 2007, Petitioner entered a nolo contendere plea to the burglary charge and the State nolo prossed the remaining counts. Exh. I, Vol. II at 251 (plea form); Exh. I, Vol. IV at 460. Additionally, it was agreed that Petitioner would receive a five-year sentence and would be adjudged a habitual felony offender. Id. at 460-61. Petitioner was given a two-day furlough and was forewarned that if he did not return to court for sentencing, he would be subjected to the maximum sentence permitted under the law as a habitual felony offender. Id. at 463. Petitioner also agreed pursuant to the plea that he would be foreclosed from withdrawinghis plea if he did not return to the court for sentencing. Id. at 463.
The trial court held the plea colloquy at which Petitioner was placed under oath, Exh. I, Vol IV at 464; stated he was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, controlled substances, or medication, which affected his ability to understand, id. at 469; stated he understood what he was doing in court, id., and, stated he understood the rights he was waiving by pleading nolo contendere to the charge, id. at 471-72. Petitioner also stated there were no promises made to him other than what had been stated in court, id. at 473, and identified the plea agreement that he signed, id. Petitioner testified that he understood the plea agreement, and that he was satisfied with his attorney, id. at 471. Petitioner affirmed that he understood that, pursuant to the plea form, he was pleading nolo contendere, and that he could be sentenced up to 30 years as a habitual felony offender if he did not appear back in court for sentencing, id. at 460, 464. Defense counsel stipulated to the factual basis for the charge presented by the State, id. at 484-85. At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial court accepted Petitioner's nolo contendere plea, found that he entered the plea freely and voluntarily, adjudicated him guilty on the charge, and deferred sentencing until July 20, 2007. Id. While Petitioner stated on the record that he reserved for appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, Exh. I, Vol IV at 460, there wasno finding by the trial court that this matter was dispositive. See generally Id. After Petitioner failed to appear for sentencing, a bench warrant issued. Exh. I, Vol. II at 257-58. Petitioner was rearrested and sentenced as a habitual felony offender to fifteen-years in prison.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his confession. Exh. 2. The State filed an Answer brief, arguing that the matter was not properly preserved for appeal because Petitioner's confession not dispositive of the case because there were two eye witnesses who saw Petitioner commit the burglary. Exh. 3 at 13. Alternatively, the State addressed the merits and argued that Petitioner's statement was voluntarily given to law enforcement. Id. The appellate court per curiam affirmed the state court's decision. Exh. 4.
This Court has carefully reviewed the record and, for the reasons set forth below, concludes no evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (2007). Petitioner does not proffer any evidence that would require an evidentiary hearing, Chandler v. McDonough, 471 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2006), and the Court finds that the pertinent facts of the case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Schriro, 127 S. Ct. at 1940; Turner v. Crosby,339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004).
Petitioner filed his timely3 Petitioner after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). Consequently, post-AEDPA law governs this action. Under AEDPA, the standard of review is greatly circumscribed and highly deferential to the state courts. Alston v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 610 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2010)(citations omitted). AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The following legal principles apply to this case.
A federal court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in state custody pursuant to a state court judgment only on the grounds that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A claimedviolation of state law is insufficient to warrant review or relief by a federal court under § 2254. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)("A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law."); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)("Today, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."); Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823, 832 n.5 (2009)(same); Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)(§ 2254 not enacted to enforce state-created rights). Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1983)(claim involving pure question of state law does not raise issue of constitutional dimension for federal habeas corpus purposes; state's interpretation of its own laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a constitutional nature is involved.)
A § 2254 application cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This imposes a "total exhaustion" requirement in which all of the federal issues must have first been presented to the state courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010)(citing O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) and Castile v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).
To fairly present a claim, a petitioner must present the same federal claim to the state court that he urges the federal court to consider. A mere citation to the federal constitution in a state court proceeding is insufficient for purposes of exhaustion. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1983). "'[T]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.'" McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kelley v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)).
"The teeth of the exhaustion requirement comes from its handmaiden, the procedural default doctrine." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136 (2002). Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief . . . . ." Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138. Aprocedural default for failing to exhaust state court remedies will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the asserted error. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). Second, under exceptional circumstances, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, even without a showing of cause and prejudice, if such a review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. House, 547 U.S. at 536; Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).
A federal court must afford a high level of deference to the state court's decision. Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-787 (2011). Habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court...
To continue reading
Request your trial