Thomas v. State
Citation | 622 So.2d 415 |
Parties | Clifford Lorenzo THOMAS v. STATE. CR 90-1133. |
Decision Date | 28 February 1992 |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Malcolm R. Newman of Newman & Newman, Dothan, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Joseph G.L. Marston III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Clifford Lorenzo Thomas, the appellant, was convicted for the capital offense involving the intentional murder and robbery of Wilmer Wayne Miller. After waiving jury sentencing, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The appellant raises four issues on this appeal from that conviction.
The appellant contends that his motion to quash should have been granted because the foreman of the grand jury, Huey Enfinger, was a resident of Houston County and not Geneva County. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge entered a written order finding that, although the foreman had been living in a house in Houston County for approximately 15 months, he had maintained his "residence" in Geneva County. R. 52-55. We find that the motion to quash the indictment was properly denied for two independent reasons.
First, the trial judge did not err in concluding that Mr. Enfinger was a "resident" of Geneva County. The facts indicating that Mr. Enfinger was a resident of Geneva County are as follows: He was born on his parents' farm in Geneva County. He later purchased that farm and either owns or has an interest in those 101 acres. His son was presently living on that farm. Mr. Enfinger was 68 years old and had lived on that farm with his first wife for 42 years. He received his mail in Geneva County. He was registered to vote in Geneva County. He did his banking, bought his groceries, and transacted most of his business in Geneva County. His motor vehicle driver's license was issued in Geneva County. He had been a lifelong resident of Geneva County and considered himself a resident of Geneva County and "a Geneva County boy." R. 38.
Mr. Enfinger's connection with Houston County was that for approximately 13 months before the return of the indictment against the appellant, he had been living in a house in Houston County. That house was owned by his second wife and was located 300 yards from the Geneva County line. Mr. Enfinger testified that if his wife died he would move back to Geneva County.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 277 Ala. 32, 37, 166 So.2d 872 (1964).
Nora v. Nora, 494 So.2d 16, 18 (Ala.1986). "[T]he terms 'legally resides,' 'inhabitant,' 'resident,' etc., when used in connection with political rights are synonymous with domicile." Mitchell v. Kinney, 242 Ala. 196, 203, 5 So.2d 788, 793 (1942).
The second reason the motion to quash was properly denied is because the allegation that a grand juror was not qualified is not a proper ground of objection to an indictment. In this state, a juror or grand juror must have been "a resident of the county for more than 12 months." Ala.Code 1975, § 12-16-60(a)(1). However, § 15-15-40(b) provides:
"No objection can be taken to an indictment, by plea in abatement or otherwise, on the ground that any member of the grand jury was not legally qualified, ... or on any other ground going to the formation of the grand jury except that the jurors were not drawn in the presence of the officers designated by law...."
See Thomas v. State, 249 Ala. 358, 360, 31 So.2d 71 (1947); Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288, 290, 90 So. 351 (1921); Boulo v. State, 51 Ala. 18, 19 (1874).
Troup v. State, 32 Ala.App. 309, 315, 26 So.2d 611, 615, motion to strike cert. granted, 248 Ala. 143, 26 So.2d 622 (1946).
The appellant maintains that he is entitled to a new trial based on the failure of a juror to truthfully answer a question submitted in an attempt to qualify the venire.
Prior to the in-court qualification of the venire, the prospective jurors were requested to complete a written "juror information questionnaire" which had been submitted by the appellant. Question 27 was:
Juror Linda Diana Couch answered this question, "No." R. 126. After trial, the appellant discovered that Mrs. Couch's 18-year-old son had pleaded guilty to theft and was in the county jail waiting to go to "boot camp" at the time of trial. Objection was raised in a motion for new trial.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Mrs. Couch testified that she did not understand question 27, that she did not know what "defendant" meant, that she tried to answer the questions the best that she could, that the fact that her son was in jail did not influence her thinking or play any part in her decision in the appellant's case, and that this fact did not come up during her discussions and deliberations with the other jurors.
We find no error in the trial judge's denial of this ground of the motion for new trial.
On the issue of whether a juror's failure to respond to questions during voir dire prejudiced the defendant, "the test is whether the petitioner might have been, not whether he actually was prejudiced." Ex parte Ledbetter, 404 So.2d 731, 733 (Ala.1981). See also Ex parte Poole, 497 So.2d 537, 542 (Ala.1986).
Eaton v. Horton, 565 So.2d 183, 185 (Ala.1990).
" "
Limbaugh v. State, 581 So.2d 5, 8 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (quoting Knighten v. State, 402 So.2d 363, 364 (Ala.Cr.App.1981)).
In this case, the prosecution denied that it had any knowledge of the criminal status of Mrs. Couch's son during the appellant's trial. The prosecution presented Mrs. Couch's testimony that she was not prejudiced against the appellant, and that the fact of her son's conviction and incarceration did not influence her verdict. This Court "recognize[s] that there are occasions where a jury's claim of freedom from prejudice and impartiality cannot be accepted and should not be believed." Parker v. State, 587 So.2d 1072, 1083 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). However, we do not consider this to constitute such a case. This Court takes judicial notice that the fact that a person related to a veniremember has been prosecuted for a criminal offense or associated with some illegal activity is reason regularly advanced by the prosecution for the exercise of a peremptory strike in the selection of the jury. For example, see Powell v. State, 548 So.2d 590, 592 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 548 So.2d 605 (Ala.1989). We find no evidence that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying of the motion for new trial based on this ground.
Despite the fact that there was no physical evidence linking the appellant to the commission of the crime, his conviction is supported by substantial circumstantial evidence.
A recitation of the entire evidence presented by the State is not necessary. Sometime between 8:00 and 9:15 on the morning of August 21, 1989, 74-year-old Wilmer Wayne "WW" Miller was robbed and murdered at his store in Slocomb, Geneva County, Alabama. Four witnesses, three of whom had known the appellant for sometime, identified the appellant and placed him near the scene of the crime shortly before the probable time of the murder. At the probable time of the murder, the appellant's...
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