Thomas v. State, 69811
Decision Date | 03 October 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 69811,69811 |
Parties | Kenneth Wayne THOMAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appellant, Kenneth Wayne Thomas, appeals from his capital murder conviction. For the following reasons we are compelled to reverse the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
In appellant's first point of error, he asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial based upon allegations that a person who had served on the jury had been charged with two theft offenses and as such was disqualified to serve per Articles 35.16 and 35.19, V.A.C.C.P. We agree.
Tempie Mashael Tonroy served on the jury that convicted appellant. She was at the time of her service on probation (deferred adjudication for a ten year period) for the third degree felony offense of theft over the value of $750 but less than $20,000. This offense had been prosecuted in the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County. Moreover, at the time of her service, Tonroy was also under legal accusation for the misdemeanor offense of theft by check. An information charging her with such had been filed in the County Criminal Court No. 5, also of Dallas County. Prior to trial, however, Tonroy did not inform the trial court of the felony or misdemeanor charges although she was asked during voir dire and in a juror questionnaire if she had been "charged, arrested, indicted or convicted" of any criminal offense.
Article 35.16, in pertinent part, provides that:
In addition to Article 35.16, Article 35.19, V.A.C.C.P., provides that "[n]o juror shall be impanelled when it appears that he is subject to the second, third or fourth cause of challenge in Article 35.16, though both parties may consent."
The juror in this case was absolutely disqualified for jury service--she was then charged with both felony and misdemeanor thefts, with legal accusations being filed in each case. This Court has repeatedly held that a person under indictment or other legal accusation for theft or any felony is absolutely disqualified for jury service. Tweedle v. State, 218 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex.Cr.App.1949); Terrill v. State, 112 S.W.2d 734, 735-736 (Tex.Cr.App.1938); Johnson v. State, 84 S.W.2d 240, 241-242 (Tex.Cr.App.1935); Hooper v. State, 70 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1934); Rice v. State, 52 Tex.Crim. 359, 107 S.W. 832 (1908). See Frame v. State, 615 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). See also Ex parte Bronson, 254 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.Cr.App.1953). Cf., Walker v. State, 645 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) ( ); Payton v. State, 572 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (same); Easterwood v. State, 34 Tex.Crim. 400, 31 S.W. 294 (1895) ( ). Specifically, in Bronson this Court wrote that:
"If upon motion for new trial, it be shown that one or more of the jurors impaneled was disqualified ..., a new trial shall be ordered, without regard to a showing of injury or probable injury or of consent or waiver." Bronson, 254 S.W.2d at 121.
The State, agreeing that Tonroy was disqualified to serve on the jury, makes two arguments that the above holdings should not be applied in this case. First, the State argues that because defense counsel never asked specific questions of Tonroy regarding the theft offenses any error in the record must be deemed waived. Second, the State argues that because appellant showed neither misleading answers by Tonroy, nor harm to his cause, reversal would be in the State's words "a travesty of justice." Both of these arguments fail. 1
The jury questionnaire that Tonroy filled out is in the record before us. The questionnaire contains, among others, the following questions and answers:
Moreover, during the voir dire of the panel the trial court questioned:
Certainly, defense counsel was justified in relying upon the above questioning to conclude that Tonroy had not been charged with any offense. See Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Although it is not apparent from the record who prepared the juror questionnaire, it is apparent that the questions were compiled with the intent of determining if a prospective juror would be disqualified from service due to theft or felony charges. We note further that the State also apparently accepted the juror questionnaire as a valid indication of the nonexistence of pending charges against Tonroy since during the individual voir dire of the then prospective juror the subject of the thefts were not even remotely broached by the prosecutor. Since both charges were out of Dallas County and had been prosecuted by the Dallas District Attorney's Office (making discovery of the charges easier), presumably the prosecutor relied solely upon the questionnaire and conducted no further investigation.
Moreover, we are reluctant to hold that appellant has waived error on appeal since there is no indication in the record before us that the defense knew of the juror's theft charges until the time of the motion for new trial. 2 It is also quite significant that both of the theft charges were out of Dallas County and were pending in Dallas County courts. Certainly the State, which had successfully prosecuted the felony theft offense and had filed the information on the misdemeanor theft offense, knew or at least should have known that Tonroy was unfit to serve on the jury. We are unwilling to say that appellant has waived error in this case when the State is at least equally...
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