Thomas v. State

• Decision Date: 20 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 1D19-3881,1D19-3881
• Citation: 312 So.3d 156
• Parties: Rebecca Jane THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

312 So.3d 156

Rebecca Jane THOMAS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D19-3881

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

January 20, 2021

Rehearing Denied February 19, 2021

Gary Lee Printy of Gary Lee Printy Attorney at Law, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Benjamin L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appellant, Rebecca Jane Thomas, appeals the trial court's order imposing three years of probation for possession of a controlled substance and challenges the denial of her motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Around midnight on November 17, 2018, a deputy with the Okaloosa County Sheriff's Office stopped for gas in Crestview, Florida. While at the gas station, the deputy ran every tag in the parking lot, as was his usual practice. One of the cars was a BMW with a dealer tag, and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV") records indicated that it was registered to a Betty Kaucher in Holt, Florida. The vehicle had three occupants—Appellant was one of the passengers, and Travis Ryan Lucas was the driver. Nothing indicated to the deputy that the vehicle was connected to a dealership. Suspecting the crime of dealer license misuse, the deputy conducted an investigatory stop, during which a K9 alerted to the vehicle. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress evidence and accepted her no contest plea. This appeal followed.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct, and we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling. Channell v. State , 257 So. 3d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). We defer to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by competent, substantial evidence, but we review de novo the application of the law to those facts. Id.

"[T]o effect a constitutionally-permissible investigatory stop, a law enforcement officer must have a well-founded, articulable suspicion that the person stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." Tobin v. State , 146 So. 3d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2018) (Florida Stop and Frisk Law). The officer must be able to point to specific facts that, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant an investigatory stop. State v. Teamer , 151 So. 3d 421, 425 (Fla. 2014). In deciding whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the totality of the circumstances must be assessed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer. Id. at 426. Factors that may be considered in making that determination include the time of day, the suspect's appearance and behavior, and anything unusual in the situation as interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge and experience. Huffman v. State , 937 So. 2d 202, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). " ‘[I]nnocent behavior will frequently provide the basis’ for reasonable suspicion. ‘[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’ " Teamer , 151 So. 3d at 426 (quoting United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ).

Section 320.261, Florida Statutes (2018), provides that "[a]ny person who knowingly attaches to any motor vehicle ... any registration license plate ..., which plate ... was not issued and assigned or lawfully transferred to such vehicle, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second...