Thomas v. State
| Decision Date | 21 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 27A02–1602–CR–374.,27A02–1602–CR–374. |
| Citation | 65 N.E.3d 1096 |
| Parties | Will THOMAS, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William T. Myers, Grant County Public Defender, Marion, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Larry D. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
[1] Will Thomas ("Thomas") was convicted of Dealing in a Narcotic Drug, as a Class A felony.1 He now appeals.
[2] We reverse.
[3] Thomas raises one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence heroin recovered from Thomas after a warrantless arrest following a traffic stop.
[4] On April 7, 2014, acting on information obtained from an informant, a joint task force of officers from the City of Marion Police Department and the Grant County Sheriff's Office engaged in surveillance of a white Dodge Caravan with temporary Illinois license plates. The vehicle was located at a hotel in Marion.
[5] Around 3:30 p.m., Byron Christmas ("Christmas") and Thomas, who matched physical descriptions provided by the informant, got in the van and left the parking lot of the hotel. Detective Mark Stefanatos ("Detective Stefanatos"), one of the officers conducting surveillance, observed the van change lanes without properly signaling a lane change, and requested that a uniformed officer, Joseph Martin ("Officer Martin"), conduct a traffic stop.
[6] Officer Martin conducted a traffic stop of the van. Christmas was driving the van, and Thomas was seated in the front passenger's seat. Detective Stefanatos came to the traffic stop, as did a police K9 handler, Grant County Sheriff's Deputy Matt Sneed ("Deputy Sneed"). Officer Martin spoke with Christmas while Detective Stefanatos spoke with Thomas. Each officer attempted to verify the men's identity and reason for their travel through Marion.
[7] During their conversation, Officer Martin obtained Christmas's written permission to search the van. Upon obtaining Christmas's permission to search, Deputy Sneed had his police dog begin to sniff the vehicle, starting along the driver's side from the rear bumper and moving toward the front of the car. The dog, which was trained in narcotics detection and suspect apprehension, alerted next to the driver's door.
[8] After the police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, the officers had Christmas and Thomas exit the vehicle and conducted a pat-down search for officer safety. Christmas and Thomas were each asked whether they would consent to a strip search at the police station, and were informed that officers would seek a search warrant if they declined to consent. Christmas agreed, and Thomas declined.
[9] Christmas, whose driving privileges had been suspended in Illinois, was transported to the Grant County Jail, where he was searched. The search disclosed $750 in cash but no narcotics.
[10] Thomas was transported to the Marion Police Department and placed in an interview room. While seated in the interview room, officers observed Thomas take something from a jacket pocket and put it into his mouth. Thomas refused to open his mouth, and police forced his mouth open. The officers retrieved a small plastic baggie with 8.5 grams of a gray, crumbly, rock-like substance that would later be identified as heroin.
[11] On April 14, 2014, the State charged Thomas with Dealing in a Narcotic Drug and Battery, as a Class B misdemeanor.2 A jury trial was conducted on November 30 and December 1, 2015. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Thomas guilty of Dealing in a Narcotic Drug and not guilty of Battery.
[12] This appeal ensued.
[13] Thomas challenges his conviction because, he argues, the trial court erred when it did not grant his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his person at the Marion Police Department. However, Thomas's case proceeded to trial, and is instead a challenge to the trial court's ruling to admit evidence. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind.2014).
The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Id. at 259–60. We review its rulings "for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights." Id. But when an appellant's challenge to such a ruling is predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider that question de novo. Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind.2013).
Id. at 40–41 (Ind.2014) (footnote omitted).
[14] Thomas argues on appeal that police lacked the requisite probable cause to arrest, detain, move, and subsequently search him after the traffic stop. Thomas does not challenge the legitimacy of the traffic stop. Rather, he contends that police detention and transportation of him to a police station in order to conduct a strip search was not supported by probable cause and was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Evidence obtained from the detention, Thomas argues, should have been barred from admission into evidence by the exclusionary rule.3
[15] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." The U.S. Supreme Court has held that even when a seizure is initiated with probable cause, the seizure may violate the Fourth Amendment "if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). One way in which this may occur is if a seizure "is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete" a stop justified "solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver." Id.
[16] In Caballes, the Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a stop for a speeding ticket was not an unlawful seizure because "a dog sniff would not change the character" of a lawfully-initiated and conducted traffic stop "unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally protected interest in privacy." Id. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834. Yet, the Court held, dog sniffs do not in themselves infringe such interests. Id. Moreover, both this Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have held that dog sniffs are sufficient to establish probable cause. State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind.2010) (citing Neuhoff v. State, 708 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ); Perez v. State, 981 N.E.2d 1242, 1251 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citing Neuhoff, supra ), trans. denied.
[17] Thus, police had probable cause to search the vehicle—and that search was further consented to by Christmas, who was operating the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop. At trial, Detective Stefanatos testified, "I was told directly by Deputy Matt Sneed ... that his dog had indicated the presence of the odor of narcotics inside the vehicle." (Tr. at 35.) The following exchange ensued:
(Tr. at 35.)
[18] With police having failed to find narcotics in the vehicle, despite the dog sniff giving rise to probable cause for the vehicle search, Thomas argues that, under the totality of the circumstances, the decision to arrest him and transport him to the police station for a strip search was unreasonable. The State argues that police had probable cause to search not only the van but also Christmas and Thomas as a result of the dog sniff, and that transporting Thomas to the police station to do so was not a violation of Thomas's constitutional rights.
[19] Without a warrant, "an arrest or detention for more than a short period" must be justified by probable cause. Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 662 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citing Woods v. State, 547 N.E.2d 772, 778 (Ind.1989) ), trans. denied. Probable cause for an arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of law enforcement officers are sufficient to warrant belief by a person of reasonable caution that an offense has been committed and the person to be arrested has committed it. Id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) ). "The amount of evidence necessary to meet the probable cause requirement for a warrantless arrest is determined on a case-by-case basis." Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind.2003).
[20] The United States Supreme Court has "distinguished between the search of a vehicle and a personal search ‘because of the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one's person.’ " United States v. Moore, 390 Fed.Appx. 503, 507 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) ). This distinction rests upon a longstanding rule that the existence of probable cause to search a vehicle does not mean that "a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948). Thus, in Di Re, the Court held as insufficient to support a search of Di Re's person his "mere presence in a suspected car." Id. at 588, 68 S.Ct. 222. Similarly, in Ybarra v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a search and arrest of Ybarra was unconstitutional, despite his presence at a location for which a warrant had been issued and where there was probable cause to believe that other persons present were engaged in criminal activity. 444 U.S. 85, 90–91, 100 S.Ct. 338, ...
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