Thomas v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 15 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 46086,46086 |
| Citation | 377 S.E.2d 666,259 Ga. 73 |
| Parties | , 57 USLW 2627 THOMAS v. THOMAS |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Penelope W. Rumsey, Rumsey & Rumsey, Atlanta, for appellee.
This granted discretionary appeal presents another version of the challenge facing factfinders, whether judge or jury, in deciding how to classify as marital or non-marital certain property which has characteristics of both. The subject of this particular inquiry involves the proceeds from the sale of the marital home and from the sale of stock in the company which employed the husband. The house was in the wife's name and had been purchased by her shortly before the marriage but marital funds had reduced the mortgage debt against the house. The stock was purchased during the marriage as the result of stock options obtained by the husband before the marriage. The stock was paid for by a combination of separate and marital funds. The trial judge awarded the wife almost all the proceeds from the sale of the house and awarded her what amounted to one-half the proceeds of the stock sale, conceded by the court to be, in part, separate property of the husband. This was done in order to restore to her a portion of sums which she had given to the husband before the marriage. The husband appeals and we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
The wife was a successful sales representative for a computer company in Florida when, in 1979, she met the husband, who was her regional manager in Atlanta. As their relationship developed the husband left his family and moved into a condominium. From June 1981 until the marriage in July 1983, the wife gave the husband almost $39,000 so that he could meet his increased obligations resulting from the separation from his family. In the summer of 1982, the wife terminated her employment from the computer company and moved to Atlanta. She and the husband located a house under construction and decided to purchase it. The actual purchase was made by the wife. In round figures In 1981 and 1982, the husband had earned stock options as part of his employment compensation. The options were exercised during the marriage at times when the value of the stock was less than its value immediately prior to the marriage. The stock was purchased with a combination of marital funds, a loan from his father, and a loan against his life insurance policies. The stock was sold prior to the divorce and a profit in excess of $30,000 was realized.
she met the $260,000 sales price by a down payment of [259 Ga. 74] $75,000 and a first mortgage of $185,000. A month after they separated in November of 1986, the house was sold for $351,000. Thus the house appreciated in value during the marriage in the amount of about $91,000. Through monthly payments, made mostly during the marriage, the mortgage was reduced from $185,000 to $177,000 at the time of the sale. The monthly payments between November 15, 1982, the date of purchase, to the date of the marriage in July 1983, were made by the wife.
The parties separated in November 1986.
With respect to the proceeds from the sale of the stock and the connection between those proceeds and the cash advanced by the wife to the husband before the marriage, the court had this to say:
[T]hose contributions [by the wife] would have been, had they been made during the marriage, treated as marital assets. They would have been a contribution to or investment in the relationship.
However, since the wife contributed $38,967 to the Husband prior to their marriage, then the equitable and rational approach would be to cause an equal amount in non-marital assets of Mr. Thomas to be treated as martial assets since they were expended for his benefit and to satisfy his legal obligations. Therefore, $38,967 of his non-marital assets would be treated as a marital asset for purposes of distribution.
The stock [shares] were premarital assets to the extent that [there] were loans that permitted the purchase of those assets, particularly when those loans were made against non-marital assets such as the cash surrender value of the insurance policies or their loan values. Also since the difference between the option price and the market price at the time of the commencement of the marriage was greater than the fair market value or market price at the time the option was exercised, that would not be subject to equitable division of property. To the extent that marital assets were used in exercising that option, that would subject the proceeds of such stock sale to that equitable division. In any event, because of the consumption of $38,967 premaritally, for the benefit of Mr. Thomas, then of those total stock sales, $38,967 would be subject to equitable division. (Emphasis supplied.)
The husband argues that to the extent the stock proceeds were non-marital assets they would not be subject to equitable division. We agree. In order to divide marital property on an equitable basis, two things must be done. First, the property must be classified as either marital or non-marital. Second, the marital property must be divided, not necessarily equally, but equitably under the principles elucidated in Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765, 273 S.E.2d 169 (1980). The classifying of property as either marital or non-marital is not a discretionary function but is based on legal principles. The second part, the division of marital property itself, is of course discretionary based on a consideration of various equitable factors. The court was not permitted to treat a portion of the husband's separate property as marital property in order to satisfy his perception of the equities of the case. In doing so, he in effect imposed an equitable trust upon those funds to the extent of the wife's premarital contribution. 1 We will remand
this issue to the trial court so that the marital aspect of the stock proceeds may be set aside for distribution. The court may then divide those marital proceeds as it sees fit based upon the usual equitable criteria.
The husband argues that all the appreciation and value of the house which occurred during the marriage should have been classified as marital property and be subject to equitable division. He concedes that the wife brought the house into the marriage as her separate property and that she was entitled to all of the value in the house apart from its appreciation during the marriage. 2
The net appreciation in the house amounted to $90,905.00. The trial court found that in addition to the down payment both parties had reduced the loan balance $7,265.00, and that the total equity paid by both parties was $82,623.00. Of the $7,265.00 reduction in debt which had been occasioned by the monthly mortgage payments he figured that $1,017.00 had been paid by the wife and $6,393.00 were paid out of marital assets. His order then stated:
A ratio of $6,393.00 to $82,623.00 (total equity paid) works out to seven percent of the payments on the equity being marital. Therefore, seven percent of the appreciation of $90,905.00 is subject to marital distribution as a marital asset, which works out to $12,756.00. That is a marital asset subject to equitable division.
The method of division utilized by the trial court is referred to as the "source of funds" rule. In Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982), the Court of Appeals of Maryland made a detailed survey of its sister states to determine the...
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