Thomas v. Vigilant Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-00211 (KAD) |
| Citation | 594 F.Supp.3d 499 |
| Parties | Robert THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. VIGILANT INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a Chubb, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Joseph E. Boccia, Kevin C. Shea, William H. Clendenen, Jr., Clendenen & Shea, LLC, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
Gregory P. Varga, Josiah T.D. Butts, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.
This lawsuit arises out a denial of coverage under Plaintiff Robert Thomas’ homeowner's insurance policy issued by Defendant Vigilant Insurance Company, d/b/a/ Chubb (hereinafter "Chubb" or Defendant) following an incident by which Plaintiff's home suffered significant water damage. Plaintiff brings a breach of contract claim for the denial of coverage and a tort claim that the Defendant violated its duty to deal with the Plaintiff in good faith (Counts One and Two). In addition, Plaintiff asserts five additional causes of action: breach of the contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Three), innocent misrepresentation (Count Four), negligent misrepresentation (Count Five), a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act ("CUIPA") and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA") (Count Six), and a second CUIPA/CUTPA violation (Count Seven).
Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts Three through Seven. of the Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.
To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Nevertheless, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw "all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor." Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp. , 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Court accepts as true the allegations in the Amended Complaint which are as follows. At relevant times, the Plaintiff owned a residence located at 60 Clark Hill Road, East Haddam, Connecticut. (Am Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 15.) On May 11, 2019, in consideration for the premium it charged, the Defendant issued the Plaintiff a homeowner's insurance policy, known as the "Masterpiece Homeowners Insurance Deluxe House Coverage" policy (the "Masterpiece Policy") and bearing policy number 1120067401. (Id. ¶ 5.)
On or about April 13, 2020, while the Masterpiece Policy was in effect, the Plaintiff suffered water damage to the insured property at 60 Clark Hill Road. (Id. ¶ 6.) The Masterpiece Policy covered damage caused by water or water-borne material which backs up or escapes from within interior plumbing or sewers. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Plaintiff promptly notified the Defendant of the damage and loss of use of the property, and the Plaintiff fulfilled the terms and conditions of the Masterpiece Policy. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.)
On or about April 15, 2020, the Defendant's agent Jeff Crane called the Plaintiff and left a message acknowledging the Plaintiff's notification of the claim. (Id. ¶ 17.) Christopher Howley, another of the Defendant's agents, inspected the property concerning the loss on or about April 17, 2020. (Id. ¶ 18.) Upon receiving Howley's report, the Defendant did not approve the Plaintiff's claim. (Id. ) On May 1, 2020 the claim was reassigned to Jon Dickenson. (Id. ¶ 19.) Chubb hired C.A. Pretzer Associates, Inc. ("Pretzer") ostensibly to investigate the claim. (Id. ¶ 11.) Pretzer assigned David Grandpre to investigate the claim. (Id. ¶ 20.) On or about June 2, 2020, Pretzer issued a report to Chubb concluding that the water causing the damage entered the east and west basements as a result of a backup in the drainpipes located within the footprint of the east and west wings.
This report was a sham designed in bad faith to manufacture reasons to deny coverage. (Id. ¶ 22.) It ignored the observations of Christopher Howley and the geographical and architectural features of the house and surrounding property. (Id. ) Further the report also defied accepted, general scientific and engineering principles and standards, and the report was "speculative and unfounded." (Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.) Neither Chubb nor Grandpre disclosed that David Grandpre was not an independent engineer but was instead an expert witness often retained by Chubb in connection with homeowner's insurance claims. (Id. ¶ 23.)
On or about June 15, 2020, Jon Dickenson left the Plaintiff a message stating that the Defendant was still investigating the claim. (Id. ¶ 26.) Jon Dickenson called again the following day and indicated that the Defendant wanted to excavate the property to further investigate and determine the cause of the damage to make a call on coverage. (Id. ¶ 27.) The excavation would allow the Defendant to insert a camera into the drainpipe and determine the source of the blockage. (Id. ) A written inquiry followed that same day. (Id. ¶ 28.) The Plaintiff questioned the need for this further investigation insofar as the finding that the water emanated from the drainage system within the dwelling established coverage under the policy. (Id. ¶ 30.) On June 25, 2020, the Plaintiff's agent indicated that the Plaintiff would allow this excavation to occur on the condition that the Defendant indemnify the Plaintiff for any damage resulting from the additional excavation. (Id. ¶ 31.) The Defendant refused Plaintiff's request and withdrew its request for additional investigation. (Id. )
On or about October 20, 2020, the Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff informing him that the Defendant would not cover the water damage to the 60 Clark Hill Road Property. (Id. ¶ 32.)
The Defendant did not, during this time or at any time within 180 days of the damage, attempt to mitigate the water damage emanating from within the home. (Id. ¶ 11.) Additional allegations shall be set forth as necessary.
This case is principally a coverage dispute. Although Plaintiff brings multiple claims, each derives from the denial of coverage which forms the basis of the breach of contract claim and which the Defendant does not challenge. Nor does the Defendant challenge the second count, which alleges tortious bad faith. Rather the Defendant challenges the counts that are peripheral to the core dispute between the parties and argues that those counts are either inapplicable as a matter of law or insufficiently plead. The Court agrees.
In both Count Two and Count Three, Plaintiff alleges bad faith on the part of the Defendant in handling his claim. The Defendant moves to dismiss Count Three as duplicative of Count Two, asserting that "these two counts ultimately involve the same legal cause of action, and, indeed, the same underlying factual allegations." (Def.’s Mem. 10, ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff responds that the bad faith claim sounding in tort is distinct from the contract-based breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. While the Court agrees in principle with the Plaintiff, under the circumstances of this case, the claims are wholly duplicative.
"Connecticut ‘recognizes a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing between an insurer and its insured,’ " and this common-law duty gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pasiaki , No. X08FSTCV094015401, 2011 WL 6413817, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2011). Connecticut law also implies into every contract a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See , e.g. , Macomber v. Travelers Property & Cas. Corp. , 261 Conn. 620, 638, 804 A.2d 180 (2002). This, of course, includes contracts for insurance. See , e.g. , Heyse v. Case , 114 Conn. App. 640, 652–53, 971 A.2d 699 (2009). Along those lines, the Connecticut Supreme Court "has tended to use the terms ‘bad faith,’ ‘lack of good faith’ and ‘breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing’ interchangeably ... and [it] applies the same analysis to claims brought under each of these terms." Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co. , 308 Conn. 760, 794 n.34, 67 A.3d 961 (2013) () (internal quotations omitted). And while there may be circumstances where a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is distinct from a tortious bad faith claim, Connecticut courts have oft held that these causes of action are duplicative where they are based on the same underlying insurance contract. See Arch Ins. Co. v. Centerplan Constr. Co., LLC , No. 3:16-CV-01891 (VLB), 2018 Wl 6519063, at *16–*17 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2018) (discussing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pasiak , No. X08FSTCV094015401, 2011 WL 6413817 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2011) ). See also Votre v. County Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C. , 113 Conn. App. 569, 580, 966...
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