Thomas v. Williams

• Decision Date: 21 November 2008
• Docket Number: 2070512.
• Citation: 21 So.3d 1234
• Parties: Teresa Desselle THOMAS v. John A. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

21 So.3d 1234

Teresa Desselle THOMAS v. John A. WILLIAMS.

2070512.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

November 21, 2008.

Certiorari Denied April 24, 2009 Alabama Supreme Court 1080299.

Shay Samples and James R. Moncus III of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellant.

Thomas H. Keene, L. Peyton Chapman III, and Bethany L. Bolger of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Teresa Desselle Thomas sued John A. Williams, seeking an award of damages on claims alleging intentional interference with a business relationship, the tort of outrage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Williams moved to dismiss Thomas's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., alleging that Thomas had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thomas responded to Williams's motion to dismiss by arguing that her complaint was sufficient under Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court heard oral arguments on the motion to dismiss. On December 11, 2007, the trial court entered a notation on the case-action summary in which it granted Williams's motion to dismiss. Thomas timely appealed.

Our supreme court has set forth the standard of review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as follows:

"`This Court must review de novo the propriety of a dismissal for failure to state a claim and must resolve all doubts in favor of the plaintiff:

"`"It is a well-established principle of law in this state that a complaint, like all other pleadings, should be liberally construed, Rule 8(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is properly granted only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Henderson, 371 So.2d 899 (Ala.1979) ....

"`"Where a 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion has been granted and this Court is called upon to review the dismissal of the complaint, we must examine the allegations contained therein and construe them so as to resolve all doubts concerning the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. First National Bank v. Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc., 398 So.2d 258 (Ala.1981). In so doing, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, only whether he has stated a claim under which he may possibly prevail. Karagan v. City of Mobile, 420 So.2d 57 (Ala.1982)."

"`Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So.2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985).'"

Fogarty v. Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., 961 So.2d 784, 787-88 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Ala.2002)); see also Stovall v. Universal Constr. Co., 893 So.2d 1090, 1101-1102 (Ala.2004) (same); and Pratt Capital, Inc. v. Boyett, 840 So.2d 138, 142-43 (Ala.2002) (same). Our supreme court has recently stated that although we have notice pleading under Alabama's Rules of Civil Procedure, "`a pleading must give fair notice of the claim against which the defendant is called to defend.'" Ex parte Burr & Forman, LLP, 5 So.3d 557, 566 (Ala.2008) (emphasis omitted), quoting Archie v. Enterprise Hosp. & Nursing Home, 508 So.2d 693, 696 (Ala.1987); see also Ex parte International Refining & Mfg. Co., 972 So.2d 784, 789 (Ala.2007) ("[T]he purpose of notice pleading is to provide defendants adequate notice of the claims against them.").¹

In his motion to dismiss, Williams argued that Thomas's complaint does not contain allegations sufficient to support her claims asserting the tort of outrage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with business relations. The factual allegations in Thomas's complaint read as follows:

"1. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, is an adult resident of Autauga County, Alabama and resides in the town of Millbrook.

"2. The Defendant, John Williams, is an adult resident of Montgomery County, Alabama and is a practicing medical doctor in Montgomery.

"3. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, was employed as a medical assistant by Dr. James Carpenter from approximately February, 2007, until September 18, 2007, when she was abruptly fired without warning, justification, or explanation.

"4. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, lost her husband, David Brian Thomas, on January 24, 2002, due to the negligent medical care delivered by Defendant, John Williams.

"5. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, as the duly qualified Administratrix of the Estate of her deceased husband, brought a wrongful death lawsuit against Defendant, John Williams, on January 23, 2004.

"6. The wrongful-death and medical-malpractice lawsuit was tried to a jury on or about the week of September 10, 2007.

"7. On September 17, 2007, a Montgomery County jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant, John Williams.

"8. On the same day, September 17, 2007, Defendant, John Williams, placed a telephone call to Dr. James Carpenter, during business hours, ....

"9. At the time of this initial call, Dr. Carpenter was not available to take [Williams's] telephone call. [Williams] was given Dr. Carpenter's cellular phone number instead.

"10. On September 17, 2007, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Defendant, John Williams, again called Dr. Carpenter's place of business and asked to speak to Dr. Carpenter. On this occasion, Dr. Carpenter was available and took the telephone call in his office.

"11. The next day, on September 18, 2007, at approximately 10:30 a.m., the Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, received a telephone call from Dr. Carpenter's office manager who stated that `your services are no longer needed anymore.'

"12. At no time was Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, offered any explanation or justification whatsoever for her abrupt and totally unexpected termination.

"13. [Thomas's] job performance had been completely acceptable during the course of her employment with Dr. James Carpenter, and no complaints had ever been voiced about her job performance prior to the phone calls made by Defendant, John Williams.

"14. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, inquired as to whether the office manager had received a telephone call regarding her employment. The office manager replied that she had not personally received such a telephone call and declined to talk further about it.

"15. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, went to Dr. Carpenter's office that afternoon to retrieve her personal belongings.

"16. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, again inquired as to whether John Williams had called the office. Dr. Carpenter's medical assistant replied that `I can't say Teresa, but believe what you are asking me is true.'

"17. The Plaintiff, Teresa Thomas, further avers that the Defendant, John Williams, intentionally and maliciously made the phone call to her employer, Dr. James Carpenter, with the intent and purpose of seeking, directly or indirectly, the termination of Teresa Thomas's employment.

"18. [Thomas] also avers that the Defendant, John Williams, knew that she was the sole bread winner for two of her children, and furthermore, that his intentional and malicious phone call was made with intent to financially damage the family, as well as to intentionally inflict mental and emotional distress upon [Thomas]."

Thomas argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims against Williams. As an initial matter, we note that Thomas purports to assert separate claims of the tort of outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the same conduct on the part of Williams; however, the tort of outrage is the same cause of action as intentional infliction of emotional distress. Harrelson v. R.J., 882 So.2d 317, 321-22 (Ala.2003); Gunter v. Huddle, 724 So.2d 544, 547 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998). For the purposes of this opinion, we refer to the two claims as a claim of the tort of outrage, and we address the trial court's dismissal of that claim first.

"The elements of such a claim are settled:

"`The tort of outrage requires that: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should have known that emotional distress was likely to result from his conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff distress; and (4) ... the distress was severe. With respect to the conduct element, this Court has stated that the conduct must be "so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society."'"

Gunter v. Huddle, 724 So.2d at 547 (quoting Harris v. McDavid, 553 So.2d 567, 569-70 (Ala.1989)); see also American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361, 365 (Ala.1980) (recognizing the tort of outrage as actionable in Alabama).

In American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, supra, Inmon lost his job after his employer conducted an investigation of an alleged "kick-back" scheme and an audit of Inmon's job performance. Inmon presented evidence indicating that he "had been harassed, investigated without cause, humiliated, accused of improper dealings, treated uncustomarily, and terminated without justification." 394 So.2d at 367. However, our supreme court, although recognizing that a cause of action existed for the tort of outrage, concluded that the evidence presented in that case was insufficient to support a tort-of-outrage claim. In reaching that conclusion, the court acknowledged that "the record supports the conclusion that the management of Inmon's investigation and termination may have been somewhat disorganized, and a humiliating experience for him personally." 394 So.2d at 368. However, the court held that the employer's conduct could not be characterized as "`so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, Comment (d), p. 73 (19...