Thompson v. Baxter
| Decision Date | 11 February 1909 |
| Docket Number | 15,939 - (214) |
| Citation | 119 N.W. 797,107 Minn. 122 |
| Parties | HELEN A. THOMPSON v. CHARLES BAXTER |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Freeborn county, on appeal from justice court, for restitution of premises claimed to be unlawfully held. There was no dispute as to the facts and the case was tried without a jury before Kingsley, J., who found that defendant was entitled to a life estate in the premises and ordered that the action be dismissed. From this order plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Tenancies Defined.
The essentials of tenancies at will, at sufferance, and from month to month pointed out, and distinguished from life estates.
Lease Construed to Give Life Estate.
A lease of urban real property, conditioned respecting the term of the tenancy in the following language: "To have and to hold the above-rented premises unto the said party of the second part, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for and during the full term of while he shall wish to live in Albert Lea, from and after the first day of December, 1904" -- held to vest in the tenant a life estate, terminable only at his death or removal from Albert Lea.
N. E Peterson, for appellant.
Dunn & Carlson and John G. Skinner, for respondent.
Proceedings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, instituted in justice court, where defendant had judgment. Plaintiff appealed to the district court, where a like result followed. From the judgment of that court she appealed to this court.
The action involves the right to the possession of certain residence property in the city of Albert Lea, and was submitted to the court below upon the pleadings and a stipulation of facts. It appears that plaintiff is the owner of the premises; that she acquired title thereto by purchase from a former owner, who had theretofore entered into a contract by which he leased and demised the premises to defendant at an agreed monthly rent of twenty two dollars; and plaintiff's title is subject to all rights that became vested in defendant thereby. The lease, after reciting the rental of the premises and other usual conditions, contained upon the subject of the term of the tenancy, the following stipulation: "To have and to hold the above-rented premises unto the said party of the second part [the tenant] his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for and during the full term of while he shall wish to live in Albert Lea, from and after the first day of December, 1904." The only question involved under the stipulation is the construction of this provision of the lease. Defendant has at all times paid the rent as it became due; but, if plaintiff has the right to terminate the tenancy and eject him, proper notice for that purpose has been given. Appellant contends that the lease created either a tenancy at will, at sufferance, or from month to month, and that plaintiff could terminate the same at any time by proper notice. The trial court held, in harmony with defendant's contention, that the contract created a life estate in defendant, terminable only at his death or removal from Albert Lea. Appellant assigns this conclusion as error.
A determination of the question presented involves a construction of the lease and a brief examination of some of the principles of law applicable to tenancies at will, at sufferance, from month to month, and life estates. Deeds, leases, or other instruments affecting the title to real property are construed, guided by the law applicable to the particular subject, precisely as other contracts are construed, and effect given the intention of the parties. Lawton v. Joesting, 96 Minn. 163, 104 N.W. 830; Whetstone v. Hunt, 78 Ark. 230, 93 S.W. 979, 8 Am. & Eng. An. Cas. 443, and extended note. The contract before us, though somewhat peculiar and unusual as to the term of the tenancy intended to be created, is nevertheless clear and free from ambiguity. It granted the demised premises to defendant "while he shall wish to live in Albert Lea." The legal effect of this language is, therefore, the only question in the case.
Tenancies at will may be created by express words, or they may arise by implication of law. Where created by express contract, the writing necessarily so indicates, and reserves the right of termination to either party, as where the lease provides that the tenant shall occupy the premises so long as agreeable to both parties. Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128; Say v. Stoddard, 27 Oh. St. 478. Such tenancies arise by implication of law where no definite time is stated in the contract, or where the tenant enters into possession under an agreement to execute a contract for a specific term and he subsequently refuses to do so, or one who enters under a void lease, or where he holds over pending negotiations for a new lease. The chief characteristics of this form of tenancy are (1) uncertainty respecting the term, and (2) the right of either party to terminate it by proper notice; and these features must exist, whether the tenancy be created by the express language of the contract or by implication of law. An accurate definition is given in 1 Wood, Landlord & Tenant, 43, in the following language:
A tenancy at sufferance arises where the tenant wrongfully holds over after the expiration of his term, differing from the tenancy at will, where the possession is by the permission of the landlord. 4 Kent, Com. 117; Edwards v. Hale, 9 Allen (Mass.) 462. He has a naked possession without right, and, independent of statute, is not entitled to notice to quit. 1 Wood, Landlord & Tenant, § 8. It also arises where a mortgagor holds over after the expiration of the period of redemption on foreclosure. Stedman v. Gassett, 18 Vt. 346. In fact, this relation exists in all cases where a person who enters lawfully into the possession wrongfully holds possession after his estate or right has ended. Kinsley v. Ames, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 29; Jackson v. McLeod, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 182; 2 Blackstone, 150; 1 Wood, Landlord & Tenant, 7.
A tenancy from month to month or year to year arises where no definite time is agreed upon and the rent is fixed at so much per year or month, as the case may be, and is terminable at the expiration of any...
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