Thompson v. City of Miami, 33330
| Decision Date | 09 September 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 33330,33330 |
| Parties | Horace THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a Municipal corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Wm. W. Charles, Miami, for petitioner.
John R. Barrett, City Atty., and Edward J. Fitzpatrick, Asst. City Atty., for respondent.
By petition for a writ of certiorari we are requested to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, because of an alleged conflict with a prior decision of another District Court of Appeal. City of Miami v. Thompson, Fla.App., 159 So.2d 877.
We must decide whether the limitations prescribed by Section 176.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., are applicable to an equity proceeding which assaults the validity of a municipal zoning ordinance.
We glean the salient facts from the opinion of the District Court. Pursuant to special charter powers the City of Miami adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Under the ordinance Thompson's property was located in a zone where filling stations were permitted. However, the ordinance contained a provision to the effect that a filling station must be more than 350 yards from a 'church, hospital, school or other such institution where large numbers of the pedestrians congregate.' Thompson's property was less than 350 yards from a church. The petitioner applied to the City Planning Board for a variance permit to erect a gasoline filling station on his property. On March 7, 1962, the City Commission sustained the Planning Board's denial of the application. On October 19, 1962, Thompson filed a complaint for equitable relief, contending that the ordinance was void in toto and as applied to his property. The case was disposed of by the chancellor on the latter ground. Prior to final hearing the City requested leave to amend its answer in order to assert the defense that Thompson had failed to pursue the remedies prescribed by Section 176.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. This section, which is a component of the general municipal zoning law, reads as follows:
The Section was amended by Chapter 60-512, Laws of Florida, 1963. However, the amendment is not applicable here.
The principal point made by the City was that Thompson had failed to file a petition for certiorari to review the adverse decision of the City Commission within 30 days from the date thereof. The Chancellor denied the City's request to amend and granted the relief sought by Thompson. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, reversed with a holding that the 30 day limitation provided by Section 176.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was applicable to the chancery proceeding. We are requested to review this decision because it allegedly conflicts with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Harris v. Goff, Fla.App., 151 So.2d 642.
By its decision in the instant case the District Court, Third District, announced that there was no prescribed method for reviewing municipal legislative action 'by charter authority or otherwise.' (Emphasis added) In Harris v. Goff, supra, the District Court of Appeal, First District held that an equity suit for an injunction has long been the traditional method of assaulting the validity of zoning ordinances. In DeGroot v. Sheffield, Fla., 95 So.2d 912, we stated that attacks on municipal zoning ordinances are typical examples of the employment of an equity injunction suit to assault allegedly unconstitutional legislative action. We detect a conflict between the instant decision and the others cited. The case before us holds that statutory certiorari is the only method for obtaining relief under the instant circumstances. The others clearly recognize an equity injunction suit as an appropriate procedural approach to the problem. We feel justified, therefore, in proceeding to the merits.
Moreover, the District Court here went even further. It held that the cited statute was exclusive and permitted no alternative.
The City of Miami exercised its zoning powers pursuant to special charter provisions. Chapter 10847, Special Acts of 1925, as amended. The record indicates that the City has never elected to proceed under Chapter 176, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. This general act provides an optional method of accomplishing municipal zoning. By the very terms of the act, however, it is not mandatory. Section 176.24, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., expressly provides that the powers granted thereby shall be 'supplemental and cumulative.'...
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City of Coral Gables v. Deschamps, 70--66
...indicates that the City of Coral Gables has never elected to proceed under Chapter 176, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. In Thompson v. City of Miami, Fla.1964, 167 So.2d 841, the Supreme Court of Florida held that an assault on the validity of a zoning ordinance may be accomplished by suit in equi......
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Coral Ridge Golf Course, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 70--966
...150 Fla. 734, 9 So.2d 280; Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., Fla.1963, 151 So.2d 439; 6 Fla.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 72; Thompson v. City of Miami, Fla.1964, 167 So.2d 841; Keay v. City of Coral Gables, Fla.App.1970, 236 So.2d To the extent that the opinion of the majority recognizes equitable ......
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Webb v. Town Council of Town of Hilliard, 1D99-2968.
...An assault on the validity of a zoning action may be accomplished by a suit in equity, rather than by certiorari. Thompson v. City of Miami, 167 So.2d 841 (Fla.1964). (Emphasis See Love Our Lakes Association v. Pasco County, 543 So.2d 855, 857-858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The grant of an excepti......
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Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale
...Upon certiorari granted to review Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.App., 166 So.2d 797, as in conflict with Thompson v. City of Miami, Fla., 167 So.2d 841, and other cases 'on the same point of law,' we qualifiedly affirm, with directions on In Harris v. Goff, Fla.App., 151 So.2d 642......