Harris v. Goff
| Citation | 151 So.2d 642 |
| Decision Date | 09 April 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. E-86,E-86 |
| Parties | Bob HARRIS, Ray Greene, Lem Merrett, Julian E. Warren and Fletcher Morgan, as members of the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County, Florida, St. Johns Enterprises, Inc., a corporation, and Sskib Corporation, a corporation, Appellants, v. H. A. GOFF, individually, and as President of Arlingwood Civic Association, a corporation not for profit under the laws of Florida, and Robert T. MacGill, individually and as President of Alderman Park Civic Association, a corporation, not for profit under the laws of Florida, Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
J. Henry Blount, Frederick H. Lenczyk, and Thomas D. Oakley, Jacksonville, for appellants.
John S. Duss, Jacksonville, for appellees.
This interlocutory appeal presents for our decision the single question as to the proper method of obtaining judicial review of a county zoning resolution or ordinance.
The complaint in this case alleges that after public hearing appellant board adopted a resolution rezoning a parcel of land in Duval County, changing the use classification from rural to business. Appellees objected to the adoption of the resolution at the public hearing held by the Board, and its subsequent petition for rehearing on the board's action was denied. The public hearing was held pursuant to published notice, but no witnesses were sworn, no testimony was taken, no evidence was adduced and no record of the proceedings was made.
After exhausting their administrative remedies appellees brought this suit in which they allege that the resolution in question is unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory. It is further alleged that as applied to their property the resolution deprives them of equal protection of the laws and constitutes a taking of their property without due process of law contrary to the guarantees of our State Constitution. The complaint prays for a decree declaring the resolution null, void and of no effect, and for an injunction restraining the board from enforcing or giving effect to the resolution and enjoining other defendants from using the rezoned land except for purposes permitted by the original zoning ordinance previously in effect.
The statute authorizing the board to zone and rezone property in the county provides that its ordinances and resolutions shall not become effective until after a public hearing of which notice is given by two weeks publication in a newspaper. 1 The statute further provides that any person aggrieved by any zoning ordinance or resolution adopted by the Board may apply to the Circuit Court of the County for relief. The statute does not provide the procedure to be followed in seeking the relief permitted thereby.
Appellant board moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the only proper method for reviewing the board's action is by certiorari, and that appellees' attempt to assault the board's action in a direct proceeding brought in equity for injunction is unauthorized. From an order denying appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint this interlocutory appeal is taken.
Appellants rely for reversal upon Rule 4.1, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., which provides that: 'All appellate review of the rulings of any commission or board shall be by certiorari as provided by Florida Appellate Rules.' Summarized, it is appellants' position that the foregoing rule is exclusive and the procedure prescribed therein must be followed in all cases wherein review of the ruling of any board or commission is sought.
In the DeGroot case 2 our Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Thornal, devoted a substantial part of its opinion to an explanation of the manner in which rulings of administrative boards, commissions and agencies may be reviewed by the judicial branch of government. It is there held that where the statute under which the board or agency purports to act requires notice and hearing, and the judgment of the board is contingent on the showing made at the hearing, then its judgment becomes judicial or quasi-judicial in character. It was there held that the decision of the board in that case was reached only after a full hearing pursuant to notice based on evidence submitted in accordance with the statute involved. A record of the proceedings was made which was susceptible of review by the court in certiorari proceedings.
In the Bloomfield case 3 this court was confronted with a similar problem regarding the appropriate method of reviewing the action of an administrative agency. In that case we held that before an administrative order may be considered quasi-judicial in character and therefore subject to review by certiorari, the statute authorizing the entry of such an order must also require that the administrative agency give due notice of a hearing to be held on the question to be considered, and provide a fair opportunity to be heard in a proceeding in which the party affected is accorded the basic requirements of due process of law. Such requirements must afford the affected party the opportunity of being present in person and by counsel, to present evidence in support of his position and to cross-examine adverse witnesses whose testimony is offered at the hearing. If the board, agency or commission intends to insist that its ruling or order to be entered upon the showing made at the hearing be reviewed only by certiorari, the obligation rests upon the board or agency to see that a proper record of the entire proceeding is made, which...
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Burritt v. Harris
...zoning board, but that the same could only be reviewed by certiorari. We affirmed the chancellor under authority of Harris at el. v. Goff et al., Fla.App., 151 So.2d 642, and held that the actions of a county zoning board were legislative in character and not quasi-judicial. Harris et al. v......
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Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co.
...which makes the hearing quasi-judicial in character and distinguishes it from one which is purely legislative. 10 See Harris v. Goff, 151 So.2d 642 (Fla.1st DCA 1963). The procedure utilized by Dade County in zoning matters such as that involved in the present case has quite clearly been re......
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Williams v. Ferrentino
...(2) the order was not 'quasi-judicial' in character but was purely administrative or 'quasi-executive' in character. See Harris v. Goff, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 642; Bloomfield v. Mayo, supra; De Groot v. Sheffield, Of course, if the Commissioner were correct in his contention that there is......
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Dade County v. Yumbo, S. A., 76-1433
...procedure, i. e., utilizing the resolution as a means of denying the request for rezoning, is quasi-judicial in nature. Harris v. Goff, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 642. * * * " This quoted section was reiterated in Centex Homes Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, supra, which again involved the ......
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Redefining "quasi-judicial": the diminishing role of quasi-judicial determinations in local government personnel actions.
...of review is appellate, not de novo. (19) City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982). (20) Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642,644 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. (21) FLA. STAT. [section] 120.68 (2004). (22) City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. ......