Thompson v. Ford, 34213
| Decision Date | 20 July 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 34213,34213 |
| Parties | , 57 O.O. 96 THOMPSON, Appellee, v. FORD, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where the owner of an automobile rightfully parks such vehicle in a municipality in accordance with all legal requirements as to such parking, and where he fully complies with Section 6307-83, General Code, Section 4513.10, Revised Code, with reference to lights on parked vehicles, he is absolved from any liability for damages resulting from the collision of another automobile with his parked one, where the one who suffers the damages makes no claim of negligence except failure to have lights upon such parked automobile.
The present cause arose out of an automobile accident. On March 23, 1951, at about 9:30 p. m., appellee, Ruby Thompson, hereinafter designated plaintiff, was a passenger in an automobile being driven in a northerly direction on South Main Street in the city of Akron, and, when within the block between Dresden and Selden Avenues, two streets which enter South Main Street from the east, the automobile in which plaintiff was riding collided with the left rear of an automobile belonging to appellant, Keith D. Ford, hereinafter designated defendant. At the time of the collision defendant's automobile was unlighted and was parked parallel with and immediately adjacent to the east curb of South Main Street. The collision deflected the course of the car in which plaintiff was riding and it continued to its left side of the street and came into a head-on collision with another car being driven by one Robert M. Schray in a southerly direction on South Main Street.
As a result of the accident, plaintiff was seriously injured, and she instituted an action against both defendant and Schray to recover for the injuries and damages which she suffered.
Schray made a settlement with plaintiff in the sum of $1,400 and was dismissed from the action under a covenant not to sue.
The cause went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict against plaintiff, upon which judgment was rendered.
The Court of Common Pleas granted a motion for a new trial and set aside the judgment.
Thereafter, on December 20, 1952, plaintiff filed an amended petition in which she alleges three specifications of negligence as follows:
'Plaintiff says that the defendant, Keith D. Ford, was guilty of the following negligent acts and omissions:
'1. He failed and neglected to use ordinary care for the safety of other persons and vehicles upon said street by leaving his said automobile upon said street without displaying any front or rear lights upon the same at said time and place and for a period of five hours under said conditions and circumstances of traffic, Weather, darkness, width of streets and the street lighting and driving conditions existing thereon.
'2. He left his said automobile stancding for five hours upon said street without any lights showing on said automobile at a time and place and under such conditions and circumstances of darkness, weather, lack of sufficient light, traffic and width of the street when in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care, he should have had a lighted tail light and a lighted front light upon said automobile to warn drivers of other automobiles.
The Akron ordinance referred to is to the same tenor and effect as Section 6307-83, General Code.
The portion of South Main Street, involved herein is a paved street 40 feet in width between curbs and illuminated by street lights located on the east side thereof at the northeast corner of the intersection with Dresden Avenue and the northeast corner of the intersection withSelden Avenue, which lights are about 295 feet apart.
There was testimony that at about the time of the accident the sky was overcast, that at about 7:00 p. m. a mere trace of rain had fallen, and that at about 11:00 p. m. rain again fell.
The condition of the street and the atmosphere was in some dispute at the trial, but there is ample evidence that the atmosphere was clear and the visability unimpaired.
There is evidence also that the street lighting was supplemented by the outside lighting of a drive-in restaurant located south of the intersection on the east side of Main Street, to the rear of where defendant's automobile was parked.
Defendant, a working man, was a student at an industrial trades institue located on the east side of South Main Street about 85 feet north of Selden Avenue. At 6:00 p. m. on the day of the accident, defendant had parked his car between Dresden and Selden Avenues, and, so far as the record shows, the parking was made in every way in accordance with all legal requirements. Without turning on any lights of the car, defendant went into the school for the purpose of remaining until 11:00 p. m. when the school session would be finished.
The testimony was in dispute as to the distance within which there was sufficient light to reveal a person or substantial object at the place where defendant's car was parked.
There was testimony on the part of plaintiff that such person or substantial object could not be revealed at a distance of more than 80 or 90 feet from defendant's car, whereas there was a great quantity of testimony to the effect that a person or substantial object could be revealed or was visible at a distance of 800 to 1,200 feet from such car.
At the time of the accident, Section 6307-83, General Code, section 4513.10, Revised Code, was in full force and effect. It reads as follows:
The times mentioned in Section 6307-76, General Code, Section 4513.03, Revised Code, are 'from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, and at any other time when there is not sufficient natural light to render discernible persons, vehicles and substantial objects on the highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead.'
Sections 6307-100 and 6307-101, General Code, refer to disabled vehicles and those carrying explosives.
It is obvious that in the present case the accident occurred during the time between one hour after sunset and one...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy
...unless prohibited by constitutional limitations, may modify or entirely abolish common-law actions and defenses," Thompson v. Ford, 164 Ohio St. 74, 79, 128 N.E.2d 111 (1955). One Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, Clifford F. Brown, has challenged this long-standing rule, arguing that unde......
-
Johnson v. BP Chemicals, Inc.
...has the authority, within constitutional limitations, to change the common law by legislation. See Thompson v. Ford (1955), 164 Ohio St. 74, 79, 57 O.O. 96, 99, 128 N.E.2d 111, 115. We are also mindful of the fundamental precepts that all legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of......
-
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prod.S Co.
...General Assembly may deem necessary to further the common good. Arbino at ¶ 131 (Cupp, J., concurring). See Thompson v. Ford (1955), 164 Ohio St. 74, 79, 57 O.O. 96, 128 N.E.2d 111 (within the scope of its police powers, the General Assembly “may modify or entirely abolish common-law action......
-
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson
...or entirely abolish commonlaw actions. Strock v. Pressnell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 214, 527 N.E.2d 1235; Thompson v. Ford (1955), 164 Ohio St. 74, 79, 57 O.O. 96, 128 N.E.2d 111; Pohl v. State (1921), 102 Ohio St. 474, 476, 132 N.E. 20, reversed on other grounds by Bartels v. Iowa (1923)......