Thompson v. Intercounty Tel. & Tel. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 December 1952 |
| Citation | 62 So.2d 16 |
| Parties | THOMPSON, Sheriff, et al. v. INTERCOUNTY TEL. & TEL. CO. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., John A. Madigan, Jr., and Ralph M. McLane, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Lewis Tribble, Tallahassee, for petitioners.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, Fort Meyers, for respondent.
The chancellor denied in part a motion of petitioners to dismiss a bill filed by the respondent to restrain the execution by the sheriff of a warrant issued by the comptroller for the collection os use taxes, penalties and interest claimed to be due under Chapter 26319, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1949, Ex.Sess., F.S.A. § 212.01 et seq.
In the order it was determined, first, that the act was unconstitutional so far as the taxes here involved were concerned because its title gave no sufficient indication of its contents relative to such taxes as required by Section 16, Article III of the Constitution, F.S.A., but, second, that the defect in this respect was cured by the enactment of Florida Statutes 1951, Chapter 26484, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951.
For particular information about the taxes now in litigation we return to the bill where we learn that they were assessed on personal property purchased by the respondent, a telephone company, outside the state and used here 'in connection with its * * * system * * *.' It is expressly alleged that the comptroller has audited the respondent's records and fixed the amount sought to be collected as 'use taxes.'
The familiar constitutional requirement is that 'Each law * * * shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title * * *.'
The pertinent phrases of the title follow: 'An Act to Define Certain Additional Privileges, and to Levy and Provide for the Collection of Privilege Taxes upon Sales of Personal Property, upon Admissions and upon Rentals of Real and Personal Property * * * to Provide for the Creation and Enforcement of Liens upon Real and Personal Property * * * for * * * Such Taxes * * * to Appropriate Monies Derived from Such Taxes and to Direct the Payment of * * * Monies Derived from Such Taxes * * *' and so on. (Italics ours.)
The comptroller relied upon Section 6 of the act for his authority to levy the tax so to decide the matter we must examine so much of that section as deals with property of the character now in litigation and compare its language with a title referring to privilege taxes on sales, admissions and rentals. It was there provided that a 'tax at the rate of three per cent (3%) of the retail sales price, as of the moment of sale, or three per cent (3%) of the cost price, as of the moment of purchase, as the case may be, shall be collectible from all dealers as herein defined on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution and the storage for use or consumption in this State, of tangible personal property.' Among several definitions of 'dealer' appears the one that seems pertinent here: a person 'who imports * * * tangible personal property from any State or foreign country, * * * for use, or consumption, * * * or for storage to be used * * * in this State.'
Without restating the long-established principles we follow in gauging, generally, the constitutionality of acts of the legislature, such as the indulgence of the presumption of validity, or the rules by which titles will be tested, Nichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 9 So.2d 157, 144 A.L.R. 1351, we go directly to the immediate question which, in the present case, is as easily decided as stated. Would one reading the caption about taxes on sales of personal property rentals and admissions gather the thought, or even the suspicion, that taxes were also authorized against property imported from another state for use, or storage for use? It seems to us a negative answer is inescapable, especially if the reader was the importer of property that would not be resold but would be used, as by the respondent, in the operation of a communication system. No one, much less a person engaged in the business of the respondent, would be apprised by the title that property imported to maintain a telephone system would be subject to the tax.
There can be no doubt that the legislature considered the...
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State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay
...19, 1949, and May 17, 1951. Claim for refund was filed with the Comptroller on July 25, 1953. In the case of Thompson v. Intercounty Tel. & Tel. Co., Fla., 62 So.2d 16, we held that the tax imposed by the act in question was not due because it was invalid by reason of a defective title to t......
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...alleged defects in the title to the original act. State ex rel. Badgett v. Lee, 156 Fla. 291, 22 So.2d 804; Thompson v. Intercounty Tel. & Tel. Co., Fla.1952, 62 So.2d 16; Rodriguez v. Jones, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d Regardless of the reasons assigned by the trial judge we, nonetheless, find that......
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...III, section 6, is invalid until such time as it is reenacted for codification into the Florida Statutes. See Thompson v. Intercounty Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 So.2d 16 (Fla.1952). Loxahatchee, 515 So.2d at 218-19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Johnson, 616 So.2d at 2. The Preface ......
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