Bloom v. Crosson

• Decision Date: 25 November 1992
• Citation: 590 N.Y.S.2d 328,183 A.D.2d 341
• Parties: Bernard M. BLOOM, as Kings County Surrogate, et al., Respondents, v. Matthew T. CROSSON, as Chief Administrator of the Courts of the State of New York, Appellant, et al., Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 328

590 N.Y.S.2d 328

183 A.D.2d 341

Bernard M. BLOOM, as Kings County Surrogate, et al., Respondents, v. Matthew T. CROSSON, as Chief Administrator of the Courts of the State of New York, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Nov. 25, 1992.

Michael Colodner (John Eiseman, Stephen Gross, Lawrence Marks and Kenneth Falk, of counsel), New York City, for appellant.

Cahn, Wishod, Wishod & Lamb (Richard C. Cahn, Scott M. Karson, Frederick Eisenbud and Howard M. Miller, of counsel), Melville, for Bernard M. Bloom, respondent.

Mahon, Mahon & Mahon (Stephen B. Hand, Donald J. Farinacci, Lawrence Mahon and John R. Morken, of counsel), Westbury, for Bar Ass'n of Nassau County, amicus curiae.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker (Anthony J. Mercorella, Sheryl Katz and Richard E. Lerner, of counsel), New York City, for Bronx County Bar Ass'n, amicus curiae.

Bleakley, Platt & Schmidt (William F. Harrington, Robert D. Meade and Mary Ellen Manley, of counsel), White Plains, for Westchester County Bar Ass'n, amicus curiae.

Howard E. Pachman, P.C. (Thomas J. Spellman Jr., of counsel), Commack, for Suffolk County Bar Ass'n, amicus curiae.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and LEVINE, MAHONEY, CASEY and HARVEY, JJ.

MAHONEY, Justice.

Appeal from that part of an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Kahn, J.), entered July 10, 1992 in Albany County, which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment and declared that defendant Chief Administrator of the Courts' implementation of the Laws of 1992 (ch. 55, § 414) is invalid, 152 Misc.2d 397, 585 N.Y.S.2d 946.

Effective April 10, 1992, the Legislature approved a two-year experimental austerity measure under which defendant Chief Administrator of the Courts was permitted to "authorize the use of mechanical recording of testimony and of other proceedings in each cause, in lieu of the taking of stenographic minutes thereof, in: (i) a surrogate's court in any county; and (ii) the court of claims" (L.1992, ch. 55, § 414) (hereinafter section 414). Pursuant to that authority, the Chief Administrator, after consultation with and approval by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and presentation to the Administrative Board of the Courts, directed mandatory electronic recording of all testimony and proceedings in the 12 full-time Surrogate's Courts throughout the State ¹ and in the eight Courts of Claims in lieu of traditional stenographic transcription. Under this directive, which took effect on May 21, 1992, unless the designated Deputy Chief Administrative Judge felt that a court reporter was necessary in a particular instance, tape recording of all proceedings was mandatory and would be the official court record. In furtherance thereof, sophisticated four-track recording systems were purchased and training sessions for court employees were held on their use and operation. The court reporters serving in the affected courts were reassigned to other courts.

Immediately following issuance of the directive, plaintiffs, who include elected Surrogates from the affected jurisdictions, court stenographers who were involuntarily reassigned as a consequence of the directive, members of the Bar who practice in Surrogate's Courts throughout the State and individuals who have cases pending in Surrogate's Court, commenced the instant declaratory judgment action seeking to void the Chief Administrator's directive in its entirety on grounds that it violated numerous Federal and State constitutional provisions, various State statutes, the provisions of certain collective bargaining agreements, and infringed upon the inherent powers of Surrogates to control the proceedings in their courts. Shortly thereafter, they sought a preliminary injunction. Both sides then moved for summary judgment prompting Supreme Court to disregard the provisional remedy application and to address directly the merits of the controversy. Supreme Court concluded that the directive was invalid, its mandatory nature being in excess of the legislatively delegated authority set forth in section 414 and not otherwise sustainable as an exercise of the powers granted to the Chief Administrator under N.Y. Constitution, article VI, § 28(b). Accordingly, the court granted plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment to that extent, declared the directive invalid and permanently enjoined its implementation. Execution of the order and judgment have been stayed pending the Chief Administrator's appeal.

Under our State constitutional scheme, the authority to regulate the courts is split between the Legislature and the Chief Judge. The Legislature is imbued with exclusive authority to regulate jurisdiction, practice and procedure in the courts (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 30) while the Chief Judge is empowered to handle all matters of court administration; after consultation with the Administrative Board and approval by the Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge is authorized to establish standards and administrative policies for general application throughout the State and, as aided by the Chief Administrator, is responsible for supervising the administration and operation of the Unified Court System (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 28[c]. Nonetheless, both the Legislature and the Chief Judge can delegate their respective powers relative to the court system to the Chief Administrator. The latter's authority to act is somewhat different, however, depending upon whether the power delegated is a N.Y. Constitution, article VI, § 30 power or a N.Y. Constitution, article VI, § 28 power. The Chief Administrator can exercise legislatively delegated powers to regulate matters of jurisdiction, practice and procedure only with advice and consent of the Administrative Board (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 30). Delegated powers of an administrative nature are not similarly restricted (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 28).

While the parties here debate whether regulation of the manner and method of recording judicial proceedings is a regulation of practice and procedure such that the Chief Administrator's authority to exercise that power is subject to the constraints of N.Y. Constitution, article VI, § 30 or is an administrative function, inasmuch as the subject necessarily involves personnel issues and issues relative to the...