Thompson v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 12-21-00072-CR |
| Parties | JOSHUA TRENT THOMPSON, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the 7th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct No. 007-0185-14)
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
Joshua Trent Thompson appeals the revocation of his community supervision. He presents four issues on appeal. We modify and affirm as modified.
In 2014, Appellant was charged by indictment with the third-degree felony "accident causing injury," commonly called failure to stop and render aid enhanced.[1] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded "true" to the enhancement paragraph and "guilty" to the charge in the indictment. The trial court found Appellant "guilty" as charged and sentenced him to imprisonment for ten years. However, the trial court suspended Appellant's sentence and placed him on community supervision for eight years.
In February 2021, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant's community supervision alleging that Appellant violated multiple terms and conditions thereof. The trial court conducted a hearing on the matter, at which Appellant pleaded "true" to several of the State's allegations and "not true" to two allegations. Following the hearing, the trial court found all of the allegations in the State's motion to be "true." Thereafter, the trial court revoked Appellant's community supervision and sentenced him to imprisonment for ten years. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider less restrictive alternatives to imprisonment.
We review a trial court's order revoking community supervision for an abuse of discretion. Hacker v State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Quisenberry v. State, 88 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd). In a revocation proceeding the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Proof of a single violation of a sole condition of community supervision is sufficient to support a trial court's decision to revoke. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence before the trial court supports a reasonable belief that a condition of community supervision has been violated. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64. The trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision if, as to every ground alleged, the State fails to meet its burden of proof. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).
In considering an appeal of this nature, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings to determine whether the evidence supports the findings. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). During a hearing on a motion to revoke supervision, the trial court is the trier of fact and determines the weight and credibility of the testimony. See Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Diaz v. State, 516 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). When we are faced with a record supporting contradicting inferences, we presume that the fact finder resolved any conflict in favor of its findings, even if it is not explicitly stated in the record. See Montgomery, 369 S.W.3d at 192.
Here, Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's revocation of his community supervision. He argues only that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment rather than granting his request to be placed in an intermediate sanctions facility to address his drug addiction.
Once a violation of any one condition of community supervision is established, trial courts "enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to continue, extend, modify, or revoke community supervision." Merino v. State, Nos. 13-19-00240-CR, 13-19-00241-CR, 2020 WL 3116351 at *3, (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 42A.751(D) (WEST SUPP. 2020); Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Smith v. State, 587 S.W.3d 413, 419 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2019, no pet.)). In Merino, the court noted that this broad discretion includes whether to place a probationer in SAFPF[2] as an additional condition of continued community supervision. Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *3 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 42A.752(A)(4) (WEST 2018)). COURTS OF APPEALS HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEFERRED TO A TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO REVOKE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION OVER THE PROBATIONER'S REQUEST FOR PLACEMENT IN SAFPF OR A SIMILAR FACILITY. Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *3; Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Hodge v. State, Nos. 02-10-00050-CR, 02-10-00051-CR, 2011 WL 2756540 at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 14, 2011, pet. ref'd) (); Mathis v. State, No. 04-09-00075-CR, 2009 WL 3320270 at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 14, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Marriott v. State, No. 07-02-00203-CR, 2003 WL 22004084, at *2, (Tex. App.- Amarillo Aug. 25, 2003, pet. ref'd) ().
Despite this clear deference to the trial court's discretion, Appellant argues that there are two considerations when addressing conditions of community supervision relative to substance abuse treatment or an appropriate progression of sanctions for violations. First, he asserts, the conditions and sanctions "should be driven by individual assessment" or tailored to the circumstances of the individual before the court. Second, Appellant argues, the least restrictive intervention should be employed. He urges that the majority of his community supervision violations involve "technical violations," and that he clearly "faces challenges regarding alcohol." While we do not disagree with Appellant that there is a broad array of alternatives to imprisonment in Texas, we cannot, based on the record here, agree with Appellant that the trial court abused its discretion in not utilizing one of those alternatives.
Under the terms of his community supervision, Appellant was prohibited from visiting bars, taverns, lounges, or other similar places. However, the record shows that Appellant was charged with the offense of public intoxication. The case was dismissed, but the evidence showed that Appellant committed the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant testified that he accidentally ended up at the bar "Where's Rufus?" for approximately fifteen minutes and did not drink any alcohol. This is in stark contrast to the officer's testimony and the dash cam footage. The record indicates that Appellant was initially charged for causing an accident and fleeing the scene. He drank alcohol, got into another accident, and refused to accept responsibility. During the revocation hearing, Appellant repeatedly denied alcohol and drug use. The record further indicates Appellant missed several urinalysis tests and visits with his supervision officer. Based on the record, the trial court could reasonably determine that Appellant was not a good candidate for continued community supervision or substance abuse counseling. See Webster v. State, No. 07-20-00248-CR, 2021 WL 1899359, at *3 (Tex. App.- Amarillo May 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
As noted, revocation proceedings are "highly discretionary." Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *4, (citing State v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). Any one of Appellant's several violations would have supported the revocation of his community supervision. Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *4, (citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Consequently, it was well within the trial court's discretion to revoke Appellant's community supervision based on evidence of other violations of the conditions of his supervision irrespective of Appellant's request that he be placed in an intermediate sanctions facility. Merino, 2020 WL 3116351, at *4.
Appellant's first issue is overruled.
In his second issue, Appellant urges the trial court violated his right to due process by failing to consider the entire range of punishment.
Due process requires that a neutral and detached judicial officer consider the entire range of punishment and mitigating evidence. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 786-87, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). "A court denies due process . . . if it arbitrarily refuses to consider the entire range of punishment for an offense or refuses to consider the evidence and imposes a predetermined punishment." Teixeira v. State 89 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, we presume that the trial court was neutral and detached and that it did not act arbitrarily. See Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex....
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