Thompson v. State

• Decision Date: 05 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 42264,42264
• Citation: 289 Minn. 270,183 N.W.2d 771
• Parties: T. Eugene THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 771

183 N.W.2d 771

289 Minn. 270

T. Eugene THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. 42264.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 5, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

In a postconviction proceeding we have reviewed the evidence of a lengthy evidentiary hearing in the light of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States since our decision on appeal. The claims are almost identical to those raised on appeal. We find no error on the part of the trial court in denying relief.

T. Eugene Thompson, pro se.

Douglas Head, Atty. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Thomas M. Quayle, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard and considered en banc.

OPINION

KNUTSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the death of his wife. Prior to trial, on motion of appellant we issued our peremptory writ of mandamus requiring a change of venue from Ramsey to Hennepin County as a result of prejudicial pretrial publicity. State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378. After a lengthy trial in Hennepin County, appellant was found guilty by a jury. We affirmed the conviction after examination of a lengthy transcript of the evidence. State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 385 U.S. 817, 87 S.Ct. 39, 17 L.Ed.2d 56. Appellant then sought relief by petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Federal district court, which was denied for the reason that he had not exhausted his state court remedies. Thompson v. Tahash (D.Minn.) 286 F.Supp. 663.

Subsequent to our original decision, the legislature of this state adopted a comprehensive postconviction statute, L.1967, c. 336, now codified as Minn.St. c. 590. After denial of relief by the Federal court, appellant commenced the present proceeding for postconviction relief under our statute in the District Court of Hennepin County. A lengthy evidentiary hearing was held, after which the trial court denied relief. The case is now here on appeal from such denial.

We have examined a voluminous record of that hearing. Many of the claims now presented are the same or substantially the same as those raised on the original appeal. We are asked to review them in the light of decisions rendered subsequent to our affirmance of appellant's conviction, particularly Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600.

The facts of the case were exhaustively set forth in our former opinion and need not be repeated here. While appellant assigns numerous reasons why he should be granted a new trial or other relief, his contentions can be summarized in a few claims. Since most of them have already been reviewed in our former decisions, that decision should stand unless it is now wrong in the light of Sheppard and other opinions that have come down since our decision.

Principally, appellant claims that he was inadequately represented in that the counsel whom he had selected failed to make proper investigation of the facts even though supplied with money to do so; that his counsel failed to move for a further change of venue or a mistrial following the assassination of President Kennedy, which occurred during the trial; and that his counsel and the state refused to turn their files over to appellant or permit discovery of investigations made by the state and by appellant's counsel.

At the outset, it must be remembered that appellant, prior to his conviction, was a practicing attorney with considerable prominence in the field of criminal law. It is safe to say that he was personally acquainted with every lawyer in the state who was proficient in this field and that he selected those lawyers he considered best qualified to represent him.

With respect to his claim that his counsel should have requested or the court should have ordered, sua sponte, another change of venue, about all that need be said is that it is doubtful that appellant could have obtained a more fair trial anywhere else in the state than he had in Hennepin County. In a case of such notoriety, publicity extends throughout the state. It should be noted that in the trial of the case of Norman Mastrian, the alleged go-between in this bizarre affair, the venue of the trial was changed to Duluth; but nonetheless Mastrian, like appellant, was convicted of first-degree murder. State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 171 N.W.2d 695, certiorari denied, 397 U.S. 1049, 90 S.Ct. 1381, 25 L.Ed.2d 662. Furthermore, the trial court found in this proceeding, and the record supports the finding, that no request was made by appellant or his counsel for another change of venue. Even though, as we stated in State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378, a defendant does not ordinarily have the right to select the county where he is to be tried when a change of venue is granted, in this case we did grant him the right to select the county where he thought he would have the best chance for a fair trial. It is doubtful that more could have...