Thompson v. State, 94-191

• Citation: 533 N.W.2d 215
• Decision Date: 24 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-191,94-191
• Parties: Mitchell Lee THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 215

533 N.W.2d 215

Mitchell Lee THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 94-191.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 24, 1995.

Philip B. Mears of the Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Kristin W. Ensign and Layne M. Lindebak, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Mitchell Lee Thompson appeals from a denial of his application for postconviction relief. Thompson contends he was denied his due process right to have an impartial and independent hearing officer on his prison disciplinary committee. We affirm.

A prison disciplinary committee at the Iowa Men's Reformatory (IMR) in Anamosa found Mitchell Thompson guilty of possessing a gambling debt list in violation of disciplinary rule 30. The committee imposed forty days disciplinary detention at level one and loss of sixteen days good conduct time. Thompson now argues he was denied his due process right to an impartial and independent hearing officer because Larry Brimeyer, the administrative law judge who headed the disciplinary committee, was the subject of a contempt-of-court action Thompson was pursuing in another matter.

This other matter concerned Thompson's successful challenge to the automatic deduction of twenty percent of his institutional wages for restitution. A district court judge filed an order stating Thompson's deductions should be made on a sliding scale. Brimeyer told Thompson the court order was a request, not a directive, and as such the institution would deny the request and comply with the usual institutional procedure in collecting restitution. Thompson then wrote a letter to the district court judge stating, "Brimeyer ... his boss in Des Moines, and the Attorney General, Bonnie Campbell," refused to comply with the court's order and that this refusal was a contempt of court. Thompson wrote he felt let down by the department of corrections and asked the court to clarify the matter for them. (The alleged debt list was written on the back of Thompson's copy of this letter.)

Postconviction proceedings are ordinarily reviewed on error. Kinnersley v. State, 494 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993). However, when a denial of constitutional rights is alleged, we make our own evaluation of the totality of circumstances in a de novo review. Id.

Prisoners' due process rights were outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951; Langley v. Scurr, 305 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Iowa 1981). However, a disciplinary committee must not present such a hazard of arbitrary decisionmaking that it deprives the inmate of due process of law. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571, 94 S.Ct. at 2982, 41 L.Ed.2d at 959-60. Therefore, an impartial tribunal is a fundamental right imposed by due process in disciplinary proceedings. Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751, 758 (Iowa 1979). In this vein, Iowa Code section 903A.1 (1993), provides The director of the Iowa department of corrections shall appoint independent administrative law judges whose duties shall include but are not limited to review ... of the conduct of inmates in institutions under the department.

(Emphasis added.)

Thompson claims Brimeyer was not impartial or independent because Thompson's letter to the district court was a request to find Brimeyer in contempt for failing to honor the court order. Even assuming this letter constituted a contempt action against Brimeyer, automatic and mandatory disqualification of Brimeyer in this situation would unduly extend Wolff's due process requirements. See Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1113 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 685 (1984). Due process is satisfied as long as no member of a disciplinary board has any form of personal involvement in the case. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 592, 94 S.Ct. at 2992, 41 L.Ed.2d at 972 (Marshall, J., concurring). Thus, the question becomes whether, with respect to the refusal to comply with the order in the restitution matter, Brimeyer had direct, personal, and substantial interests adverse to Thompson or whether he was performing ministerial duties in his administrative capacity. See Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir.1987) (comparing claims of "personal" bias and "institutional" bias); see also Williams v. State, 421 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Iowa 1988) (independence required of the hearing officer is that the officer not be personally involved in the incident for which discipline is sought or in prior disciplinary actions against inmate). In a situation where there is personal bias, a prior opinion can be formed on the subject of the hearing whereas in a situation which involves ministerial duties the ability to serve as a neutral and detached decisionmaker may not be impaired. See Malek, 822 F.2d at 816 (citing Redding, 717 F.2d at 1113); see also Langley, 305 N.W.2d at 420.

Wolff does not provide guidelines for evaluating impartiality. In Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1355-56 (S.D.Tex.1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983), the Court looked to other decisions to establish the following guidelines:

[D]ue process requires that hearing bodies be independent, fairminded, and capable of an individuated judgment in...