Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Gott, 85-1132

• Decision Date: 21 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1132,85-1132
• Citation: 387 N.W.2d 342
• Parties: THORP CREDIT, INC., Appellee, v. Dorothy M. GOTT and Melvin Gott, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 342

387 N.W.2d 342

THORP CREDIT, INC., Appellee, v. Dorothy M. GOTT and Melvin Gott, Appellants.

No. 85-1132.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 21, 1986.

Jerrold Wanek and John E. Landess of Garten & Landess, Des Moines, for appellants.

David D. Dixon of Heslinga, Heslinga & Dixon, Oskaloosa, for appellee.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ, and CARTER, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

Defendants Dorothy M. Gott and her son, Melvin, borrowed money from Thorp Credit, Inc. and secured the loan with a mortgage on approximately sixty acres of farmland. The Gotts defaulted, and Thorp Credit began this foreclosure action.

A dispute arose in the pleadings, and in discovery, as to whether Dorothy Gott's home, located on the sixty acres, was to be included in the mortgage. The trial court entered a partial summary judgment, ordering foreclosure and sale of all of the land except the home tract. We granted the defendants' application for interlocutory appeal, Iowa R.App.P. 2, and stayed the district court proceedings. We now reverse and remand.

On appeal, the Gotts claim that summary judgment, even a partial one, was inappropriate. They claim there were disputed fact issues regarding their allegations of fraud. Specifically, they claim Thorp's officers defrauded them by including the home in the mortgage, despite their assurances that they would not do so, and by inserting an interest rate of twenty-three percent in the note, despite their assurance that the rate would be "eighteen or nineteen" percent. They also contend that details such as the legal description and the amount due were in dispute.

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 237(a) provides:

A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the appearance day or after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

(Emphasis added.)

The legal principles surrounding summary judgment are well known. Summary judgment will not be granted unless it is shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Matherly v. Hanson, 359 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Iowa 1984). This procedure is functionally akin to a directed verdict, and every legitimate inference that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence should be afforded the nonmoving party; a fact issue is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Knapp v. Simmons, 345 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1984). A court ruling on a summary judgment motion must examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 343 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 1984).

In contrast to summary judgment disposing of an entire case, the partial summary judgment procedure is useful to resolve some of the issues when the entire case does not lend itself to summary disposition. Partial summary judgment is thus similar to a pretrial order "[s]tating and simplifying the factual and legal issues to be litigated" under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 136(b)(5). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) advisory committee note. (Compares partial summary judgment under federal rule 56(a) and pretrial orders under federal rule 16)

The summary judgment procedure here did not...