Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith

• Decision Date: 02 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-3530, No. 19-3603,19-3530
• Citation: 3 F.4th 1017
• Parties: Eric Roshaun THURAIRAJAH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS ; Sebastian County, Arkansas ; State of Arkansas; Bill Hollenbeck, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff for the County of Sebastian, Defendants Trooper Lagarian Cross, individually and in his Official Capacity as a State Trooper with and for the State of Arkansas, also known as L. Cross, Defendant - Appellee John Does 1-5, individually and in their official capacity in their roles as an employee of the City of Fort Smith, The State of Arkansas, The Arkansas State Police and/or Employee of Sebastian County, Defendant Eric Roshaun Thurairajah, Plaintiff - Appellee v. City of Fort Smith, Arkansas ; Sebastian County, Arkansas ; State of Arkansas; Bill Hollenbeck, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff for the County of Sebastian, Defendants Trooper Lagarian Cross, individually and in his Official Capacity as a State Trooper with and for the State of Arkansas, also known as L. Cross, Defendant - Appellant John Does 1-5, individually and in their official capacity in their roles as an employee of the City of Fort Smith, The State of Arkansas, The Arkansas State Police and/or Employee of Sebastian County, Defendant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

3 F.4th 1017

Eric Roshaun THURAIRAJAH, Plaintiff - Appellant

v.CITY OF FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS ; Sebastian County, Arkansas ; State of Arkansas; Bill Hollenbeck, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff for the County of Sebastian, Defendants

Trooper Lagarian Cross, individually and in his Official Capacity as a State Trooper with and for the State of Arkansas, also known as L. Cross, Defendant - Appellee

John Does 1-5, individually and in their official capacity in their roles as an employee of the City of Fort Smith, The State of Arkansas, The Arkansas State Police and/or Employee of Sebastian County, Defendant

Eric Roshaun Thurairajah, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.City of Fort Smith, Arkansas ; Sebastian County, Arkansas ; State of Arkansas; Bill Hollenbeck, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff for the County of Sebastian, Defendants

Trooper Lagarian Cross, individually and in his Official Capacity as a State Trooper with and for the State of Arkansas, also known as L. Cross, Defendant - Appellant

John Does 1-5, individually and in their official capacity in their roles as an employee of the City of Fort Smith, The State of Arkansas, The Arkansas State Police and/or Employee of Sebastian County, Defendant

No. 19-3530

No. 19-3603

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 13, 2021

Filed: July 2, 2021

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied August 17, 2021

William W. Hyman, James Cameorn King, KING LAW GROUP, Fort Smith, AR, for Eric Roshaun Thurairajah.

Vincent P. France, Assistant Attorney General, Maryna O. Jackson, Jennifer L. Merritt, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Little Rock, AR, for Trooper Lagarian Cross.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

The present case stems from Arkansas State Trooper Lagarian Cross's arrest of Eric Roshaun Thurairajah for disorderly conduct after Thurairajah yelled an expletive at him from a moving vehicle. Thurairajah filed suit against Trooper Cross, asserting, among other things, First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-123-101 to -108, for violating rights secured by Article II, §§ 6, 8, 9, and 15 of the Arkansas Constitution. Thurairajah appeals the district court's¹ order granting summary judgment on his ACRA claims and punitive-damages claims, order in limine precluding Thurairajah from presenting a punitive-damages argument to the jury, and order denying a new trial for damages on his § 1983 claims of First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure. Trooper Cross appeals the district court's order awarding attorney's fees to Thurairajah. We affirm.

I. Background

Trooper Cross arrested Thurairajah for disorderly conduct after Thurairajah yelled "f**k you" at him from a moving vehicle. Trooper Cross believed the shout constituted unreasonable or excessive noise in violation of Arkansas law.² Thurairajah sued Trooper Cross, asserting, among other things, First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under the ACRA for violating rights secured by Article II, §§ 6, 8, 9, and 15 of the Arkansas Constitution. Trooper Cross moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court granted Trooper Cross's motion on all ACRA claims and Thurairajah's claims for punitive damages. The district court held that Thurairajah failed to present evidence that Cross's conduct was "malicious" to support his ACRA claims, as required by Arkansas law. Likewise, the district court held that Thurairajah did not present evidence demonstrating that Trooper Cross's actions were motivated by an evil motive or intent or involved reckless or callous indifference to Thurairajah to support his punitive-damages claims. The district court denied the motion with respect to the individual capacity § 1983 claims asserting First and Fourth Amendment violations. We affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on these claims. See Thurairajah , 925 F.3d at 982. The district court granted Thurairajah's cross-motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the issue of Trooper Cross's liability to Thurairajah under § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights.

The district court submitted the issue of damages to a jury following trial. Prior to trial, Thurairajah's pretrial disclosure sheet indicated his intent to argue that his ACRA claims should remain pending and that he was entitled to punitive damages on the claims. The court sua sponte entered an order in limine precluding Thurairajah from presenting a punitive-damages argument to the jury. At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Trooper Cross's actions were not the proximate cause of Thurairajah's damages and awarded him nothing. The district court subsequently awarded nominal damages of $1.00 to Thurairajah. Thurairajah moved for a new trial, alleging that defense counsel acted inappropriately and that the district court should not have admitted evidence of a collateral source at trial. The district court denied the motion. Thurairajah moved for attorney's fees, and the district court awarded attorney's fees of $15,100.00.

II. Discussion

Thurairajah appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment on his ACRA claims and punitive-damages claims, order in limine precluding Thurairajah from presenting a punitive-damages argument to the jury, and order denying a new trial for damages on his § 1983 claims of First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure. Trooper Cross appeals the district court's order awarding attorney's fees to Thurairajah.

A. ACRA

Thurairajah first challenges the district court's dismissal of his ACRA claims. He asserts that the district court misapplied Arkansas statutory immunity. Specifically, he asserts that, under Arkansas law, "malice" is equated with the "clearly established" prong of federal qualified immunity and that no analysis of Trooper Cross's subjective intent is necessary. According to Thurairajah, had the district court not dismissed his ACRA claims, he would have been permitted a punitive-damages instruction as a matter of law.

"We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment." Smith v. McKinney , 954 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2020).

"Officers and employees of the State of Arkansas are immune from liability and from suit, except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance,^{[3 ]} for damages for acts or omissions, other than malicious acts or omissions , occurring within the course and scope of their employment." Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-305(a) (emphasis added). The Arkansas Supreme Court "has recognized that the immunity provided by Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-305 ... is similar to that provided by the Supreme Court for federal civil-rights claims." Fegans v. Norris , 351 Ark. 200, 89 S.W.3d 919, 924 (2002). "In interpreting § 19-10-305, [the Arkansas Supreme Court] ha[s] traditionally been guided by the analysis adopted by the United States Supreme Court for qualified-immunity claims in federal civil-rights actions." City of Fayetteville v. Romine , 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10, 13 (2008) (citing Fegans , 89 S.W.3d at 919).

Under that analysis, a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity is precluded only when the plaintiff has asserted a constitutional violation, demonstrated the constitutional right is clearly established, and raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the official would have known that the conduct violated that clearly established right. An official is immune from suit if his or her actions did not violate clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. The objective reasonable-person standard utilized in qualified-immunity analysis is a legal inquiry.

Id. at 13–14 (cleaned up).

"Further , employees and officers of the State [of Arkansas] are afforded statutory immunity from civil liability and from suit for nonmalicious acts occurring within the course of their employment." Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers , 2017 Ark. 213, 521 S.W.3d 459, 463 (2017) (emphases added). "Thus, for a plaintiff to counter an assertion of [statutory] immunity, he or she must allege sufficient facts in his or her complaint to support the claim of malicious conduct by the defendant." Fuqua v. Flowers , 341 Ark. 901, 20 S.W.3d 388, 391 (2000) (emphasis added). The Arkansas Supreme Court has defined malice as follows:

"It is true that in law malice is not necessarily personal hate. It is rather an intent and disposition to do a wrongful act greatly injurious to another ." Satterfield v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc. , 253 Ark. 181, 185, 485 S.W.2d 192, 195 (1972) ; see also Stine v. Sanders , 66 Ark. App. 49, 987 S.W.2d 289 (1999). Malice is also defined as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent .... A conscious violation of the law ... which operates to the prejudice of another person. A condition of the mind showing a heart ... fatally bent on mischief." Black's Law Dictionary, 956–57 (6th ed.1990).

Id. (emphases added) (alterations in original).

In summary, the "immunity [provided under § 19-10-305 ] is similar to that provided for federal civil-rights claims except for the non-malicious requirement ." Smith v. Norris , No. 4:12-cv-00277-BSM, 2013 WL 12109475, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 26, 2013) (emphasis added) (granting summary judgment on the ACRA claim because the plaintiff produced "no evidence that defendants’ actions were malicious"), aff'd , 583 F. App'x 563 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). "[T]he immunity provided by § 19-10-305" is "[m]ore rigorous[ ]" than federal qualified immunity because it "only provides state employees with statutory immunity for...