Tiger Oil Corp. v. Department of Licensing, State of Wash.
| Decision Date | 26 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 20665-0-II,20665-0-II |
| Citation | 88 Wn.App. 925,946 P.2d 1235 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | TIGER OIL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent. |
Helen Marie Kennedy, Seattle, for Appellant.
Pat L. De Marco, Assistant Attorney General, Olympia, for Respondent.
Tiger Oil Corporation appeals a trial court order ruling, as a matter of law, that Tiger Oil is not entitled to a direct refund of taxes it paid on special fuel used for a tax-free purpose. We hold that Tiger Oil is entitled to a refund and remand for further proceedings to determine the amount due.
Tiger Oil buys special fuels from distributors and sells it to special fuel users, but does not have a Washington special fuel dealer's license. Tiger Oil claims that it pays taxes to Washington at the time it purchases special fuels. Tiger Oil does not charge its customers the tax if they can certify that they were using the fuel for tax-exempt uses. On November 3, 1994, Tiger Oil filed an application for a refund of taxes totaling $38,536.68 paid between January 1 and October 31, 1994, on fuel that was used for tax-exempt purposes.
The Department of Licensing (the Department) denied Tiger Oil's application on November 18, 1994. The reasons stated were that an unlicensed fuel dealer must sell special fuels with tax included and only special fuel users have the right to refund or tax credit under the statute. After this denial, Tiger Oil charged its customers the tax and obtained assignments from them for any special fuel tax refunds to which they were entitled.
On January 18, 1995, Tiger Oil amended its refund claim, including the assignments, and updated the claim to include taxes paid between November 1 and December 31, 1994, bringing the total refund sought to $39,447.57. On March 16, 1995, the Department again denied the claim, asserting that licensed special fuel users could not receive a refund, but only a tax credit.
Tiger Oil then filed a complaint in Thurston County Superior Court on June 14, 1995, claiming that the Department exceeded its statutory authority in denying the claims for refund, and seeking a refund either directly, or through the assignments from the special fuel users. The Department counter-claimed, asserting that Tiger Oil had unlawfully acted as an unlicensed fuel dealer in Washington by purchasing special fuel without paying the tax, and selling the fuel without collecting the tax upon delivery.
Tiger Oil and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court denied both summary judgment motions, but held that while Tiger Oil was not entitled to a direct refund, it was entitled to whatever refund due to those of its customers (special fuel users) who assigned their rights to Tiger Oil. The State moved to have its counter-claim dismissed without prejudice. Tiger Oil then moved for attorney fees and costs. The court dismissed the Department's counter-claim and denied Tiger Oil's motion for attorney fees and costs. After the court made that ruling and denied Tiger Oil's motion for reconsideration, the parties stipulated to dismissal of all remaining claims.
Tiger Oil appeals the court's conclusion that it is not entitled to a direct refund and the court's denial of its motion for attorney fees and costs on the counter-claim.
Tiger Oil contends that under the Special Fuel Tax Act (the Act), RCW 82.38, et. seq., it is entitled to a direct refund from the State for all taxes paid on fuel used for tax-exempt purposes. The Department argues that only special fuel users are entitled to a refund or tax credit under the Act.
The court's challenged ruling partially granted each side's summary judgment motion. The familiar standard for review of a summary judgment order appears succinctly in Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 106 Wash.2d 1, 12-13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986) and Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982): The appellate court's role is to engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. A summary judgment motion brought under CR 56(c) can be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain, or having its affidavits considered at face value; after the moving party has submitted adequate affidavits, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts sufficiently rebutting the moving party's contentions and disclosing the existence of a material issue of fact. The court should grant the motion only if, from all the evidence, reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion.
Through their cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties conceded that there were no material issues of fact. Thus, our only question is whether the court's legal conclusions were correct. In order to evaluate the claims in this case, we must first explore the statutory scheme of the Act. Then, we can determine whether the parties here complied with the Act and whether Tiger Oil was entitled to a direct refund under the Act.
Construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo under the error of law standard. City of Pasco v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 119 Wash.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992); Inland Empire Distrib. Sys., Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 112 Wash.2d 278, 282, 770 P.2d 624, 87 A.L.R.4th 627 (1989). The courts retain the ultimate authority to interpret a statute. Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 325-26, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106, 103 S.Ct. 730, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983). The reviewing court's obligation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Review begins with the plain language of the statute. Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). Where a statute is unambiguous, legislative intent is determined from the language of the statute alone. Waste Management of Seattle, Inc. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wash.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994); In re Eaton, 110 Wash.2d 892, 898, 757 P.2d 961 (1988).
Whether an agency's construction of the statute is accorded deference depends on whether the statute is ambiguous. Where an agency is charged with the administration and enforcement of a statute, the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is accorded great weight in determining legislative intent. Pasco, 119 Wash.2d at 507, 833 P.2d 381 (citing Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wash.2d 801, 813-14, 828 [946 P.2d 1238] P.2d 549 (1992)). Absent ambiguity, however, there is no need for the agency's expertise in construing the statute. Pasco, 119 Wash.2d at 509, 833 P.2d 381. Furthermore, we will not defer to an agency determination that conflicts with the statute. Cowiche, 118 Wash.2d at 815, 828 P.2d 549.
The Act was enacted to impose a tax on those fuels used to power motor vehicles not taxed in the Act. RCW 82.38.010. All special fuel used to power vehicles that travel on highways, with certain exceptions not relevant here, is taxed. RCW 82.38.030(2). A special fuel dealer is "any person engaged in the business of delivering special fuel" to special fuel users. RCW 82.38.020(7). Both Tiger Oil and the Department agree that Tiger Oil was a special fuel dealer and that it sold and delivered special fuel similar in some respects to a licensed special fuel dealer. The Department claimed in its counter-claim that Tiger Oil was in violation of RCW 82.38.090, which states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to act as a special fuel dealer or a special fuel user in this state unless such person is the holder of an uncanceled special fuel dealer's or a special fuel user's license issued to him or her by the department.
A special fuel dealer's license authorizes a person to deliver previously untaxed special fuel into the fuel supply tanks of motor vehicles, collect the special fuel tax on behalf of the state at the time of delivery, and remit the taxes collected to the state as provided herein. A licensed special fuel dealer may also deliver untaxed special fuel into bulk storage facilities of a licensed special fuel user or dealer without collecting the special fuel tax. Special fuel dealers, when making deliveries of special fuel into bulk storage to any person not holding a valid special fuel license, must collect the special fuel tax at time of delivery, unless the person to whom the delivery is made is specifically exempted from the tax as provided herein.
Tiger Oil did not have a license and was acting as a special fuel dealer. Thus, it appears that Tiger Oil was in violation of the plain language of this statute.
Tiger Oil contends that it complies with this statute so long as it does not deliver "previously untaxed" fuel. The Department's rules seem to support that contention. WAC 308-77-032 provides:
A special fuel dealer's license must be obtained before engaging in the retail sale of previously untaxed special fuel, regardless of whether or not the special fuel tax is collected on the sale.... Persons purchasing special fuel with the special fuel tax included may resell this special fuel without having to obtain a special fuel dealer's license.
Tiger Oil contends that it paid the taxes on all fuel that it purchased and thus was not in violation of the Act. The Department does not now contend that Tiger Oil violated the law by purchasing special fuel without a license.
There is no provision that prohibits Tiger Oil from applying for a refund even if it did buy and sell special fuels in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
CKMS II, Inc. v. Ho, No. 53354-1-I (WA 12/27/2004), No. 53354-1-I
... ... 6. Condor Enters., Inc. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 71 Wn. App. 48, 54, 856 P.2d 713 (1993) (citing ... 9. Id. (citing Hoffer v. State, 110 Wn.2d 415, 425, 755 P.2d 781 (1988), adhered ... Wn.2d 888, 903, 969 P.2d 64 (1998) (citing Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Licensing, 88 Wn. App. 925, ... ...
-
State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen
... ... of Judge of the Pierce County Superior Court Department 1 for the term beginning January 13, 1997. The information ... State ex rel. Smith v. Mills, 2 Wash. 566, 568-69, 27 P. 560 (1891); see also 74 C.J.S. Quo ... Tiger Oil Corp. v. Department of Licensing, 88 Wash.App. 925, ... ...
-
Smith v. State
... ... SMITH, Respondent, v. State of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Appellant. Matthew B. Dyson, Appellant, v ... 4 Clement v. State Dep't of Licensing , 109 Wash. App. 371, 374, 35 P.3d 1171 (2001) (citing Walk v. Dep't ... 2d 587, 593, 362 P.3d 1278 (2015) (citing Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd. , 154 Wash.2d 224, 239-40, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005) ). 9 Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Licensing, State of Wash. , 88 Wash ... ...
-
Stiles v. Kearney
... 168 Wash.App. 250 277 P.3d 9 Dee Ann STILES and Arleta E ... [277 P.3d 14] Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., ... at 756, 82 P.3d 707 (quoting Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Licensing, 88 Wash.App ... ...
-
§11.6 Analysis
...conducting discovery does not prove that it did not have a factual basis for its allegations. See Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Licensing, 88 Wn.App. 925, 939, 946 P.2d 1235 (1997). Thus, Washington courts look to the status of the underlying case at the time the disputed pleading, motion, or......
-
Table of Cases
...v. Hendricks, 44 Wn.2d 837, 271 P.2d 683 (1954): 5.6(4), 55.5(3), 55.6(1), 55.6(13)(c), 55.7(1) Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Licensing, 88 Wn.App. 925, 946 P.2d 1235 (1997): 11.6(1)(b), 11.7(1) Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wn.2d 121, 875 P.2d 621 (1994): 49.7 Tinker v. Kent......
-
§11.7 Significant Authorities
...and meals to him while he gave them investment advice), review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1004 (1998); Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Licensing, 88 Wn.App. 925, 939, 946 P.2d 1235 (1997) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award sanctions, because "[t]he fact that ......