Tihonovich v. Williams

Decision Date14 August 1978
Docket NumberNo. 27500,27500
Citation196 Colo. 144,582 P.2d 1051
PartiesDan TIHONOVICH, Sheriff of Pueblo County, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles R. WILLIAMS, A. H. Hayden, William Gradishar, and the Board of CountyCommissioners of Pueblo County, State of Colorado, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Darol C. Biddle, Pueblo, for plaintiff-appellee.

James V. Phelps, County Atty., John G. Scorgie, Spec. Asst. County Atty., Pueblo, for defendants-appellants.

Perry P. Burnett, Denver, for amicus curiae, Colorado Counties, Inc.

Wm. David Lytle, Pueblo, for amicus curiae, Colorado Sheriff's Assn.

HODGES, Justice.

The sheriff for Pueblo County sued the Board of County Commissioners of Pueblo County (the board) seeking an increase in his 1976 annual budget. After trial to the court, a judgment was entered ordering certain increases and alterations in the budget. On appeal, the board argued for reversal on the ground that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. We agree and reverse the trial court's judgment.

The following facts are summarized from the evidence presented at trial. The sheriff's department, including the jail facilities, experienced a high employee turnover rate of 27%. After comparing his department with other law enforcement agencies throughout the state and with other county departments, the sheriff determined that this turnover rate was excessively high because of low salaries and a need for additional personnel. Employees frequently had to work overtime without additional pay or compensatory time off. To remedy this, the sheriff, in his 1976 budget proposal, requested salary increases, funding for an additional twenty-three employees, and funds to equip the additional employees. The amount of the budget request was more than double the approved budget for 1975.

Pursuant to statutory requirements, the sheriff submitted his budget proposal to the county manager, the officer designated by the board to prepare the county budget. See section 29-1-105, C.R.S.1973. The chairman of the board, Commissioner Hayden, and the county manager devoted much time to the preparation of the 1976 county budget. In addition to the needs of the various county departments, they considered the amount of revenue anticipated from the general fund and the ability of Pueblo County taxpayers to pay for services in light of recent increases in the mill levy by the city of Pueblo and by the Pueblo County school districts. Despite an expected increase in anticipated revenue provided by a four-tenths of a mill increase for the county general fund and an increase in assessed valuation, no county department received as much money as it had requested. The sheriff had requested $494,381 for the county jail and $1,036,322 for the sheriff's department. He received $366,739 and $508,588, respectively. This amounted to an increase of about $210,000 over the previous year's budget for the sheriff's department.

The sheriff brought this action under C.R.C.P. 106, to compel the board to approve his budget requests, alleging that it was the board's ministerial duty to approve his reasonable budget requests. The sheriff also sought to prohibit the board from altering salaries set by him, alleging that in so doing the board exceeded its jurisdiction. The trial court heard evidence regarding the budget-making process and the reasonableness of the sheriff's requests. At the close of the sheriff's evidence, the court granted the sheriff's motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence.

The trial court found that the sheriff had met his burden of proof in establishing the reasonableness and necessity for salary increases and for fourteen additional deputies. Further, it found that the board had abused its discretion by failing to give the sheriff an adequate opportunity for a budget hearing to explain and justify his requests. The district court ordered the board to increase the 1976 budget to cover the salary increases requested and make them retroactive to January 1, 1976. The board was ordered to provide money for hiring fourteen deputies effective January 1, 1977. The court also ordered the board to give the sheriff an adequate budget hearing to determine the amount of extra equipment needed for the additional employees. Finally, the trial court ordered the board to explore every available legal source of revenue to fund these additional expenditures, including as a last resort, raising the mill levy.

I. Jurisdiction

This action was brought under C.R.C.P. 106. C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) provides for suits to force a board to perform ". . . an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . .". The sheriff's complaint asserted that the Board was required by law to approve salaries set by the sheriff. This allegation was based upon section 30-2-106, C.R.S.1973, which provides in part:

". . . In all counties the salaries of the undersheriff and deputy sheriff shall be fixed by the sheriff, with the approval of the board of county commissioners."

The approval of the board of county commissioners is a discretionary power, not a ministerial duty to rubberstamp a county officer's decision. See Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484 (1973); Johnson v. Board of Commissioners, 174 Colo. 350, 483 P.2d 1344 (1971). Consequently, Rule 106(a)(2) does not apply to these facts.

C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) does not apply either. It provides for review of an inferior tribunal which, in exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. Clearly, the Board's adoption of a budget is not a judicial or quasi-judicial function, but is commonly considered to be a legislative and administrative function. See Amdahl v. County of Fillmore, Minn., 258 N.W.2d 869 (1977); Broward County v. Administration Commission, 321 So.2d 605 (Fla.App.1975); Hicks v. Orange County Board of Supervisors, 69 Cal.App.3d 228, 138 Cal.Rptr. 101 (1977).

While we agree with the board's contention that a Rule 106 proceeding is inapplicable here, we note that the trial court granted a motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Consequently, although the original complaint was not appropriately brought under Rule 106, the trial court determined that the pleadings and evidence presented a claim which was entitled to judicial review and determination. See Regennitter v. Fowler, 132 Colo. 489, 290 P.2d 223 (1955).

Although this is not a proper C.R.C.P. 106 proceeding, it is apparent that the legislature intended such disputes to be brought to court. See section 30-2-104(2), C.R.S.1973; Wadlow v. Kanaly, supra. This suit involves a conflict between two constitutional officers in the performance of their statutory duties. Its resolution requires an interpretation of various statutes, a judicial function.

II. Separation of Powers

There is no real constitutional separation of powers issue between the statutory authority of the sheriff and of the board. The board argues, however, that the trial court substituted its judgment for that of the board regarding the adoption of the county budget. We agree that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction.

Separation of powers is preserved by Article III of the Colorado constitution:

"The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."

Nowhere in the constitution are the courts expressly directed or permitted to set a county's budget or a sheriff's budget. See Amdahl v. County of Fillmore, supra; Broward County v. Administration Commission, supra; Hicks v. Orange County Board of Supervisors, supra. The legislature has delegated the performance of these duties to the county boards of commissioners pursuant to statutory procedures. See sections 29-1-110, 29-1-301, and 30-25-201, C.R.S.1973. In directing the performance of the budgeting and taxing functions, which are legislative in nature, the trial court here impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the board. Cf. Frankel v. Denver, 147 Colo. 373, 363 P.2d 1063 (1961) (court will not substitute its judgment for municipality's "legislative" zoning decision.)

We hold that in reviewing the budgeting and taxing actions of a board of county commissioners, which are clearly legislative, a trial court should give great deference to the board's discretionary acts, and should apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Amdahl v. County of Fillmore, supra. Here, the sheriff failed to show that the board abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily or unreasonably. 1 Only if the evidence establishes this may a reviewing trial court nullify a board's legislative decision, and remand to the board for reconsideration.

III. Legislative Intent

Both the sheriff and the board of county commissioners are obligated to perform certain statutory duties. The sheriff must keep the jail "clean, safe and wholesome" and must provide the prisoners with "good and sufficient food." Sections 27-26-102, 27-26-104, and 30-10-511, C.R.S.1973. He must serve process in the county, transport prisoners, and keep the peace. Sections 30-10-514, 30-10-515, and 30-10-516, C.R.S.1973.

To assist the sheriff in fulfilling his duties, the legislature has empowered the sheriff to appoint deputies and, subject to board approval, to set their salaries. Section 30-2-106, C.R.S.1973, provides:

"Undersheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall be appointed by the sheriffs of their respective counties, and their salaries shall be paid monthly. In all counties the salaries of the undersheriff and deputy sheriff shall be fixed by the sheriff, with the approval of the board of county commissioners."

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