Tilton v. Dayton Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1928
• Docket Number: (No. 1617.)
• Citation: 2 S.W.2d 889
• Parties: TILTON et al. v. DAYTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

2 S.W.2d 889

TILTON et al. v. DAYTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. et al.

(No. 1617.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

February 8, 1928.

Rehearing Denied February 22, 1928.

Appeal from District Court, Liberty County; Thos. B. Coe, Judge.

Suit by R. S. Tilton and others against the Dayton Independent School District and others. Judgment dismissing case, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Stevens & Stevens and Ward & Ward, all of Houston, for appellants.

Llewellyn & Kayser, of Liberty, and R. J. Sullivan, of Beaumont, for appellees.

O'QUINN, J.

This suit was brought in the district court of Liberty county, Tex., by plaintiffs, appellants here, as trustees of common school districts Nos. 8, 9, and 23, in Liberty county, and by them individually as taxpayers of said districts, against the Dayton independent school district, the trustees of said independent school district, and the tax assessor and collector of said district, seeking:

(a) To declare invalid and void the special act of the Thirty-Ninth Legislature (Acts First Called Session 1926, c. 7), having for its purpose the re-creating of the Dayton independent school district and enlarging same by including in the newly created district said common school districts Nos. 8, 9, and 23.

(b) To require restitution of the funds of said three common school districts alleged to have been unlawfully taken by the trustees of said Dayton independent school district.

(c) To enjoin the trustees of said Dayton independent school district from interfering with the trustees of said common school districts in the management and control of the affairs of said districts.

(d) To restrain the trustees of said Dayton independent school district from creating any indebtedness against said common school districts.

(e) For a mandatory injunction for the return to said common school districts of their funds.

(f) And to restrain appellees, defendants, from collecting any taxes or asserting any tax liens affecting the property of plaintiffs in the territory of said common school districts.

Plaintiffs set out in their petition the special act of the Legislature enlarging or recreating the Dayton independent school district, and then alleged that the election mentioned in the act was held in pursuance to the provisions of the act, and set out the order for the election passed by the board of trustees — the notice of election and canvass of the election returns by the board showing that both propositions, that is (1) whether the entire Dayton independent school district, as defined and bounded after the passage of the special act creating same, should assume the bonded indebtedness theretofore voted and existing against the old Dayton independent school district, and (2) whether the maintenance tax theretofore voted and existing in the old Dayton independent school district should be extended over the entire territory provided in the special act, were carried by a majority vote.

Defendants answered by general demurrer and general denial. Hearing was duly had and the court sustained defendants' general demurrer and refused the injunction, and plaintiffs declining to amend, judgment was entered dismissing the case, to which action of the court plaintiffs excepted, and the case is before us for review.

Appellants' first proposition asserts that the special act creating the Dayton independent school district is void, because the caption is not sufficient to apprise the public of any intention of the Legislature to abolish the three common school districts by including them within the bounds of the enlarged or re-created Dayton independent school district, and by their second proposition they insist that the act is void because its caption violates article 3, § 35, of the Constitution, which requires the subject of the bill to be expressed in the title to the act.

The caption of the special act reads:

"An act to enlarge and re-create the Dayton independent school district in Liberty county, Texas, defining its boundaries, to provide for the election of trustees, providing for the retention in office of the present board of trustees of the Dayton independent school district, and providing for the abolition of all other boards of trustees of any school district included within the district hereby created, providing for the raising of revenue, issuing bonds, maintaining public free schools, providing for the means of transportation of the school children in said district, to provide for the establishment of voting precincts and places for the holding of elections within said district, validating all issues of bonds heretofore voted and made, declaring valid and continuing in force all maintenance taxes heretofore voted and levied, providing for an election to determine (1) whether the entire district as a whole as herein created shall assume all outstanding bonding indebtedness (2) whether all property within the Dayton independent school district as created by this act, shall be subject to all special school taxes heretofore voted and levied by the Dayton independent school district repealing all laws in conflict with this Act and declaring an emergency."

It is well settled that the Legislature has the power to create independent school districts, and that it may do so by re-creating or enlarging already existing districts, by including within the re-created or new district territory forming portions or all of common school districts. Const. art. 7, § 3; McPhail v. Tax Collector (Tex. Civ. App.) 280 S. W. 260 (writ refused); Geffert v. Yorktown Independent School District (Tex. Civ. App.) 285 S. W. 345, 350; Henderson v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App.) 286 S. W. 501 (writ refused); Hill v. Smithville Independent School District (Tex. Com. App.) 251 S. W. 209.

We do not understand appellants to deny that this authority exists, but that they challenge the validity of the act because of insufficient caption to meet the constitutional requirements. We do not think appellants' criticism of the caption above set out is well taken. The gist of the complaint is that the caption does not in so many words state that common school districts Nos. 8, 9, and 23 are included within the new or re-created independent district. Const. art. 3, § 35, invoked by appellants, does not require that the details of the legislation shall be expressed in the caption, but only that the general or ultimate object of the bill shall be thus shown. Doeppenschmidt v. Railway, 100 Tex. 535, 101 S. W. 1080; Geffert v. Yorktown Independent School District (Tex. Civ. App.) 285 S. W. 345 (this case was reversed [Tex. Com. App.] 290 S. W. 1083, on question of legality of tax levy, not on validity of the district); Johnson v. Martin, 75 Tex. 40, 12 S. W. 321. The caption to the special act here under consideration stated that it was "An act to enlarge and re-create the Dayton independent school district in Liberty county, Texas," etc., which, we think, was a substantial, if not a literal, compliance with the spirit of the constitutional requirement, at least in so far as it related to the territory to be affected by the act. Sutherland v. Board of Trustees (Tex. Civ. App.) 261 S. W. 490 (writ refused). True, it did not state in detail the new territory or the common school districts to be included within the boundaries of the new or re-created independent district, but it did state that it was an act to enlarge and re-create the Dayton independent school district in Liberty county, Tex., and this, we think, was sufficient to fairly and reasonably give notice that new adjoining territory was to be included in the enlargement of said independent district, the subject-matter of the statute, and thus met the requirement of the Constitution. Lowery v. Red Cab Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 262 S. W. 147, 149 (writ refused); Geffert v. Yorktown Independent School District (Tex. Civ. App.) 285 S. W. 345; Morris & Cummings v. State, 62 Tex. 728; Johnson v. Martin, 75 Tex. 35, 40, 12 S. W. 321. We do not think it can be said, as contended by appellants, that the caption was misleading or deceptive.

What we have said disposes of propositions 3, 4, 5, 6, 25, 26, and 30.

Appellants' twelfth proposition is that the special act is void because it violates article 3, § 35, of the Constitution, in that its caption contains more than one subject. This proposition is overruled. The act had for its purpose one object only, the enlargement and re-creation of the Dayton independent school district, and all matters properly connected with the proper functioning of said district may be included in the caption without being subject to the fault suggested by appellants. Bloodworth v. Rhea (Tex. Civ. App.) 280 S. W. 1071; Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 359, 268 S. W. 915.

By their eighth proposition appellants say the special act is unconstitutional and void because it provided for an election to determine (1) whether the enlarged district should assume the outstanding bonds theretofore voted by the old district, and (2) to determine whether all property in the enlarged district...