Timberline Air Service, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 November 1994
• Docket Number: INC,HELICOPTER-TEXTRO,No. 60392-8,60392-8
• Citation: 125 Wn.2d 305,884 P.2d 920
• Parties: , 63 USLW 2344, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,113 TIMBERLINE AIR SERVICE, INC., an Oregon Corporation; and James and Adele Crawford, husband and wife and the marital community composed thereof, Appellants, v. BELL, a foreign Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 305

125 Wn.2d 305

884 P.2d 920, 63 USLW 2344, Prod.Liab.Rep.

(CCH) P 14,113

TIMBERLINE AIR SERVICE, INC., an Oregon Corporation; and James and Adele Crawford, husband and wife and the marital community composed thereof, Appellants, v. BELL HELICOPTER-TEXTRON, INC., a foreign Corporation, Respondent.

No. 60392-8.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Nov. 22, 1994.

Northcraft, Tierney & Hilleman, P.C., Mark Northcraft, Seattle, for appellants.

Mills, Cogan, Meyers & Swartling, Blair B. Burroughs, Frederick M. Meyers, Seattle, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

At issue is whether a manufacturer who complies with mandatory government specifications for design of a military helicopter later converted to civilian use has an absolute defense to a postmanufacture products liability failure-to-warn claim under either RCW 7.72.050(2) or the federal common law government contractor's defense. We conclude neither the statute nor the common law defense applies, and accordingly reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.

For purposes of this appeal, the manufacturer, Respondent Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc. (Bell), concedes the accuracy of the facts as stated by Appellants Timberline Air Service, Inc. and James and Adele Crawford (hereafter collectively Timberline).

This case began as a collection action on an open account against Timberline. Timberline filed a third party complaint asserting several product liability claims against Bell. These product liability claims arose from a helicopter crash on June 14, 1989, during logging operations. The UH-1L helicopter which crashed was manufactured by Bell in 1969 pursuant to a government wartime procurement contract, and was one of over 10,000 Huey series helicopters developed and manufactured by Bell beginning in the mid-1950's and sold to the government. The military owned the helicopter for nearly 17 years, then it was transferred in 1986 to an Oregon corporation which sold it to Timberline. The helicopter was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1986 for use in civilian restricted category operations, including logging. It was one of several hundred former military helicopters which had been surplused by the military and then used in civilian operations with certification by the FAA.

The crash resulted from the failure of the -9 input pinion gear installed in the helicopter's 42-degree gearbox. In brief, this gearbox is one of two through which power is transmitted to the tail rotor. The tail rotor is used by the pilot to counteract the spinning effect on the helicopter caused by the circular motion of the main rotor. With failure of the -9 gear, power is no longer transmitted to the tail rotor. Timberline alleges that the crash resulted when James Crawford, who piloted the aircraft, could not control the helicopter's spin after failure of the 42-degree gearbox -9 input pinion gear.

Civilian equivalents of the helicopter were also sold, and these commercial counterparts are capable of and are used in external lift operations, including repetitive heavy lift operations. The UH-1L helicopter has the same external cargo capabilities as the commercial counterparts. The -9 gear is interchangeable among commercial and military versions of the Huey helicopters, and is still available from Bell as a replacement part for both civilian and former military helicopters.

As early as 1977, Bell learned of adverse effects of repetitive heavy lift operations upon component parts of the commercial and military helicopters which it had manufactured. Beginning in 1981, Bell warned operators of the civilian equivalent Huey series helicopters that certain component parts are adversely affected by repetitive heavy lift operations, but did not warn owners and operators of former military helicopters. Bell did notify the FAA, which issued airworthiness directives addressing the problem and affected parts.

However, unlike the case with other component parts, with respect to the -9 input pinion gear Bell never issued warnings to owners and operators of either commercial or former military helicopters of the effect of repetitive heavy lift operations on the gear and the 42-degree gearbox. Prior to the helicopter crash at issue here, four 42-degree gearbox failures had occurred involving former military Huey series helicopters, and one had occurred in a commercial helicopter of the Huey series. Up to the time of preparing its brief, Timberline claims that eight and possibly nine -9 gear failures have occurred. In 1989, after four of these failures (involving one death and one serious injury), Bell wrote to the FAA about the effect of repetitive heavy lift operations on the 42-degree gearboxes incorporated in former military helicopters used in civilian heavy lift operations, identifying four accidents, the first occurring in 1982.

There is no dispute on appeal that the design of the helicopter, including the 42-degree gearbox and the -9 gear, is in compliance with mandatory government design specifications.

In September 1992, Bell filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of Timberline's claims based upon design defects and failure to warn of design defects. Bell argued that the federal common law government contractor defense provides a complete defense. The trial court granted the motion in part, dismissing all claims except a claim that Bell failed to provide postmanufacture warnings of a danger connected with the product but not learned of until after manufacture. Bell filed a supplemental motion for partial summary judgment, and on April 1, 1993, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the postmanufacture failure-to-warn claim on the basis of the government contractor's defense. Timberline appealed. Direct review was granted.

RCW 7.72.030(1)(c) provides for liability for violation of the postmanufacture duty to warn:

(1) A product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufacturer in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed or not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided.

....

(c) A product is not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided after the product was manufactured where a manufacturer learned or where a reasonably prudent manufacturer should have learned about a danger connected with the product after it was manufactured. In such a case, the manufacturer is under a duty to act with regard to issuing warnings or instructions concerning the danger in the manner that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would act in the same or similar circumstances. This duty is satisfied if the manufacturer exercises reasonable care to inform product users.

Timberline maintains the -9 gear cannot withstand the frequency of application or maximum power during repetitive heavy lift operations, and that Bell knew or should have known of the dangerous nature of the gear after it was designed and originally manufactured, long before the crash of Timberline's helicopter, but that Bell failed to warn of the danger. Timberline says it can prove that Bell could have issued proper warnings to civilian operators of aircraft which utilize the -9 gear (there is no question that the owners and operators of former military helicopters are readily ascertainable). Timberline suggests several courses which Bell could have followed, including reducing the suggested times between overhauls, suggesting alternative means of determining flight hours based upon repetitive lift usage, and prescribing a finite life for the -9 gear. As noted, Bell concedes the accuracy of these factual assertions for purposes of this appeal.

In that there are no disputed facts on this appeal from summary judgment, the issues are issues of law which this court reviews de novo. Rivett v. Tacoma, 123 Wash.2d 573, 578, 870 P.2d 299 (1994).

Statutory Defense

RCW 7.72.050(2) sets forth Washington state's statutory government contractor's defense to a product liability claim. Pursuant to the statute:

When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with a specific mandatory government contract specification relating to design or warnings, this compliance shall be an absolute defense.

RCW 7.72.050(2).

There is no dispute on appeal that Bell complied with specific mandatory government contract specifications for design of the product. The initial question is whether Bell's compliance with specifications pertaining to design gives rise, as a matter of law, to an absolute statutory defense to a postmanufacture failure-to-warn claim. In deciding this question, we first examine RCW 7.72.050(2) and determine whether, if there was compliance with design specifications, any and all product liability claims are foreclosed. We then turn to Bell's suggestion that the statute does not, by its terms, address postmanufacture warnings, and therefore the statutory defense must be read as an exception to the postmanufacture duty to warn. Lastly, we address Bell's argument that Timberline's claim is, in actuality, a design defect claim.

Our first inquiry is the meaning to be given the language in RCW 7.72.050(2). The purpose of statutory construction is to effectuate legislative intent. Washington Fed'n of State Employees Coun. 28 v. Office of Fin. Mgt., 121 Wash.2d 152, 163, 849 P.2d 1201 (1993); Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash.2d 178, 185, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992). "Where the meaning of the statute is clear from the language of the statute alone, there is no room for judicial interpretation." (Footnote omitted.) Kadoranian, at 185, 829 P.2d 1061.

However, where a statute is susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous. Shoreline Comm'ty College Dist. 7 v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 120 Wash.2d 394, 405, 842 P.2d 938 (199...