Timmons v. Ford Motor Co.

• Citation: 982 F.Supp. 1475
• Decision Date: 29 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. CV 397-43.,CIV.A. CV 397-43.
• Parties: Johnnie Lee TIMMONS, Sr., Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Cynthia P. Timmons; Joseph Partridge, Individually; Jacquelyn Ryals, Individually; Clifford Partridge, Sr., Individually and as Administrator of the Estates of Lenora Bailey and Burnice Edward Bailey; Michael Hicks, Individually; and Latrice Hicks, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Desiree D. Hicks, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

982 F.Supp. 1475

Johnnie Lee TIMMONS, Sr., Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Cynthia P. Timmons; Joseph Partridge, Individually; Jacquelyn Ryals, Individually; Clifford Partridge, Sr., Individually and as Administrator of the Estates of Lenora Bailey and Burnice Edward Bailey; Michael Hicks, Individually; and Latrice Hicks, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Desiree D. Hicks, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. CV 397-43.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Dublin Division.

September 29, 1997.

Charles Kyle Reed, Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Atlanta, GA, Earl W. Gunn, Atlanta, GA, Joseph K. Reid, III, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Richmond, VA, Grace R. den Hartog, William H. King, Jr., Richmond, VA, for Defendant.

David Roberson, Roberson & Schmidt, John Thomas Woodall, Woodall & Mackenzie, Savannah, GA, Betty Walker-Lanier, Tifton, GA, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER

BOWEN, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against all Plaintiffs on all issues of liability. This products liability case is brought pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 seeking monetary damages caused by injuries and deaths resulting from a motor vehicle collision occurring in Dodge County, Georgia. Diversity jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 22, 1996, Dwayne Franklin Carr was traveling southbound on Georgia State Road 27 driving a 1991 Nissan "King Cab" pickup truck, while heavily intoxicated. Carr's vehicle crossed the center line of the road directly into the path of a northbound 1994 Ford Explorer causing a violent, destructive, and fatal collision. The occupants of the Explorer were Plaintiffs' decedents; Cynthia Timmons, Lenora Bailey, Edward Bailey, and Desiree Hicks. Carr's vehicle was traveling at least seventy miles per hour when it struck the Ford Explorer. According to Plaintiffs' engineering expert, Dr. Craig Depken, the resulting closing speed of the Nissan truck and the Ford Explorer was approximately 102 miles per hour at impact. While Plaintiffs' facts are accepted as true for the purposes of this Motion, it should be noted that Defendant's experts estimate that the closing speed of the two vehicles was in excess of 130 miles per hour.

As a result of the high-speed collision, the Ford Explorer's engine was pushed rearward and could actually be seen from inside the passenger compartment. The Explorer's fuel pump shut off properly at the point of impact and none of the fuel lines showed any sign of fracture. However, at some point after the Explorer came to rest, a fire from an undetermined source, possibly the fuel rail, started in the vehicle.

Tragically, four of the five occupants of the Ford Explorer—Cynthia Timmons, Lenora Bailey, Edward Bailey and Desiree Hicks— died as a result of the collision. Plaintiffs' medical expert, Dr. Brian Frist, M.D., opines that 1) Edward Bailey suffered blunt-force trauma to his head, chest, and pelvis and died as a result of significant internal injuries; 2) Lenora Bailey suffered blunt-force trauma to her chest and it was inconclusive whether she died of her injuries or the ensuing fire; 3) Cynthia Timmons suffered blunt-force trauma to her head and chest and died as a result of her injuries; and 4) Desiree Hicks showed no signs of internal injuries and died of smoke and heat inhalation.

The exact cause of baby Desiree's death is the subject of much contention in this case. However, it is uncontested that baby Desiree was found in what remained of the front floorboard area of the Explorer. As indicated by the toxicology report, her carboxyhemoglobin (blood carbon monoxide) level was zero. Additionally, the autopsy report indicates that soot was noted on the epiglottis, in the trachea down into the bifurcation, and into the pulmonary airways.

The medical examiner in his initial autopsy report specified the cause of death as "smoke inhalation." After toxicology reports indicated that the carboxyhemoglobin level was zero, the medical examiner amended his report showing that baby Desiree's cause of death was "external causes associated with smoke inhalation."² The exact cause of death, however, was found inconclusive. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Motion, I view the facts as to baby Desiree in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs noting that the medical examiner amended his report.

II. REQUIREMENTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Applicable substantive law determines which facts are material, that is, which facts have the potential to affect the outcome of the trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court must "resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant, and draw all justifiable inferences in his [or her] favor." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for its motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the nature of the movant's initial burden "varies depending on whether the legal issues, as to which the facts in question pertain, are ones on which the movant or the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). If the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, that party "must show that, on all the essential elements of its case, . . . no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1438. On the other hand, if the non-movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant may carry its initial burden either by negating an essential element of the non-movant's case or by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir.1991) (explaining Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Merely stating that the non-movant cannot meet its burden at trial is insufficient. Id.

If—and only if—the movant carries the initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Id. at 608.³ Again, this burden varies depending upon whether the movant or non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial. If the movant has the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by coming forward with evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict at trial. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116 (citation omitted). If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant's response must be tailored to the method by which the movant carried its initial burden. If the movant presented evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated." Id. If the movant demonstrated an absence of evidence on a material fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant, or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. (citation omitted).

The clerk has given the non-moving party notice of the summary judgment motion, of the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and of the consequences of default. Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.1985), are satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motion is ripe for consideration.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE

Plaintiffs allege that the deaths of Cynthia Timmons, Lenora Bailey, Edward Bailey, and Desiree Hicks were the result of defects in the fuel and seat systems of the Ford Explorer. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant is liable pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 under principles of strict liability in tort, negligent design, design defect, and failure to warn.

A. CRASHWORTHINESS

Under Georgia law, the appropriate analysis for manufacturer defect liability is the "Risk-Utility" standard as adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 735, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994) (adopting this standard for both strict liability and negligence). In Banks, the parents of a nine-year-old boy who died after ingesting a poisonous rodenticide brought suit alleging defective design and inadequate labeling of ICI's product under theories of strict liability and negligence. Id. 450 S.E.2d at 672. The Georgia Supreme Court conducted "an exhaustive review of foreign jurisdictions and learned treatises" and concluded the "Risk-Utility" analysis was appropriate in design defect cases. Id. at 673.

At its core, the "Risk-Utility" analysis incorporates the concept of "reasonableness." The Georgia Supreme Court found that numerous factors must be considered in balancing the risk-utility of a given product to determine the reasonableness of the design. According to the Georgia Supreme Court, the "heart" of a design defect analysis is whether an alternative design exists. Id. at 674.

Nevertheless, Defendant incorrectly argues that Plaintiffs must establish an alternative...