Timperley v. Chase Collection Service
Decision Date | 09 May 1969 |
Citation | 272 Cal.App.2d 697,77 Cal.Rptr. 782 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Darrell TIMPERLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHASE COLLECTION SERVICE aka Chase Collection Service Inc., a California corporation, D. L. Dillon, James W. Brown, Harry Mulholland, Ronald L. Baker, Sidney Halper & Arthur La Touf, a co-partnership dba Chase Collection Service sued herein as Doe I, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 32997. |
Roger C. Campbell, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Louis R. Eglash, Beverly Hills, for respondents.
Respondents' demurrer to the second amended complaint was sustained with twenty days' leave to amend on the ground that no cause of action was stated. Two months later, when appellant failed to amend, respondents moved to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure, section 581, subdivision 3. Appellant appeals from the judgment of dismissal that followed and purports to appeal also from the order sustaining the demurrer. The order sustaining the demurrer is a preliminary order that is not separately appealable. (Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 107 Cal.App.2d 253, 254, 237 P.2d 51.)
Respondents contend at the outset that the sufficiency of the complaint is not before us on this appeal and that the sole question presented is whether the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss in view of appellant's failure to amend or to appear in response to respondents' motion to dismiss. This contention is contrary to authority, as respondents recognize (Sierra Investment Corp. v. County of Sacramento, 252 Cal.App.2d 339, 60 Cal.Rptr. 519; Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.2d 253, 237 P.2d 51.) Saddlemire v. Stockton Savings and Loan Society, 144 Cal. 650, 79 P. 381, cited by respondents in support of its contention, holds precisely the opposite. Pacific Paving Co. v. Vizelich, 141 Cal. 4, 74 P. 352, also relied upon by respondents, is not in point since it involved dismissal after failure of the plaintiff to return or file summons within three years. The dismissal was reversed because the appellate court concluded that the defendant whose motion to dismiss had been granted had appeared in the action. Appellate counsel does not serve either this court or the cause of his clients by such careless citation of authority.
The second amended complaint alleges that respondent Chase Collection Service wrote a letter to appellant's employer, the United States Post Office, without any request by the employer or notice to appellant, advising the employer that appellant had not paid a $206 attorneys' bill that had been assigned to Chase for collection. The letter asked the employer to advise appellant that 'unless this matter is taken care of with payment directly to CHASE COLLECTION SERVICE within five (5) days, we will be forced to proceed with legal action.' The purpose of the letter, according to appellant, was to enlist the employer's 'aid in collection of the alleged and purported debt' to respondents. As a result of the letter, appellant was forced to resign his job with the Post Office. Appellant alleges that respondents should have known this result would follow when they sent the letter and that respondents intended to convey by the letter the implication that appellant refused to pay a just debt, whereas, in fact, the debt was disputed by appellant. Appellant concludes from these facts that respondents acted with malice in sending the letter.
The theory of appellant's cause of action is that respondents invaded his right of privacy by writing the letter to his employer. The governing law as recently summarized by this court is as follows: (Schwartz v. Thiele, 242 Cal.App.2d 799, 804--805, 51 Cal.Rptr. 767, 770.)
Authorities have generally recognized that a creditor or his collection agent has a limited right to reveal to others the existence of a debtor's obligation in order to collect the debt. Although this right has not been extended to include a privilege of informing the public in general of the indebtedness (see Trammell v. Citizens News Co. (1941) 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708; Brents v. Morgan (1927) 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 55 A.L.R. 964) or a privilege of using excessively oppressive means of collection , it has been held to cover communications to the debtor's employer disclosing the fact of the debt, even if disputed, and requesting the aid of the employer.
Several arguments have been advanced in support of this right. One rationale is based upon the mutual interest of the parties to the communication: the creditor's interest in gaining the assistance of the employer in his collection efforts and the employer's interest in protecting himself against dishonest employees or unnecessary involvement in wage assignments, garnishment actions, and other creditor proceedings. (See Yoder v. Smith, Supra, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (especially, concurring opinion).) Another ground was considered in Schwartz v. Thiele, Supra: ...
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