Tinker v. Beasley

• Decision Date: 10 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-14597.,04-14597.
• Citation: 429 F.3d 1324
• Parties: Chiketta TINKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Perry BEASLEY, Dan Watson, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1324

429 F.3d 1324

Chiketta TINKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Perry BEASLEY, Dan Watson, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 04-14597.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

November 10, 2005.

Kevin Christopher Newsom, Montgomery, AL, Jack M. Curtis, Alabama Dept. of Public Safety, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants-Appellants.

George P. Ford, Howard Edgar Howard, Ford, Howard & Cornett, P.C., Gadsden, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before BIRCH, HULL and BOWMAN^*, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendants-appellants, Perry Beasley and Dan Watson, appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and discretionary-function immunity. The appeal requires us to address: (1) whether the coercive questioning of plaintiff-appellee, Chiketta Tinker, by Beasley and Watson, constitutes a violation of Tinker's substantive due process rights even though it did not result in a confession or other self-incrimination; and (2) whether the coercive questioning rises to a level sufficient to constitute the tort of outrage under Alabama law.¹ We REVERSE and REMAND.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of Tinker's arrest, incarceration, and questioning on suspicion of murder. At the time of her arrest, Tinker was a twenty-four year-old mother of three young children. She worked in a hospital kitchen in Greensboro, Alabama. Beasley and Watson were agents of the Alabama Bureau of Investigation ("ABI") who questioned Tinker in relation to the shooting of a bank teller in the course of a robbery. Before the bank teller died at the scene, she had identified Tinker as the shooter.

Tinker was arrested at her home the same afternoon and taken to the "old jailhouse" in Greensboro where she was kept in a holding area. R1-55 at 2. Later that evening, she was taken to the Hale County jail. Patrick Arrington, an attorney called upon by her family to represent her, came to see her at some point that evening. With Arrington present, Tinker was then interviewed by Beasley. Beasley has alleged that Arrington informed him after this first interview that he was no longer representing Tinker. Beasley told Watson that Tinker was no longer represented. Arrington asserts that he never said he no longer represented Tinker, and that, to the contrary, he had instructed the investigators specifically that Tinker should not be questioned in his absence.²

The next day, Tinker made an initial appearance.³ After she returned from the courthouse, Tinker was fingerprinted by Watson. Arrington was not present at the courthouse or later at the jail. Watson asserts that Tinker began asking him questions about her case, and appeared to want to make a statement. When Tinker asked for her lawyer, Watson told her that her lawyer no longer represented her. R1-44 Exh. unnumbered 1 (Deposition of Chiketta Tinker), at 213. Tinker then signed a waiver-of-rights form and gave a statement in which she described how she knew the victim of the shooting and admitted that she had been at the bank on the day of the shooting.

Tinker asserts that throughout this and the following several days of her incarceration, Beasley and Watson interviewed her repeatedly, telling her that her lawyer had "bailed out" on her, that they were all she had to get her out of trouble, that she would never see her children again unless she confessed, and that she had two options: the electric chair or life in prison. R1-44, Exh. unnumbered 1, at 213. She says that they referred to her "sizzling" and "frying" in the electric chair, and that they further pressured her through references to her recently deceased mother. R1-19 at 3. Tinker also asserts that at some point during one of the interviews, Beasley told her that if her father or any other family members went to a lawyer on her behalf "they would fuck it up for [her]." R1-44, Exh. unnumbered 1, at 251.

Two days after the shooting, Tinker agreed to a polygraph exam in the absence of Arrington. Sometime later that day, Arrington learned about the polygraph and the interviews and complained to Beasley and Watson about both. Tinker was finally released late on the evening of the fourth day because she had been eliminated as a suspect by the authorities' capture of the actual perpetrator of the crimes. Tinker never confessed to any crime or otherwise incriminated herself.

All claims against Beasley and Watson have been dismissed except allegations that their questioning of Tinker concerning the murder (1) violated her Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process rights and (2) constituted the Alabama tort of outrage. Beasley and Watson filed a motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims, contesting each claim and arguing that they are protected from any constitutional claim by qualified immunity and from the state-law claim by state-law, discretionary-function immunity. The court issued an order denying summary judgment as to both claims. Beasley and Watson appeal that order.⁴

II. DISCUSSION

A. Qualified Immunity

A district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is reviewed de novo, construing all facts and making all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir.2004). The qualified immunity inquiry involves three steps: (1) the alleged conduct must fall within the scope of the discretionary authority of the actor; (2) if it does, we must then determine whether that conduct violates a constitutional right; (3) if so, we must inquire whether the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 1346 (11th Cir.2002). In this case, it is undisputed that Watson and Beasley were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when they questioned Tinker.

Once action within the scope of discretionary authority has been established, a "reviewing court's first task is to determine whether the complainant has alleged the deprivation of a cognizable constitutional right." Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam). The circumstances under which coercive interrogation that does not result in a confession or other self-incrimination may constitute a violation of substantive due process rights is an issue of first impression for our circuit.

The analysis of any claim to a substantive due process right should begin with "a `careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)). That liberty interest must be "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (citation omitted).

In the context of involuntary confession, the Supreme Court has observed that "certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 449, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). The Court more explicitly identified the liberty interest here at issue in Chavez v. Martinez, confirming that, under some circumstances, coercive interrogation alone may violate a suspect's right to substantive due process, even when no self-incriminating statement is used against the person interrogated. See 538 U.S. 760, 780, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2008, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003).⁵ Such a violation will be recognized, however, only where the specific conduct alleged rises to a level of coercive interrogation that "shocks the conscience." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998).

The Supreme Court and our circuit have offered scant guidance as to what conduct shocks the conscience. The Supreme Court found a conscience-shocking violation of substantive due process where police directed an emergency room doctor to extract against a suspect's will his stomach contents, which included heroine-filled capsules. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). On the other hand, in Moran v. Burbine, the Court found that failure of police to inform a murder suspect of telephone calls from an attorney, who had been contacted by his sister, before continuing an interrogation, did not undermine the validity of the suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights or shock the conscience when that suspect had never asked for an attorney, was unaware that his sister had called one, and had not been formally charged. 475 U.S. 412, 415, 428, 432-33, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1138, 1145,1147, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). The Court in Moran concluded: "We do not question that on facts more egregious than those presented here police deception might rise to a level of a due process violation." Id. at 432, 106 S.Ct. at 1147.

Our court found a conscience-shocking violation of substantive due process in a coach's deliberate striking of a high school student in the eye with a heavy object, with enough force to cause permanent blindness, as a disciplinary action. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir.2000).⁶ In contrast, shooting at a suspect to protect against that suspect's use of deadly force "does not rise to the level of egregious conduct that would shock the conscience of a person even with the most tender sensibilities." Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 (11th Cir.2003). In sum, "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849, 118 S.Ct. at 1718; Neal, 229 F.3d...