Titelman v. Stedman
Decision Date | 01 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. S03A1159.,S03A1159. |
Citation | 277 Ga. 460,591 S.E.2d 774 |
Parties | TITELMAN et al. v. STEDMAN. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Wendy J. Titelman, pro se.
Deborah L. Dance, Dorothy H. Bishop, for appellee.
Jones, Jensen & Harris, Richard E. Harris, Atlanta, Hayes & Boone, LLP, Alene R. Levy, Ann Al-Bahish, Mercy L. Carrasco-Lowe, Houston, for amicus curiae.
After Ms. Wendy J. Titelman lost custody of her two daughters to their father, she and others presented to the Juvenile Court of Cobb County for filing a petition for adjudication of deprivation. Appellants subsequently filed a petition for mandamus in superior court, alleging that Judge Juanita Stedman (Appellee) refused to allow filing of the deprivation petition or to sign any order or provide any other written documentation of the denial of filing. The superior court dismissed the petition for mandamus, finding that such relief was not appropriate. Appellants appeal from this order.
Under the Civil Practice Act (CPA), "[e]xcept when otherwise specifically provided by statute, all judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk." OCGA § 9-11-58(a). This portion of the statute was adopted verbatim in Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1. See English v. Milby, 233 Ga. 7, 9-10(1), 209 S.E.2d 603 (1974) ( ). Very similar language is also found in the Appellate Practice Act (APA): "The filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of a judgment within the meaning of" the APA. OCGA § 5-6-31. Under the case law, Gregory, Ga. Civil Practice § 7-4, p. 574 (2d ed.1997). State v. Sullivan, 237 Ga.App. 677, 678, 516 S.E.2d 539 (1999) ( ).
Furthermore, "[t]he filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the entry of the judgment, and, unless the court otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effective for any purpose until the entry of the same...." OCGA § 9-11-58(b). See also Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1. " State v. Sullivan, supra at 678, 516 S.E.2d 539. Therefore, this Court has held that, under the CPA, Crowell v. State, 234 Ga. 313, 215 S.E.2d 685 (1975). This rule is also compelled by force of the APA:
Under [that] Act the well established rule that "what the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such," is still of force, and both a written judgment and its entry by filing the writing with the clerk are essential prerequisites to an appeal. [Cits.]
Boynton v. Reeves, 226 Ga. 202, 203, 173 S.E.2d 702 (1970). Accordingly, (Emphasis supplied.) Smith v. State, 242 Ga.App. 459, 530 S.E.2d 223 (2000). Continued adherence to this rule is supported and mandated not only by statutes and cases, but by the rationale underlying it: "`' Bishop v. State, 176 Ga.App. 357, 358, 335 S.E.2d 742 (1985). See also Seabolt v. Seabolt, 220 Ga. 181(1), 137 S.E.2d 642 (1964). That rationale applies equally whether a trial court precludes further legal proceedings by ruling on the merits of a proceeding filed in that court or by denying the filing of a petition or other pleading.
OCGA § 9-11-58(a) and Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1 mandate that the trial judge, in the absence of an explicit statutory exception, sign "all judgments...." Indeed, in an appeal purportedly from an oral ruling, this Court remanded the case and required the trial court to enter a written judgment, without prejudice to the right to file a subsequent appeal. Crowell v. State, supra. Thus, trial courts have a clear legal duty to enter all of their judgments, including those which deny the filing of an initial pleading.
Because the trial court's entry of a written order denying filing is an appealable judicial act, mandamus is not an available means of reviewing the propriety of that ruling. Barber Fertilizer Co. v. Chason, 265 Ga. 497, 458 S.E.2d 631 (1995). See also Grier v. Peed, 276 Ga. 521, 522, 578 S.E.2d 861 (2003); Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 273 Ga. 431, 433-434(1), 543 S.E.2d 16 (2001). However, mandamus is an available remedy for a trial court's failure to carry out an administrative act, Henderson v. McVay, 269 Ga. 7-8(1), 494 S.E.2d 653 (1998). OCGA § 9-11-58(a), Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 17.1, and applicable case law do not leave a trial court any room to exercise its discretion by orally announcing a judgment, but declining to enter it. Furthermore, where a trial judge refuses to permit the filing of a petition and fails to perform her clear legal duty to enter a written order, an appeal is not possible. In that circumstance, therefore, mandamus is appropriate, not to review the propriety of the denial of filing, but to compel the trial court to enter a written order from which an appeal can be taken. Compare Grier v. Peed, supra at 521, 578 S.E.2d 861.
In their petition for mandamus, Appellants did not only assert that the denial of filing of the deprivation petition was erroneous. They also complained of Appellee's refusal to sign any order or to provide any other written documentation of the denial of filing, and prayed that a writ of mandamus be issued ordering her to dispose of the deprivation petition according to law and to grant all other proper relief. Under these allegations, relief is available to Appellants in the form of an order that requires Appellee either (1) to sign and file with the clerk a written order denying filing of the deprivation petition, or (2) to permit the petition to be filed and proceed according to law. Therefore, the superior court erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus.
Judgment reversed.
HUNSTEIN, J., disqualified. HINES, J., not participating.
Because the juvenile court code provides a specific exception to the requirement of a written order denying filing, I respectfully dissent.
On August 4, 2000, following Appellant's divorce from her husband, a trial court awarded custody of the couple's two daughters, aged 6 and 8, to husband. A custodial modification action is apparently pending in Cobb County.1 On June 10, 2002, Appellant and 29 other individuals presented to the Cobb County Juvenile Court for filing a petition for adjudication of deprivation, alleging that the daughters were being subjected to sexual abuse by their father. Attached to the petition as exhibits were (1) reports from two psychologists who interviewed the older child, (2) the report of a psychologist who reviewed a videotape interview of the children conducted by Cobb County Department of Family and Children Services and other records, (3) letters from five individuals, including personnel from the agency charged with supervising Appellant's visitation with the children, (4) letters from two individuals who observed behavior on the father's part that they considered suspicious, (5) a letter from an individual who states she observed the father's inappropriate behavior with the younger daughter, (6) the September 2000 report of an out-of-state psychologist who interviewed the children, and (7) an April 2001 letter from jurors who acquitted Appellant of various charges in Cobb County stemming from her taking the children to see the out-of-state psychologist, stating, among other things, the jurors' belief that the state's experts who concluded that no abuse occurred were not credible.
An employee of the Juvenile Court refused to allow the filing, and no written order was issued. Within 30 days, Appellant filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of Appeals seeking to require the Juvenile Court to file the petition. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals refused to accept the...
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