Titus v. Lawndale School Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1958
• Citation: 322 P.2d 56,157 Cal.App.2d 822
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robert C. TITUS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. LAWNDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public corporation, Frank T. Hogan, Marvin D. Haggberg, Milan P. Kissinger, Gordon E. Williams, Emery F. Hokanson, Leon J. Darley and Martha R. Hunt, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 22433.

Page 56

322 P.2d 56

157 Cal.App.2d 822

Robert C. TITUS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. LAWNDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public corporation, Frank T. Hogan, Marvin D. Haggberg, Milan P. Kissinger, Gordon E. Williams, Emery F. Hokanson, Leon J. Darley and Martha R. Hunt, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 22433.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 24, 1958.

Rehearing Denied March 24, 1958.

Hearing Denied April 23, 1958.

S. V. O. Prichard, Hollywood, for appellant.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Wm. E. Lamoreaux, Asst. County Counsel, James W. Briggs, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents.

ASHBURN, Justice.

Petitioner Robert C. Titus appeals from a judgment denying his prayer for writ of mandate requiring the Lawndale School District and its board members to reinstate him in his position as Superintendent of Schools of said district and to pay his salary as such.

Pursuant to § 1303, Education Code, ¹ petitioner was elected superintendent of said district for a term of four years ² beginning July 1, 1955. The statute provides (§ 1306) that the superintendent, in addition to other powers and duties granted to or imposed upon him, (a) shall be the chief executive officer of the governing board of the district, (b) except where otherwise provided by the board shall prepare and submit the budget, and (c) subject to approval of the board shall assign all certificated employees to positions in which they are to serve. (As amended in 1957 § 1306 also requires the superintendent to enter into contracts on behalf of the district as contemplated by § 18071, also enacted in 1957.) Pursuant to this election the board made a written contract of January 20, 1955, with petitioner employing him as superintendent for the four-year term at a salary of $10,000 per annum, adjustable upward but not otherwise. It contains this paragraph: 'The duties of the district superintendent shall be to serve as District Superintendent in charge of all educational and financial matters pertaining to the operation of the school district and to serve as chief executive officer of the Board of Trustees.' Though required to have a school administration certificate and a teacher's certificate (§ 1304), the superintendent is not hired as a teacher but as a supervisory and executive functionary. His position in the school system is unique, as will be shown presently.

While statutory methods are prescribed for discharging permanent employees (§ 13521 et seq.), and probationary employees (§§ 13581-13582), there is no provision for discharging a superintendent holding a contract for a term of years; on the contrary, § 1303.1 authorizes termination, by mutual consent only, of 'the term of employment of, and any contract of employment with, the superintendent of schools' effective on the next succeeding first day of July, and his reelection and reemployment upon other mutually agreed terms and conditions. Section 1303.2 provides that six months advance written notice must be given the superintendent if the board decides not to renew his contract, failing which the superintendent shall be deemed reelected for a term equal to the existing one and upon the same conditions.

On January 5, 1956, six months after the beginning of his term, the school board undertook to discharge appellant, did so without affording a hearing, and thereafter prevented him from discharging any of the duties or exercising any of the prerogatives of superintendent of schools. The board members went throught the form of filing charges against petitioner, gave him five to ten minutes to answer the charges, which he declared to be insufficient time, as was manifestly true. No evidence was produced or tendered in support of the charges. Then the board adopted the following resolution: 'A motion was made that the Board relieve Robert C. Titus of all duties and responsibilities as Superintendent of the Lawndale Elementary School District effective immediately and that Mr. Titus be placed on paid inactive leave through February, 1956, at which time Mr. Titus' contract as Superintendent and his employment with the District be terminated.' On February 2, 1956, appellant made written demand for a hearing on the charges pursuant to § 13522, which relates to dismissal of a permanent employee. This the board denied upon the ground that said section was inapplicable. The board held no hearing and filed no suit pursuant to § 13529 (quoted infra). Thereupon appellant filed his mandamus suit on March 23, 1956. This was followed on April 19, 1956, by a notice from the board to appellant purporting to terminate his services as a 'probationary employee': 'You are hereby notified that your services as a probationary employee in the Lawndale School District will not be required during the ensuing year (1956-1957 school year).'

The trial judge ruled: 'I think the case of Board of Education [of City of Los Angeles] v. Swan, 41 Cal.2d 546 and Holbrook v. Board of Education in 37 Cal.2d 316 , are determinative; that the Board of Education can cancel a contract of the superintendent at any time, subject, of course, to his remedy, if any, for breach of contract. * * * The petitioner's rights to work for the Board of Education were by virtue of his contract with the Board and not by virtue of statute under which most civil service and certificated personnel are employed. Furthermore, his rights as a probationer, that is to say a probationer who has been hired because of the fact that he had to have a certification, in fact two certificates, were in my opinion cut off by the notice of May of 1956.' The formal findings say: '[T]he court makes no finding with respect to whether or not petitioner performed any or all conditions of the contract to be performed on his part, the determination of this mandamus proceeding being without prejudice to petitioner's right to bring an action for breach of contract; the court specifically makes no finding with relation to the allegations set forth in paragraph V of the Amended Petition and paragraph II of the Answer thereto.' Said paragraph V is an averment of full performance by petitioner until prevented from further rendition of services by respondents. Paragraph II of the answer denies that allegation and specifies numerous alleged failures and refusals on petitioner's part to properly perform his contract.

The major questions presented by this appeal are whether a shcool board may discharge a superintendent whom it has hired for a four-year term; if so, what method should be pursued; and what, if any, remedy does the superintendent have if wrongfully ousted from office.

Correct solution of these questions requires studious recognition of the difference between the superintendent's contract rights and his potential tenure rights under the teachers' tenure act (§§ 13081-13104). Teachers fall into four classifications,--permanent (§§ 13081, 13084), probationary (§ 13101), substitute (§ 13103), and temporary (§ 13104). A permanent employee is one employed in a district having average daily attendance of 850 or more (which Lawndale does have), who, having been employed for three successive school years in a position requiring certification qualifications, is reelected for the next school year in a like position (§ 13081). Such an employee cannot be discharged without filing of charges of misconduct, incompetency or the like (§ 13521), with an opportunity to demand a hearing. If this is done, 'the governing board shall have the option either (a) to rescind its action, or (b) to file a complaint in the superior court of the county in which the school district or the major part thereof is located, setting forth the charges against the employee and asking that the court inquire into the charges and determine whether or not the charges are true, and if true, whether or not they constitute sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the employee, under the provisions of this code, and for judgment pursuant to its findings.' § 13529. 'If the board elects to file a complaint, the complaint shall be filed within 30 days from the date of the employee's demand for hearing. If the complaint is not filed within such period the board's action shall be deemed to be rescinded and all charges dismissed.' § 13530. This procedure could not apply to appellant, for he had not served a full year when charges were filed, and it takes three years of service with an election for a fourth year to ripen into permanent status. He did have a potential permanent status, however, for he had been elected for four full years and if permitted to serve would have acquired tenure ³ as a classroom teacher (Holbrook v. Board of Education, 37 Cal.2d 316, 333-334, 231 P.2d 853).

A probationary employee is one employed for the school year in a position requiring certification qualifications, who has not been classified as a permanent of a substitute employee (§ 13101); the classification is made at the time of employment and thereafter in the month of July of each year (§ 13102). In other words, a probationary employee is one employed from year to year, who has not served in a certificated job for three successive years and been elected for a fourth. Appellant was not employed from year to year, but had been elected for four years and given a contract for the same period. A probationary employee cannot be discharged during the school year except for cause, 'as in the case of permanent employees' (§ 13581), which language connotes a necessity of following the same procedure as in case of dismissal of a permanent employee. Comstock v. Board of Trustees, 20 Cal.App.2d 731, 732, 67 P.2d 694. However, such employees may be terminated at the end of the school year by mere service of notice under § 13582, which reads: 'On or before the fifteenth day of May in any year the governing board may give notice an writing to a probationary employee that his services...