Todd v. Bettingen
| Decision Date | 15 November 1907 |
| Docket Number | 15,273 - (94) [2] |
| Parties | JOHN A. TODD v. WILLIAM J. BETTINGEN |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $4,000 for the breach of a contract. The report on the former appeal will be found in 98 Minn. 170. From an order, F. V. Brown J., granting plaintiff's motion to amend and supplement his amended complaint and for a new trial upon the framing of such issues as should be made upon such amended complaint defendant appealed. Reversed.
Amendments to Pleadings.
Liberality in allowing amendments to pleadings is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, decreases as it progresses, and changes to a strictness ordinarily amounting to a prohibition after the matters litigated have received the normally final sanction of an adjudication by the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the court of last resort.
Amendments to Pleadings -- After Affirmance upon Appeal.
When that affirmance is of the trial court's order for judgment, it ordinarily amounts to a direction not to proceed to a determination, as in case of reversal on appeal, but to enter the judgment affirmed. After such affirmance amendments to the pleading which involve a new trial should not be allowed, except possibly in extraordinary cases, and then only when the proposed amendment sets forth, clearly and distinctly, a basis for relief which has not before been presented for judicial determination.
Amendments to Pleadings.
Plaintiff's original complaint, in an action begun in February, 1903, set forth facts without separate statement of causes of action, and sought different kinds of both equitable and legal relief. Upon demurrer, plaintiff amended. After issues had been joined, the trial court placed the cause on the jury calendar. Plaintiff again amended. Subsequently the court, on motion, amended the complaint. On trial, the court directed a verdict for defendant. On appeal from an order denying a new trial, its conclusions were affirmed, viz., that the pleadings and the course of trial determined the action to be one at law to recover damages for the breach of a written contract void under the statute of frauds. The case was remanded. In November, 1906, the trial court allowed amendments which set forth a cause of action in assumpsit or in conversion, and granted a new trial. It is held that the case was not shown to have been within any possible exception to the normal rule prohibiting such an amendment at the time in question.
Appeal.
Pursuant to an order of the trial court allowing an amendment, plaintiff paid defendant $150 when the amended complaint was served. That sum was retained. Plaintiff made no motion on the first day of the term to strike from the calendar, or to affirm, or to dismiss, but, on the contrary, in many ways actively acquiesced in the appeal. It is held that defendant was not prevented from prosecuting his appeal.
Harris Richardson and Harold C. Kerr, for appellant.
Wilson & Mercer, for respondent.
Plaintiff's original complaint set forth facts without separate statements of causes of action, and sought different kinds of both equitable and legal relief. The trial court, after argument, placed the cause upon the jury calendar. On trial a jury was called. Having heard the testimony, the court disposed of the controversy as a matter of law and directed a verdict for the defendant. It subsequently denied plaintiff's alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. From that order an appeal was taken to this court, which sustained the view of the trial judge that the pleadings and the course of trial determined the action to have been one at law to recover damages for the breach of a written contract, that the contract was void under the statute of frauds, and that defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. Todd v. Bettingen, 98 Minn. 170, 107 N.W. 1049. After the cause had been remanded to the district court, plaintiff moved upon contested affidavits to amend his complaint. The clerk was restrained from entering judgment and taxing costs pending the hearing. The court allowed the amendment on terms. This appeal was taken by the defendant from an order granting plaintiff's motion.
The essential question presented is whether the trial court has power to grant an amendment to a complaint after a trial has been had upon the pleadings and a verdict directed, the alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings or for a new trial had been denied by the trial court, and the legal conclusions of the trial court had been confirmed by this court.
The right of the trial court to make amendments is recognized by statute and enforced by well-settled practice, permitting such amendments with great liberality, so as to properly determine the merits of legal controversies. The trend of modern judicial opinion is wholly opposed to allowing mere mistake in form to defeat the substantial rights of parties. The right of amendment in the earlier stages of the proceedings may be a matter of course. In later stages, amendments are liberally allowed for cause shown, upon application to and by leave of the court, upon terms, it may be. Some of the cases on which the plaintiff has laid emphasis have little more than this effect on the issues of this particular case. In Miller v. Watson, 6 Wend. 507, a declaration was amended after three trials at circuit, but when plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. And see Swank v. Barnum, 63 Minn. 447, 65 N.W. 722; Hardman v. Kelley, 19 S.D. 608, 104 N.W. 272; Esch v. Home, 78 Iowa 334, 43 N.W. 229, 16 Am. St. 443. Even on or after trial, and verdict and judgment, such amendments are freely allowed as will cause the pleadings to sustain, not destroy, the verdict or order for judgment, by conforming their averments and prayer to the facts proved on trial, in order that a proper judgment may rest upon a technically correct foundation, as well as upon adequate substantive proof. Some of the cases to which appellant refers are to this effect. See Thomas v. Hatch, 53 Wis. 296, 10 N.W. 393; Hansen v. Allen, 117 Wis. 61, 93 N.W. 805; Anderson v. First National Bank, 5 N.D. 80, 64 N.W. 114. Such cases are sui generis. The case at bar is not at all of that class.
It is undoubtedly true that where a conclusion has been reached by the trial court, and that conclusion has been reversed upon appeal, and the case remanded to the trial court for the very purpose of securing a judicial determination, the issues may, and generally must, in large measure, be tried de novo in that court. In the absence of any inconsistent ruling or any direction in the opinion of the court of last resort, and in the absence of other controlling consideration, the trial court may accordingly allow supplemental pleadings or amendments in its proper discretion, and, as a necessary result, grant a new trial and proceed to try the case accordingly. Most of the cases on which we understand that the appellant relies are of this class. See City of Winona v. Minnesota Ry. Const. Co., 29 Minn. 68, 11 N.W. 228; Burke v. Baldwin, 54 Minn. 514, 56 N.W. 173; Reeves & Co. v. Cress, 80 Minn. 466, 83 N.W. 443; State v. District Court of Ramsey County, 91 Minn. 161, 97 N.W. 581; North v. Nichols, 39 Conn. 355; Smith v. Sabin, 141 N.Y. 315, 36 N.E. 338. Even in these cases Collins, J., in Burke v. Baldwin, 54 Minn. 514, 521, 56 N.W. 173.
Where, however, the decision of the trial court directing judgment, is affirmed, the ordinary result is that the litigation is ended. The losing party has no right to take a new start in that action, and to try de novo another controversy on the same or any other subject. He cannot thus tack two lawsuits together. He cannot experiment on one theory, and then try another in the same action, if the first is not upheld. This follows necessarily from the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and of res adjudicata. In logical order, the liberality in allowing amendments is greatest at the time the lawsuit is commenced, and steadily decreases as the suit progresses. It finally changes to a strictness amounting ordinarily to prohibition after the matters in litigation have received the normally final sanction of an adjudication by the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the court of last resort. When that affirmance is of the trial court's order for judgment, it amounts to a direction not to proceed to a determination, as in case of reversal on appeal, but to enter the judgment affirmed. The trial court is not, ordinarily at least, justified in allowing an amendment after the case has been submitted and decided. See Hoatson v. McDonald, 97 Minn. 201, 106 N.W. 311. This accords with the general rule that the statutory grounds for a new trial are exclusive. Valerius v. Richard, 57 Minn. 443, 447, 59 N.W. 534. Counsel for defendant has collected many cases in this connection. An elaborate review of the authorities will be found in 6 Current Law, 1039. The conclusion is so obviously and necessarily true that we refrain from incumbering the record with citation of cases.
The control of a court over its own judgments is so nearly absolute that exceptions to this general normal rule may possibly exist. It may be that instances of fraud or oppression connected with excusable mistake or neglect, or of new and substantive facts entitling the successful party to increased recovery, or the like, constitute such exceptions in order that the sanctity of the judgment should not operate as a safeguard to wrong and a barrier to justice. ...
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